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Only the CP solves—congress is comparatively more progressive and durable than court

Doerfler and Moyn’22[Ryan D. Doerfler is a professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. Henry R. Luce is a professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School; Professor of History at Yale University.]Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, April 21, 2022, https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2022/04/the-ghost-of-john-hart-ely//HZ

Ely’s conjecture flies in the face not merely of the under protection of racial and other minorities, but that the empowerment of the court more regularly leads to the protection of minorities who do not deserve it. Taking stock, the intuitive appeal of Ely’s first conjecture depended upon both conflating state and federal officials and omitting affirmative harms done by courts to minorities and other vulnerable groups. With these clarifications, it becomes far from obvious that officials insulated from majoritarian pressures are less bigoted than those who are not. By itself, that should be enough to make mainstream liberals open to institutional experimentation since the obviousness of Ely’s conjecture was what made judicial empowerment seem like the “safe” course of action. Adding to the ledger the aid courts have provided for wealthy minorities, legislative empowerment should seem to liberals at least somewhat safer. Either way, the key claim is that attention to the full history of judicial (and legislative) activity makes liberal confidence in the judiciary completely untenable. As admirable as the Warren Court may have been, it gives liberals no reason to place faith in the judiciary as an institution. Assuming, though, that liberals come away from this historical account not yet convinced of the superiority of legislatures but merely uncertain, the question becomes how, under conditions of uncertainty, to decide between judicial and legislative empowerment. Here, it becomes critical to attend not only to the relative tendency of judges and elected officials to afford protections to minorities and other vulnerable groups but also to the type of protections each of those actors has been disposed to afford. Most significantly, federal courts in particular have, for various reasons, been mostly unwilling or unable to recognize and enforce positive rights for minorities and other vulnerable groups, opting systematically for negative rights instead.119 Most visibly, “[f]or nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not secure ‘positive’ rights to governmental aid,”120 rejecting constitutional arguments for, among other things, state-financed abortion,121 special scrutiny for policies disadvantaging disabled persons,122 and increased funding for schools in low-income districts.123 During that same period, legislatures have provided, through ordinary legislation, contraception at no cost to patients,124 guaranteed access to places of public accommodation for disabled persons,125 and direct payments to low- and middle-income parents, among many other positive guarantees.126 As we use those terms, “positive” rights are guarantees by the state to bring about some material outcome, whereas “negative” rights are promises by the state not to bar the pursuit of that outcome through “private” transactions. So construed, a “positive” right to abortion would, for example, require that the state make abortions available at minimal or no cost to the patient, while a “negative” right would require only that the state not prohibit the procedure, leaving financing and accessibility to contracting individuals. As different scholars have noted, even the implementation of negative rights involves affirmative measures by the state—a federal right to abortion, understood negatively, requires the availability of judicial proceedings to challenge state and local ordinances that conflict with that right.127 At the same time, for any given right, we think it remains helpful to ask whether that right is understood as positive or negative.128 And when it comes to the rights that typically concern us, like those to abortion, racial equality, or freedom of speech, courts have been reluctant to interpret those rights positively, in notable contrast to legislatures. What accounts for courts’ comparative apprehension to recognize and enforce positive rights? Domestically, the U.S. Constitution is widely regarded as, in the words of Judge Richard Posner, a “charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”129 This pervasive understanding, especially among judges, is grounded partly in a contestable history according to which the principal concern of the Framers was government overreach as opposed to state inaction.130 So too, the narrative continues, the drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments “sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental services.”131 Apart from such historical claims, domestic courts offer institutional reasons to be wary of judicial recognition and enforcement of positive rights. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit significant disparities in per-pupil expenditures within public schools, reasoning in part that judicial “interference[ ] with [a] State’s fiscal policy” is presumptively inappropriate because judges “lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.”132 Similarly, in Maher v. Roe, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require state funding of “nontherapeutic” abortions, explaining that the “decision whether to expend state funds” on such procedures was “fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply divided,” and that for “policy choices as sensitive as those . . . the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.”133 Taking stock again, if mainstream liberals came away from the historical discussion unsure whether to empower elected officials or courts, a commitment to real freedom of choice points toward elected officials. Because courts are more hesitant than elected officials to recognize positive rights, theirs is a world in which abortion remains practically unavailable for poor women and many women of color, despite fewer legal prohibitions of the procedure. Similarly, explicit racial segregation of residential areas and schools has been supplanted by effective segregation through geographic migration and zoning policies. Put slightly differently, given the relative hesitancy of courts to recognize positive rights, empowering courts over legislatures has the effect of prioritizing the minimization of express legal barriers to individual choices over the guarantee that everyone is in a real sense able to make these choices. The reason is that courts’ ability to recognize and enforce negative rights is one and the same as the power to set aside positive rights afforded by legislatures. Practically speaking, this means that for every Griswold v. Connecticut,134 there is a Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.;135 for every Brown, the Civil Rights Cases, and so on. The result is a world with fewer immediate legal barriers to contract, but also one with fewer persons having real opportunity to choose. In sum, the intuitive appeal of Ely’s narrative that courts are more protective of “discrete and insular” minorities (however those are identified136) and other vulnerable groups depends on attending to the help that empowered courts provide but not to the concomitant harms. This is, of course, not to say that courts never provide help. Particularly in moments when public sentiment takes a reactionary turn, a judiciary appointed during a prior moment will likely act as a modest bulwark against the manifestation of those reactionary sentiments in government policy. The question, though, is whether minorities and other vulnerable groups on the whole fare better under a regime of judicial supremacy. And as this Part suggests, there is no reason to believe that courts are systematically more attentive to the interests of vulnerable populations generally speaking. Worse still, courts’ unwillingness or inability to recognize and enforce positive as opposed to negative rights puts a depressingly low ceiling on the sort of freedom judicial empowerment might achieve.

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