FGJ is unrealistic and an impossible imaginary and exacerbates harms
Gulker PhD 18 [Max Gulker, PhD, Senior Research Fellow, “The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis,” American Institute for Economic Research, 2018, https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf, accessed 7-23-2023] EAY
5 The Reality of Running a Federal Job Guarantee An employer normally pays an employee because the latter is doing something of value. Under a federal job guarantee, that logic is reversed: the government must find something for ten million or more workers to do because they are being paid. The difference is of great importance. The work handed out under a job guarantee is subject to complex criteria. In the view of the Levy report, these jobs must • Be able to “quickly accommodate new entrants into the program and let them go without disruption should they find alternative employment” • Help low-skilled workers build human capital to “enhance their chances to obtain work outside the program. They will gain work experience as well as on-the-job training.” • In every community, “provide visible benefits, meeting specific local needs” • Put millions to work “without competing for employees or displacing private sector undertakings” or “conventional public-sector work” These points, taken together, are astonishing.14 The work given to enrollees must teach valuable skills, but not so valuable that someone securely employed in the private sector would want to enroll. And while the work needs to result in “visible benefits,” these benefits should not be so great that any firm or government agency would be willing on its own to pay a wage of fifteen dollars per hour.15 The Levy report’s authors see concerns about finding such work as a failure of imagination: Is there really a dearth of useful things that might be done by our unemployed workers? Have we become so blind that we cannot see our failing infrastructure, our understaffed parks with their closed swimming pools and unkempt trails, the unmet needs of our seniors and our children, our polluted ponds and streams that require clean- up, and our low-income housing that would benefit from repairs and insulation? Are we really so unimaginative that we cannot think of a way to match our jobless with paid work tackling the unmet tasks surrounding us? Beyond examples such as these, both reports leave the job guarantee’s implementation, and its feasibility, to the reader’s imagination. The remainder of this section will consider the logistical details of finding and assigning work to over ten million people without the aid of the market, while also meeting the above criteria. While large- scale, centralized proposals can sound good in the abstract, even scratching the surface of the logistics involved shows how they quickly break down, sometimes catastrophically. 5.1 Two Approaches to Finding Work: Local and National Since the work done by job-guarantee enrollees cannot be created by mutual economic opportunity, it must be somehow found through a bureaucratic process. We will assume that the goal of the agency given this task is to find the work with the most value to society. But whether this is done at a local, state, or national level, the process inevitably runs into fatal flaws. Both reports emphasize, to varying degrees, the importance of relying on smaller units of government to administer the program. The Levy Report relies almost exclusively on “communities” (taken here to mean local or county governments) to find and assign work: While we recognize some advantages to designs that feature a federally administered program like the [New Deal program] WPA [Works Progress Administration], we prefer a highly decentralized program. Today, the federal government directly employs only 2.8 million workers (less than 2 percent of US employment). Advocates of a universal job guarantee recognize that the program might employ five times that number of workers. We worry about the political feasibility of expanding federal employment on such a scale. We also see the advantages of decentralizing administration to the community level. Since the goal is to create jobs in every community, and to create projects that are beneficial to every community, it makes sense to involve the local communities in these projects, from the proposal stage through to implementation, administration, and evaluation. The CBPP report is less explicit about who administers its program, but seems to envision a larger role for the federal government alongside input from states and localities: Because of the vital role of state and local governments in providing public workers and services, it is essential that federal agencies and the NIEC [National Investment Employment Corps] are empowered to work closely with these governments. Local and state governments will be encouraged to develop employment proposals in conjunction with community leaders, local government officials, labor organizations, and local residents to ensure the proposals will serve the needs of the constituents and available pool of labor. The employment proposals may not be used to employ individuals who will replace or speed the displacement of existing employees or individuals who would otherwise perform similar work. The program will cover wage, benefits, and material expenses. This structure will largely parallel the direct employment programs under the New Deal, whose projects were developed and proposed by local and state governments. Fostering partnerships and buy-in from local and state partners is critical to the success of but with the hiring and pay decisions already made by mandate, the advantages of a market structure are wiped away. To understand the process of finding and assigning work on a local level, we will look at a concrete example. There are few places where unemployment and its consequences are clearer than Hampden County, Massachusetts, whose 5 percent unemployment rate16 is well above the national average. Home to state capitol Springfield and several other small cities and large towns, Hampden County’s population in the 2010 census was 463,490.17 We estimate18 that under the projections of the CBPP and Levy (upper bound) reports, respectively, the local governments of this county of less than 500,000 people would have to find work for between 17,000 and 28,000 job-guarantee enrollees, between 3.6 and 6.0 percent of the population. As we showed above, these numbers could increase by 50 percent or more during a recession. How would a medium-sized county such as Hampden create work on this scale? The Levy report lists a litany of laudable ideas in the quote above, but how much work would these ideas really create? And how would they fare under the criteria stated in the Levy report? Allow us to consider some of those details by looking directly at the ideas proposed. “Our failing infrastructure” Infrastructure projects have been a favorite of hiring plans since the New Deal (including, to some extent, the current CBPP plan), but the Levy report mostly rejects them out-of-hand: “We would limit the use of PSE [Public Service Employment] workers on infrastructure projects to small-scale projects or for approved apprenticeship or other trainee positions.” There is no evidence that “small-scale” projects would create more than a small number of transitory jobs for the program or provide much value in return. “Our understaffed parks” Online searches do not reveal any discussion of a labor shortage in Hampden County’s parks. The census reports 124 paid employees in Hampden County parks, museums, and historical sites,19 meaning any shortage would be trivial relative to the county’s obligation to staff 17,000 to 28,000 jobs. the program, as localities may be most aware of the skills of their available workers as well projects that will provide the greatest benefit their communities. 