Readiness high- long-term planning
Miller, 19 -- senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
[Dr. James N., PhD, leads a project on preventing war among great powers, former under secretary of defense for policy and department’s deputy for National Security Council policymaking and crisis management; and Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011 to 2012, "Quality Over Quantity: U.S. Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years," January 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190103_military_strategy_spending.pdf
Two years into the Trump administration, there is much to like about the overall direction that former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has taken at the Pentagon. Although we have often been critics of Trump administration foreign policy, there is a clarity and cogency to longer-term defense strategy, reflected most vividly in Mattis’ National Defense Strategy of early 2018, entitled “Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge." That document prioritized great-power competition over the forever wars of the Middle East and South Asia. The shift toward focusing on China’s rise, with economic and diplomatic as well as military tools, had begun in the Obama administration, with the so-called pivot or rebalance to Asia starting in 2011. The changes intensified after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression against eastern Ukraine of 2014, and the promulgation of a “third offset” modernization agenda. But Mattis brought even greater mission clarity—and more budgetary resources—to the Department of Defense. No one wants war with Russia or China. However, to prevent it, intensified efforts to shore up America’s deterrence of these two powers, especially for possible crises or conflicts in Eastern Europe and the western Pacific region, are entirely warranted.