Court won't overrule Chevron now - at worst, they'll narrow it - Roberts is moderating the court in this area
Posner’ 2023[Cydney Posner, the blog’s author, served as co-chair of Cooley’s public companies practice from 2006–2016. For four consecutive years, she has been named a Top Author by JD Supra in its Readers Choice Awards for her authorship of Cooley PubCo, a blog that produces dynamic thought leadership and curated content for public companies. In 2020, she was selected as a National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Directorship 100 Honoree: Governance Professionals and Institutions.], Will Chevron deference survive? Why you might really care about a case about fishing, May 11 2023, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6578c521-8fa7-4199-bae2-42181e9bf2e4/HZ
On May 1, SCOTUS granted cert in the case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a case about whether the National Marine Fisheries Service has the authority to require fishing vessels to pay some of the costs for onboard federal observers who are required to monitor regulatory compliance. So why is this relevant to public companies? Because one of the questions presented to SCOTUS was whether the Court should continue the decades-long deference of courts, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to the reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies (such as the SEC). The doctrine of Chevron deference, articulated in that case, mandated that, if there is ambiguity in how to interpret a statute, courts must accept an agency’s interpretation of a law unless it is arbitrary or manifestly contrary to the statute. The decision, expected next term, could narrow, or even completely undo, that deference. Of course, the conservative members of the Court have long signaled their desire to rein in the dreaded “administrative state.” (See, for example, the dissent of Chief Justice John Roberts in City of Arlington v. FCC back in 2013, where he worried that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”) But, in recent past cases, the Court has resolved issues and avoided addressing Chevron. This case, however, may well present that long-sought opportunity. Depending on the outcome, its impact could be felt far beyond the Marine Fisheries Service at many other agencies, including the SEC. SideBar Does that 2013 statement portend that Roberts will take the same position 11 years later? Perhaps the Court’s recent decision regarding Auer deference may be instructive. You’ll recall that Auer, often viewed as complementary to Chevron, stands for the proposition that courts should defer to the reasonable interpretations by agencies of their own ambiguous regulations (in contrast to laws, as in Chevron). In his dissent in City of Arlington above, Roberts also said that “[o]verturning Auer would be a modest but important check on ‘the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.’” But, in 2019, in Kisor v. Wilkie, to the question of whether SCOTUS should overturn Auer deference, the Court, with Justice Kagan writing the majority opinion and Roberts as the swing vote), said no. Auer deference, she wrote, was “rooted in a presumption about congressional intent—a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities.” But, the key is that it doesn’t always apply, and that determination requires a nuanced analysis. As Kagan summarized, the “upshot of all this goes something as follows. When it applies, Auer deference gives an agency significant leeway to say what its own rules mean….But that phrase ‘when it applies’ is important—because it often doesn’t.” As she explained, while Auer “gives agencies their due,” it also obligates “courts to perform their reviewing and restraining functions.” In the end, the decision took care “to reinforce the limits of Auer deference, and to emphasize the critical role courts retain in interpreting rules.” Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the portions of Kagan’s opinion regarding stare decisis and the limitations on Auer, thus making a majority to retain Auer. But several of the Justices made clear in concurrences that they would have been happy to bid farewell to Auer and, as Justice Gorsuch wrote, viewed Kisor as simply a “stay of execution.” Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, in a separate concurrence, believed that Auer “should be formally retired.” Roberts wrote “separately to suggest that the distance between the majority and Justice Gorsuch is not as great as it may initially appear.” So will the Court take the same middle path in Loper Bright? Hmmmm. Importantly, for this purpose, in his concurrence, Roberts took pains to distinguish Chevron, emphasizing that “[i]ssues surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress…. I do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.” Kavanaugh also agreed with Roberts with respect to the inapplicability of that