Court prioritizing the elite—it historically prefers the protection of affluent minorities over racial/political minorities.
Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ
Third, discussions of rights, including Ely’s, typically center on how well courts or elected officials attend to the interests of political minorities and other vulnerable groups most mainstream liberals regard as deserving of constitutional protection.107 Hence, for Ely, the discussion builds from the idea of “discrete and insular” political minorities articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,108 and then goes on to consider the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and the like.109 As previously mentioned, whether it is beneficial to assign protection of these minorities’ interests to courts or elected officials is itself a difficult question. What complicates the matter even further, though, is that by so limiting the discussion, we miss that authorizing courts to protect the interests of these minorities and other groups opens the possibility of judicial protection for undeserving minorities as well. As Evelyn Atkinson recounts,110 for example, the extension of Fourteenth Amendment protection to Chinese immigrants in Yick Wo v. Hopkins111 was intimately bound up with the granting of Equal Protection rights to corporations in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.112 The Court would rely upon both sets of precedents during its Lochner era, invalidating swaths of legislative protections for workers on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.113 More recently, in a series of First Amendment decisions, the Court has construed commercial and political speech doctrine to insulate corporations and affluent individuals from disclosure requirements,114 political spending constraints,115 and restrictions on the sale of consumer information.116 Add to this the use of free speech doctrine to undermine unionization,117 and the “weaponiz[ation]” of the First Amendment becomes clearer still.118 Whether the Court’s history of affording protections to wealthy, powerful minorities outweighs whatever aid it has secured to political minorities deserving of protection is, again, complicated and not something we can hope to settle here. For present purposes, the claim is simply that by empowering courts to protect politically disadvantaged minorities and other vulnerable groups, courts are simultaneously empowered to determine which minorities and groups are deserving of protection. And, as even the brief sketch above shows, courts have, as a historical matter, very often and very consequentially gotten it wrong—at least from the perspective of liberals.