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No backsliding—statistical analyses prove a trend of increasing democratization.

Doorenspleet 19 [Renske Doorenspleet, Award Winning Scholar, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Director, Centre for Studies in Democratization, PhD in Political Science from Leiden University, Postdoctoral Fellowship Completed at Harvard University, “Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective” The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, Chapter 2, Palgrave Macmillan, Springer International, 2019] EAY

The second half of Table 2.3 shows the percentage of countries, classified as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’.37 There is little or no evidence of a democratic recession. To the contrary, the world is far freer today than it was in 1975. Overall, countries are nowadays considerably freer than in 1990, while there has been no clear decline since the mid- 2000s, which is often seen as the beginning of the democratic recession (Levitsky and Way 2015). An analysis of the period between 1995 and 2005 shows that from the ‘partly free countries’ roughly a similar number became ‘free’ on the one hand and ‘not free’ on the other hand (see also Merkel 2010: 28–29). There is a small decline in free countries, as well as an increase in unfree countries after 2005. Still, the number of 41.7% countries which can be classified as ‘free’ in 2015 is very impressive compared to 25.3% free countries 40 years earlier. If we rely on the Polity IV data instead of the FH data, similar patterns can be detected. The upper half of Table 2.3 shows the percentages of different types of political systems over time (1975–2015). This information shows that the proportion of democracies has clearly increased since 1975, while the proportion of dictatorships has clearly decreased. The proportion of hybrid systems has remained quite stable at the global level (see also Fig. 2.1). If we focus on the overall proportion of democracies in the world, the data suggest a positive trend since 1975 (supporting the first view), with stagnation and stability since 2005 (supporting the third view). A global democratic recession or backsliding seems to be an exaggeration, and ‘can neither be supported by figures nor by arguments’ (Merkel 2010: 29); the second view can thus be rejected as a myth or illusion (see Levitsky and Way 2015). The average level of democracy went gradually up from −2.3 in 1975 to 2.6 in 1995 and 4.3 in 2015. Slowly but surely a clear trend towards more democracy can be seen after 1975. So why have so many scholars recently supported the second pessimistic approach? A first answer to this question can probably be found in the excessive optimism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, expecting countries to become democratic overnight, not just in Eastern Europe but also in other parts of the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union generated a widespread perception that liberal democracy was the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). As Levitsky and Way (2015: 45–46) explained it well, those ‘early post–Cold War transitions generated unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism and gloom’. If dictatorships went through periods of crises or instability, then it was seen as signs of democratization processes, but there is no foundation—neither theoretically nor empirically—to assume such an outcome. It is true that the collapse of a dictatorship creates opportunities for democratization. Historically, most endings of dictatorships have not led to democratization though, let alone a stable democratic system (Svolik 2012). Breakdowns may result in different outcomes, ranging from the formation of a new dictatorship (e.g. Iran after 1979), or to state collapse and anarchy (e.g. Libya after 2011). Sometimes, it generates a transition to a minimal democracy (e.g. South Africa and Chile in the early 1990s), but we should not assume that this will necessarily, automatically happen. When the democratization boom in the 1990s is seen as an exceptional phenomenon, the recent developments around the world can be assessed in a more realistic way—not through rose-tinted glasses anymore, but with less expectations regarding successful transitions to democracy. Such a more realistic approach would make us less pessimistic about the recent political developments around the world. The excessive scholarly attention to democratic developments in the USA, particularly recently, might also explain the current pessimistic mood around democratic trends. This focus might be caused by the fact that most influential—and highly cited—democracy scholars are still American or based at American universities, or it might be caused by the fact that the USA is still seen as one of the most important democratic world powers. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the pessimistic approach emphasizes the increasing lack of democratic quality in established democracies. Larry Diamond, for example, wrote that ‘the most worrisome dimension of democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West, including the United States’ (Diamond 2015: 152). Lower popular trust in government, decreasing rates of voter turnout and the receding of democracy promotion as a priority of US foreign policy are all ‘additional signs’ of ‘democratic ill health’ according to this approach, while ‘the world takes note of all this’ giving dictators ammunition to ‘discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against US pressure’ (Diamond 2015: 152). While this might be true to a certain extent, this pessimistic approach conflates the analyses of the proportion of democracies around the world on the one hand, with democratic quality on the other hand. There are certainly signs that the democratic quality of some established democracies is in decline; still, there is no clear reverse trend with numerous transitions away from democracy, and in this regard, the second pessimistic view cannot be supported. Despite increasingly unfavourable conditions in recent years—not just in democracies such as the USA, but also globally, the new democracies have remained strikingly robust (Levitsky and Way 2015).

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