Congressional legislature is shrouded in colonialism. By demanding governmental action, the AFF re-entrenches Puerto Rico in a cycle of colonial violence.
Córdova 08(Nathaniel I., Willamette University American Ethnic Studies Program, Latin American Studies Program, and the Center for Religion, Law, and Democracy. Expert in Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Theory. The Incomplete subject of Colonial Memory: Puerto Rico and The Post/Colonial Biopolitics of Congressional Recollection. The Communication Review. 2008. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10714420801888427?needAccess=true. DOA 7/18/2023)//NPR
The Mnemonic Power of the Law: Establishment of Congressional Memorial Superiority Over That of the Colonial Subject Congress further extended the legitimacy of its recollection by asserting its memorial superiority and establishing an incomplete colonial subject just arriving at the gates of political maturity. Puerto Ricans were (and are) deemed incomplete subjects by virtue of their political immaturity, their inability to resolve their problem of political status. Such incompleteness, combined with the already established congressional authority, marks the subject’s absence of memory and thus “world,” creating an ever-expanding master’s universe in which the subject can participate. This master’s universe is deployed in the registers of congressional memory. Moreover, congressional memory excludes the U.S.’s role in forging a fragmented colonial situation in the first place, but takes the fragmentary nature of the subject’s recollection and pits it against Congress’ own unified “whole and coherent” recall based on access to a legal archive that can re-member selves through officially sanctioned mechanisms like the referendum. The preponderance of institutional and judicial evidence that the Young Act, and the Task Force Report marshall in support of official recollection invests them with a mantle of moral superiority by virtue of their capacious memory, and the sovereign exception to dictate the space of the nation occupied by their unincorporated possession.21 The imprimatur of congressional authority even legitimates its claims to memory over those of its colonial subjects by countering the viability of Puerto Ricans using such documents as the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act (48 U.S.C. 731 et seq.), which some Puerto Rican leaders had rightfully claimed described the relationship between the United States and the island as being “in the nature of a compact, based on the principle of consent,” as memorial touchstone in support of their own recollection (48 U.S.C. 731b): Based upon the present status of Puerto Rico under Public Law 81–600, the Federal courts have ruled that for purposes of U.S. law this arrangement for local territorial government has not changed Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory subject to the plenary authority of Congress under the Territorial Clause; that the right to due process and equal protection of the law applies to Puerto Rico, but this does not include equal enfranchisement in the political process or equal rights and benefits under Federal law as available to citizens residing in the States; that the authority of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is limited to purely local affairs not governed by provisions of the Federal Constitution and Federal laws applicable to Puerto Rico; and that the establishment of local constitutional self-government with the consent of the people was authorized through an exercise of Congressional discretion under the Territorial Clause which is not binding on a future Congress. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 81–600 (1976); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); U.S. v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143 (1993). (H.R. 105–131, p. 13) The tone of the Young Act is one of correcting and disciplining the recollection of its colonial subjects, an approach also clearly seen in H.R. 105–131’s section titled “Puerto Rico’s International Legal Status,” especially in the paragraph noting that, “those who suggest that U.S. diplomats overstated the degree of self-government achieved under the Constitution to get the U.N. to go along may be partially right, but that is why countries submit written statements to clarify ambiguities and set the record straight” (p. 15). Once again, we are reminded of the legal archive upon which congressional memorial superiority is grounded, setting the record straight as to the intent of the United States, and disciplining any counter-memorializing. Official congressional recollection declares not only that Puerto Rico has been a colonial backwater since 1898, but remembers Puerto Ricans as “statutory citizens,” a colonial limbo with no guarantee of protection under the U.S. Constitution unless one of the options provided by Congress is adopted. The language of statutory citizenship emerges as a citizenship class that embodies the “included excluded” status that firmly locates the subject at the margins of the political order, with less than equal rights: While the U.S. citizenship of persons born in Puerto Rico is expressly recognized in the local constitution, the current citizenship of persons born in the territory is not created, defined or guaranteed by the local constitution or the commonwealth structure of local self-government. Rather, the current U.S. citizenship of persons born in Puerto Rico is created and defined by Congress in the exercise of its Territorial Clause power and in implementation of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris. (H.R. 105–131, p. 13) Through this “exclusionary inclusion” Puerto Ricans are thus ambivalently inscribed into the political order arriving at self-determination if and when they choose the course of action provided by