Competitiveness---both economic and technological---is vital to deterring great power nuclear war.
Michele A. Flournoy 22, Chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy under President Bill Clinton and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President Barack Obama, also served as served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, “Testimony of Michèle A. Flournoy for the Senate Armed Services Committee”, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC%20Testimony%20Flournoy%20030122.pdf
First, geopolitically, the rise of a more powerful and assertive China, as well as the resurgence of a far more aggressive Russia (as we are witnessing with Putin’s egregious and illegal invasion of Ukraine), is creating a shift in the global balance of power and challenging the post-World War II rules-based order that has been the foundation of international relations for more than 75 years. Authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing are posing new threats to their neighbors and to peace and stability in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Here in the United States, we are experiencing a profound shift of strategic focus from the post-9/11 wars of the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, and global counterterrorism operations) to the increasingly urgent imperative to deter and defeat aggression by these nuclear-armed strategic competitors.
Looking into the longer-term future, the coming decades will be shaped most profoundly by a multidimensional, strategic competition with China -- one that has political, economic, military, technological and ideological dimensions as well as enormous stakes for the prosperity and security of the United States and our allies and partners.
Second, we are experiencing a period of profound -- perhaps unprecedented -- technological disruption. The accelerating development and adoption of technologies like artificial intelligence, 5G, synthetic biology, quantum computing, hypersonics, robotics and autonomy, among others, will transform not only how we live and work but also how militaries fight in the future. Consequently, U.S. forces cannot rest on their laurels and assume that they will remain the best fighting force in the world if they simply implement the current program and budget. Keeping the U.S. technological edge and military advantage in the future will require adopting new cutting-edge capabilities and new operational concepts with much greater speed and scale. In short, we are in a military-technological race with China, and what we do in next five years will do much to determine whether we can successfully deter and defeat their aggression over the next 50.
Third, we cannot ignore the increasingly urgent existential threat posed by climate change. The international community is running out of time to make major changes to both reduce carbon emissions and adapt to inevitable changes in temperature and the environment. Addressing this challenge will require unprecedented degrees of international cooperation, including between the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, the United States and China.
Fourth, all of this is happening at a time when U.S. global leadership has been called into question by events of the past several years. The unpredictability and isolationist tendencies of President Trump created significant uncertainty among allies and partners who depend on the United States as a vital security partner, from Asia to the Middle East to Europe. On top of that, the deep polarization of our society and the January 6 insurrection have shaken confidence in our democracy in some quarters and fueled concerns that we are too internally preoccupied and divided to lead internationally. Just watch the nightly news in Beijing and you will hear a persistent (if erroneous) narrative of irreversible U.S. decline.
In this context, U.S. defense policy must focus first and foremost on deterring aggression by nuclear-armed great powers, focusing on China as the pacing challenge, but not forgetting the importance of deterring further Russian aggression in Europe.
With regard to China, the name of the game is out-competing China without spiraling into crisis and armed conflict. This is easier said than done for several reasons. First, Beijing believes its own narrative of U.S. decline, which in turn risks creating overconfidence and more room for miscalculation. Second, Beijing has had a head start. President Xi has been focused on this competition since he came into office, has consistently made strategic investments in key technologies, in the Peoples Liberation Army, and in extending Chinese influence overseas (from the Belt and Road Initiative to dominating multilateral forums on technology standards setting).
In addition, since the first Gulf War, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gone to school on the American way of war and developed an expanding set of asymmetric approaches to undermine U.S. military strengths and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, including robust antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to disrupt and destroy U.S. networks and thwart U.S. power projection into the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, the U.S. military can no longer assume that it will have the freedom of action that early superiority in the air, space, cyber and maritime domains would allow. U.S. forces will need to fight to gain advantage across these domains—and then to keep it—in the face of continuous PLA efforts to disrupt and degrade U.S. battle management networks. This will require fundamental changes in how we deter and fight.
Overall, I would commend the broad China strategy that the Biden administration has laid out thus far, which emphasizes: 1) investing in the drivers of American competitiveness here at home; and 2) strengthening cooperation with allies and partners abroad who share our interests and, in many cases, our values. The latter can be seen in recent efforts to revitalize and operationalize the Quad (comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), launch the AUKUS initiative, build a more aligned approach with Europe regarding China, deepen bilateral ties with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and show up arm in arm at key international policy and standards-setting forums.