Prefer Congress--courts comparatively fails to safeguard minority rights
Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ
Taken together, this combination of historical reminders and contemporary experience makes plausible to many that political majorities in the United States cannot be trusted to respect the rights of at least these minorities. But what about courts? Does history or experience give reason to think that judges do better? Here, Ely, like many before and since, calls to mind various moments when the Supreme Court was indeed protective of relevant groups. Recalling heroic moments from the Court’s history—with heavy emphasis on Warren Court classics like Brown and Gomillion v. Lightfoot88—Ely offers examples of the Court acting in the rights-protective role he recommends and, more importantly, conjectures and predicts judges will actually perform. Here again, for mainstream liberal audiences, Ely’s reminders are mostly superfluous as the Warren Court’s legacy is what grounds that group’s confidence, or at least faith, in the judiciary.89 Add to this more recent examples of protections for LGBTQ persons afforded by the otherwise reactionary Roberts Court, and belief in the importance of judges in protecting minorities from the political branches of government grows further still.90 Ely acknowledges, of course, that the Court’s record in these areas is flawed, criticizing, for example, the Rehnquist Court’s rights-restrictive tendencies.91 The moments of rights protection that do occur—even as the Supreme Court moved further right—are enough to warrant the assumption that courts are on balance better. Liberals follow suit in adopting this view even today. If Ely’s argument is best understood as historical in nature, the question is, then, how does his history hold up? This is really two separate questions: First, is his depiction of the Warren Court correct, and second, is it generalizable across time so that it authorizes Ely’s conjecture in different historical circumstances? Ely’s suggestion that the history of the United States is one of persistent discrimination against political minorities is beyond question. Indeed, as recent scholarship has highlighted, the histories of discrimination widely taught in this country are, if anything, woefully incomplete.92 Nonetheless, Ely’s portrayal of the judiciary’s role in that history of discrimination is itself conveniently partial. In addition, the implicit comparison Ely makes between judges and more politically accountable branches of government, and legislatures in particular, is misleading. First, the comparison at issue for Ely is between judges and elected officials. For that comparison to be informative, though, one must hold all other relevant factors fixed, including, among other things, jurisdiction. Suppose, for instance, that certain state elected officials prove reliably less attentive to minority interests than do federal judges. In that scenario, one might be learning less about the difference between elected officials and judges than between state and federal officials. And, indeed, many of the historical examples favorable to Ely fit precisely this schema. The vast majority of the civil rights cases from the Warren Court era that involve judicial intervention see the Court declaring unconstitutional various state laws.93 So too with more recent favorable examples like Obergefell v. Hodges.94 To be sure, the mere fact that it is federal judges negating the actions of state elected officials does not make these cases irrelevant for purposes of institutional comparison. If, for example, federal judicial interventions were prompted by the unwillingness or inability of federal elected officials to act, such cases could still teach us something about the comparative tendency of judges and elected officials to countenance bigotry.95 As it turns out, though, in many of the cases just mentioned, federal judicial decisions were anticipated or supplemented by federal action, especially federal legislation. And in many of those cases, it is at least plausible that it was federal legislation that had the greater impact in counteracting discrimination—with Brown the most widely discussed example.96