the United States. To this end, the Young Act included a provision proposed by Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) which stipulated that in the event the initial referendum was deemed inconclusive and Puerto Ricans chose to continue commonwealth status, another referendum would take place no less than once every 10 years or until such a time when a viable status was selected. Thus, although 1998 conceivably marked the moment at which Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects had finally arrived at the gates of political maturity, it did not guarantee self-determination. The colonial subject remains an incomplete subject until such a time when it remembers to choose properly from a menu provided by the colonial master and Congress deems the choice appropriate. Congressional memory relies on legal doctrine as universalizing discourse, displacing contingency and replacing it with the mnemonic power of the law. Ensconced within the mantle of legal discourse, Congress masks an attempt at “departicularizing” the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, that is, erasing any semblance of localized or concretely situated meaning, by using a barrage of legal detail and technical reference (Alonso, 1988).22 Paradoxically, the law’s mnemonic power also grants congressional memory the appearance of particularity. Not only does the minute level of recollection establish institutional authority, but it numbs us by the sheer weight of its rhetorical prowess. This departicularization or universalization is achieved by diverting our attention to a set of legal specificities, such as Supreme Court decisions and constitutional clauses to which Congress holds privileged access and thus special institutional recollection. Its reliance on the mnemonic power of law grants Congress the semblance of a detached observer, an objective institution through which knowledge of the past flows. As a result, Congress appears as speaking with a unified voice, one that bestows upon congressional memory a sense of normalcy and correctness, what sociologist Ana Maria Alonso refers to as “transparent objectivity” (Alonso, 1988, p. 36). As Alonso also tells us, the “voice” of the “I” who “sees” is that of the observer, an observer who claims to hear the colonial subject’s voice while remaining eyewitness to the past, and thus its sole legitimator (p. 45). As sole legitimator of the past, Congress retains the power to define Puerto Rico’s present and future, prohibiting Puerto Ricans living in the U.S. from voting in the referendum, and demanding compliance with language admonitions for entrance into the union as a state. These demands once again reveal the logic of sovereign exception that suffuses congressional claims to a process of self-determination, reasserting a biopolitical practice that required the locals to subject their bodies and lives to the various demands of the colonial master. The weight of legal precedent displayed in these artifacts, and the exclusion of the U.S.’s responsibility in forging the colonial impasse, coupled with the newly remembered moral responsibility of Congress, and the declarative style in which the Young Act reasserts the U.S.’s national interest, do not countenance any opposition to the U.S.’s authority to act as it sees fit with the island. As Congressman Burton, a member of the House Committee on Resources that initiated H.R. 856, oxymoronically noted during the first hearings on the Act, “If the Puerto Rican people choose to maintain Commonwealth status, turning away from self-rule, we as a Congress will maintain the supreme administrative control of the island” (Young Act Hearings Report: #105–16, 1997, p. 4). In essence, Rep. Burton’s comment was an invocation of traditional authority which sought to establish itself, as Hannah Arendt’s dictum in the introduction to Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations reminded us, as sovereign: “Insofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition, it possesses authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, it becomes tradition” (Arendt, 1969, p. 38). Hence, Congress’s memorial superiority, buttressed by the mnemonic power of the law, and by the vision of the incomplete memory of the colonial subject now finally arriving at the gates of political maturity, grants Congress, the Young Act, and the proposed referendum as sites of remembrance, an unapologetic aura of tradition, authority, and full sovereignty over the incomplete subject of colonial memory that it constitutes, and which inhabits an indistinct zone of exception in a U.S. post-colonial imaginary. Congress takes great pains to make sure its authority is firmly established by asserting their right and authority under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution to determine federal policy and resolve issues of self-determination for the island. Of foundational value among the historical claims is the recognition of congressional authority over Puerto Rico as stipulated in article IX of the Treaty of Paris and thus in U.S. Constitutional law: “under the Territorial Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the authority and responsibility to determine Federal policy and clarify status issues in order to advance the self-determination process in Puerto Rico” (H.R. 856, Part 2, 12). Although claims to authority do not culminate with this next passage in the Young Act, titled Authority of Congress to Determine Status, it is perhaps the most telling of them all: Since current unincorporated territory status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not a permanent, unalterable, or guaranteed status under the Constitution of the United States, Congress retains plenary authority and responsibility to determine a permanent status for Puerto Rico consistent with the national interest. (H.R. 856, Part 6, 3)