5.2 The Local Approach as to The Levy report touts a “highly decentralized” program, federally funded but run almost entirely on the local level. While the authors’ instinct that local governments will have more detailed knowledge about their communities’ needs is correct, they apparently misunderstand the term “decentralized.” In a labor market, employees and employers gather information about each other and each can commence, negotiate, and terminate relationships based on what benefits them most. This decentralized decision-making enables our labor market to process the information necessary to put millions of workers in the right place to create value. The Levy report’s job-guarantee program can better be described as “delegated,” where a decision that has already been made is given to others down the chain of command to execute. This structure may afford some informational advantages in the process of finding and assigning work to program enrollees, 12 The Job Guarantee “The unmet needs of our seniors and our children” Teachers’ aides and elder care are prominent suggestions in both the Levy and CBPP reports. Hampden County public and charter schools employed 4,604 teachers and 2,115 teachers’ aides in the 2017– 18 school year.20 In theory, the county could occupy the time of up to 2,500 job-guarantee enrollees by giving every public school teacher an aide. This is yet another proposal that sounds nice enough until one takes even a cursory look at the details. Does every teacher want an aide? Would the county’s system for handing out work do a good job of finding the best people available for the classroom? And wouldn’t a flood of fully federally subsidized teachers’ aides violate the stated goal of not competing with the current private and public labor markets for paraprofessionals? These details become even more troubling when looking at elder care. Hampden County has more than eleven thousand residents over the age of eighty-five,21 and that number will grow in the coming decade.22 The county currently has just over three thousand home health care workers. Couldn’t they mandate that thousands of job-guarantee enrollees each be assigned as a forty-hour-per-week companion to an elderly person? “Companion” is a more apt term in this instance as current home health aides have essential job-specific skills and are employed by the existing private or public sectors, both violations of the Levy report’s criteria. “Our polluted ponds and streams” According to a 2015 op-ed in the Boston Globe,23 polluted waterways are indeed a problem in Massachusetts. An in-depth analysis of environmental cleanup is beyond the scope of this report, but none of the several fixes proposed in the article appear to benefit from a large number of unskilled laborers. “Low-income housing... repairs and insulation” Hampden County has a sizable amount of low- income housing: 16,670 units deemed “affordable,” including 11,475 that set rent based on one’s income.24 Data on the repair status of these housing units are not readily available, but two points are in order. First, this work, especially insulating, is likely temporary, rather than a source of ongoing labor for enrollees. Second, while low-skill labor may be useful for home repairs, it also likely requires a large presence by managers with construction know-how, again underscoring human capital as a neglected part of both reports’ cost estimates. Adding It Up The sum total of the examples listed in the Levy report’s impassioned plea does not appear to realistically account for more than a few thousand workers, almost certainly less than half of the lower estimate of seventeen thousand workers that Hampden County would be mandated to employ. Finding work for projected job-guarantee programs would be a long and costly process, which cannot be fully replicated in a brief report. The infeasibility of finding work for millions of participants is one of the most frequently levied criticisms against job-guarantee proposals. The fact that proponents have not even attempted to produce a proof-of-concept showing how workers might be deployed is quite telling. There are other ideas such as blight cleanup and community theaters mentioned in the Levy report. We invite the authors to show, in much greater detail, how so many enrollees could be put to work without placing a huge bureaucratic burden on local governments already stretched thin such as those in Hampden County. 5.3 The National Approach The CBPP report also leans heavily on local administration, and therefore must answer the same questions posed above. However, the authors place more emphasis on the federal government to create work and make frequent comparisons to New Deal programs such as the WPA. This approach carries with it an additional set of problems. The invocation of the WPA and New Deal in general is problematic given the vastly different economic circumstances faced by the United States today. The WPA was created in 1935 to provide temporary employment to jobless heads of household, employed a maximum of 3.3 million workers in 1938, and was wound down after the start of the Second World War.25 Public works projects, including road construction, sewers and other utilities, parks, and public buildings, accounted for at least three-quarters of the WPA’s workers. The other quarter or less were in smaller, locally focused projects more like those proposed by the Levy report. The WPA offered temporary relief to those out of work during a national emergency of unprecedented proportions. While debates rage to this day as to the efficacy and impact of New Deal programs, those debates are of limited relevance to our current situation, where unemployment rates are near twenty-five-year lows. The infrastructure-construction projects that dominated WPA employment rolls26 would be more capital intensive than the other ideas put forward in both reports, adding further cost to the program. In addition, the lack of information conveyed by market signals would be compounded by more centralized program management. There is evidence that these issues arose during the years of the WPA itself. That program initially had a tiered wage-and-hours structure like the structure described in the CBPP report, which raised familiar concerns about competition with existing private sector jobs. Officials tried other schemes, including linking wages to those “prevailing” in private sector versions of the same work, and simply fixing hours and wages. These attempted solutions underscore the blunt instruments with which administrators must work when attempting to design a rational system from the top down. Whether nationally administered or delegated locally, it appears that finding and assigning work on the scale both reports propose would quickly turn their vision of a public good into a public burden. But the disruptive effects on the wider economy, to which we now turn, might prove far more burdensome.