Even international degrowth fails – International competition makes coordination impossible as each government tries to circumvent degrowth policies
Kenta Tsuda, March 2021, MPhil/PhD candidate, Harvard Law School, J.D. magna cum laude, 2014; Cambridge University, MPhil, 2008; Brown University, B.A. magna cum laude, 2007 "Kenta Tsuda, Naive Questions on Degrowth, NLR 128, March–April 2021," New Left Review, https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii128/articles/kenta-tsuda-naive-questions-0n-degrowth
Domestic policy is only the start. Degrowthers do not directly address the issue of international coordination, but presumably all large economies would need to contract in order to achieve the required material-throughput reductions. Degrowth in one country is a non-starter. International coordination of degrowth, however, threatens to reproduce the domestic coordination problem within the anarchic dynamics of inter-state politics, where economic magnitude comes armed with military power. It seems likely that every state will aim to maximize its relative position in a degrowth world—that is, to degrow the least relative to other nations. Recognizing this problem, powerful states will then aim to establish an international agreement—a Global Degrowth Pact, say—to constrain each other. The Pact would include mechanisms to monitor and punish defection. Pact members would settle on metrics against which national contraction could be measured. Where national statistics failed to conform to the degrowth schedule, punishment would kick in—escalating economic sanctions, for example.
So much for the Pact on paper. What about in practice? The Pact would need to define criteria for degrowth to be applied to widely varying economies, with each government wanting the discretion to define these for itself. Most would no doubt argue that their proportion of degrowth should be reduced, invoking the degrowth principle of ‘localized growth in the public interest’, or other specific national circumstances. In the absence of determinate public-interest criteria, each government’s claims would be hard to contest. How much contraction is demanded of each nation is likely to take on an arbitrary character, accommodating the will of the powerful rather than optimizing for achievement of ecological targets.
Enforcement would remain a work in progress: states routinely distort national macroeconomic indicators, but under the Pact, the incentives to do so would be magnified. Ministries might send promising junior officials to prestigious universities to sharpen their facility in cooking the books. Governments will deploy this expertise both to dissemble their own numbers and to scrutinize those of other nations. The Pact could also face a further problem endemic to group coordination: defection. Though degrowthers hope to see substantial international redistribution, this might fall short, leaving poorer countries with a still-smaller tax base to alleviate unemployment, homelessness, disease and famine. Their suffering populations might turn to revolution. Responding to popular demands, the new government would modify the ancien régime’s degrowth commitments, or even repudiate the Pact altogether. The larger Pact members might ignore the withdrawal of a microstate, but would be unlikely to countenance the defection of a major power. The response of the ‘international degrowth community’ would be swift and furious: a punitive, exogenously imposed degrowth.