Monetary sovereignty assumes atomized, competitive nation-states
Kotilainen 21 — Konsta Kotilainen, a SYLFF fellow at the University of Helsinki in politics, economics, and philosophy, doctoral researcher, holds a M.A. and B.A in world politics with specializations in Global Political Economy and Global Governance and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki, 2021 (“A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory,” Taylor and Francis Online, March 19th, available online at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343, accessed 07-14-2023) //CD
My third MMT-inspired argument against leaving the exercise of monetary sovereignty solely to the nation-states relates to the wider political economy in which these states operate. As the neochartalists often stress, numerous institutional, judicial, and ideological factors, as distinct from “purely economic” ones, undermine the ability of monetarily sovereign states to take the full advantage of their currency privileges (Armstrong ; Sardoni and Wray ). Many such barriers are supranational by nature. Contemporary nation-states are rarely politically strong enough to coordinate sufficiently effective economic, social, and regulatory policies despite their in principle considerable capacities as monetary sovereigns. Few individual states acting alone are fit to fight the global institutional and ideological forces that constrain their exercise of monetary sovereignty. While even the smallest and poorest of nation-states are not always incapable of benefitting from their sovereign privileges to some limited extent, it is especially hard for them to bact alone against the prevailing global near-consensus on appropriate macroeconomic policy defined by the powerful states, governance organisations, and influential private actors on the scene. As Gill and Law (, 491) argue, transnational capital greatly benefits from the political division of the world into separate, competing, and mostly relatively weak, nation-states. In playing states against each other, economic elites routinely employ the age-old divide et impera strategy. As a result, long-term trends in global political economy are not easily reversed by any single state even within its own territorial borders. For instance, “new constitutional” neoliberalism (Gill , 116–142; Hirschl ), manifested in the evermore-stringent legal constraints on national policies from the 1990s onwards, probably cannot be effectively combatted without cross-border action for new, truly transformative forms of global constitutionalism (Kochi ).