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Readiness solves nuclear war, terror, and WMD prolif but military recruitment is key.

Bonds 17 (Timothy M. Bonds is vice president, Army Research Division, and director, RAND Arroyo Center. Bonds has served as a RAND vice president since 2011. Previously, he was deputy director of the Arroyo Center from 2003 to 2011, acting director from March 2009 to May 2010, and, from 1999 to 2003, director of the Aerospace Force Development Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. Prior to joining RAND, Bonds spent nine years in the aerospace industry, where he led projects to develop high-speed vehicle and weapons concepts. He holds an M.S. in aero/astro engineering from the University of Illinois and an M.B.A. from Washington University, St. Louis. Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need—An Update. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces on March 1, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT466/RAND_CT466.pdf) Garg

Given that our most recent defense plans have not completely anticipated current threats, let’s examine the regrets that the nation might face if it does not meet the commitments we have made to meet those threats. For our first example, what might happen if the United States does not continue its missions to defeat ISIL, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent extremist groups around the world? One potential regret is enduring terror movements that continue to destabilize vulnerable nations and whole regions; harm captured peoples; exploit captured territory to train terrorists, raise funds, and attract new recruits; and export violence to the United States and its allies and friends. It remains unknown whether currently deployed forces are sufficient to achieve U.S. objectives. In fact, the United States has steadily increased troop deployments to Iraq and Syria and extended the mission in Afghanistan. However, this analysis assumes that U.S. ground forces will remain engaged at their current levels against extremist groups in order to continue to degrade them. Therefore, we assume here that these troops could not be pulled away for other operations without ending this mission. It is also possible that countering violent extremists will require more troops if the mission changes—for example, if additional ground troops are committed to combat operations, such as those in Syria and Iraq. Total troop requirements would remain those shown earlier as the worldwide commitments.

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