The facial differences between the Insular Cases and Vaello-Madero provide a cover for continual colonial domination in the name of self-government and international stability. Judicial sanctioning of the weaponized exclusion of territories shows the America’s role in racialized and systemic violence, genocide, and war.
Rana 20 – Law Professor at Boston College Law School
Aziz Rana, Expert on American Constitutional Law and Political Development, “How We Study the Constitution: Rethinking the Insular Cases and Modern American Empire,” Volume 130 Yale Law Journal, 11/02/20,
Engaging with the Insular Cases thus provides critical insights into central transformations in settler ideological and institutional practice during the early twentieth century. But beyond that, it also allows us to appreciate how basic constitutional adjustments helped set the stage for the increasingly dominant form of American power in the twentieth century—what I call U.S. imperial primacy. Today, U.S. citizens tend not to see their country in a story of demographic displacement and settler conquest. They also do not understand themselves as overseeing a global set of colonial dependencies. In many ways, this is because of the set of ideological choices made by governing elites about the basic direction of power in the wake of both the Spanish-American War and the Insular Cases.
As Justice White himself noted, while it might be politically necessary for the federal government to have the discretionary power to pursue a global footprint, this did not mean that it was always strategically wise to maintain foreign colonies. Indeed, more and more defenders of annexation, including to some extent Teddy Roosevelt himself,47 concluded that actually trying to replicate Britain or France would be unwise. To begin with, the United States had appeared on the global stage at a decidedly late moment, after the most valuable colonial possessions had already had been claimed. This fact limited the usefulness of direct possessions as a symbol of national power or as a means for asserting American global dominance. Moreover, the experience of actually trying to hold dependencies following the Spanish-American War also cautioned against future colonizing adventures.
Atrocities on both sides marred the fighting in the Philippines, with the American army resorting to the large-scale use of torture as well as the construction of “reconcentration camps.”48 Rural populations were forcibly garrisoned as part of what historian Paul Kramer describes as a policy aimed at “the deliberate annihilation of the rural economy”49 through “the destruction of villages,” “the burning of rice stores,” and “the killing of livestock”50—all of which led to mass starvation, disease, and death. Stories about the U.S. Army’s atrocities circulated throughout the American press and even led to a Senate investigation initiated by Massachusetts Republican George Frisbie Hoar in the first half of 1902.51 The result was an environment at home in which critics like Mark Twain, who had always been wary of annexation, wondered aloud, “why[] we have got into a mess, a quagmire from which each fresh step renders the difficulty of extrication immensely greater.”52 To underscore the point, Roosevelt’s declaration of an end to hostilities was itself in Kramer’s words, “a beleaguered fiction that broke down in unflattering reversals: by 1905, parts of the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Cavite, and Albay would be returned to military authority due to continued Filipino resistance.”53
In a sense, this reality spoke not only to the United States’s late arrival as a colonial power but also to the increasingly transformed nature of international relations at the dawn of the twentieth century. The era witnessed the beginning of sustained anticolonial resistance across the globe, of which events in the Philippines embodied only one example. As the great African American activist, writer, and critic W.E.B. Du Bois declared of the new age, “T[he] problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”54 What Du Bois presaged was the coming demise of formal colonial empires, a development that defined the world order by the mid-century. But even at this earlier moment, nonwhite political assertiveness emphasized the pitfalls of being ensnared in expensive and costly colonial wars.
In this way, global realities suggested a new mode of international engagement. Rather than directly controlling territory, the United States would assert constant economic and military power abroad. It would open new markets for American domestic goods and intervene wherever chaos supposedly threatened U.S. interests. Over time, it became increasingly clear that such primacy—within the Western Hemisphere and then eventually across the world—did not require extensive colonial dependencies and was justified in the name of global self-government and stability. It drew from classic European colonial discourses the notion that American supervision and tutelage was essential to the proper exercise of local self-rule. The thought became that the United States, even if not formally the political sovereign, nonetheless provided a benevolent hand steering weaker and later decolonizing nations in peaceful and prosperous directions.
Crucially, this transition in imperial understanding had two striking effects. To begin with, it cast American power in a far more inclusive light than the traditional terms of settler politics. Defenders of global expansion had been confronted at home by anti-annexationist arguments premised on race and xenophobia. And abroad, they increasingly faced a rising nonwhite world profoundly opposed to explicit white supremacy.55 All of this led politicians and government officials to stress the universal benefits of American primacy—the commitment to a world order of formally sovereign and equal polities. And for the United States to create such a world—of self-governing, constitutionally-respectful, and capitalist nation-states—as Justice White himself implied in Downes, war-making and coercive control could not be lasting features of the international order. Of course, the stated commitment to local sovereignty did not mean that expansionists were unprepared for tutelage to fail and thus for American authority to reassert itself on the ground. Still, the logic of U.S. power—the focus on establishing liberal constitutionalism and market capitalism—as well as both global realities and the stringent ethnonationalism of domestic opponents shifted the emphasis toward a more inclusive international vision.
Second, this transition in imperial understanding made the previous debates over annexation moot. As the twentieth century proceeded, both sides, by and large, could agree on the aim of American power, which involved imposing order on a disordered globe, and on its means, consisting of economic expansion as a general rule and the application of military force where necessary. In many ways, governing elites increasingly saw the future of American global power as an extension of the long-standing Monroe Doctrine, introduced in 1823 by President Monroe during his seventh State of the Union Address to Congress.56 Under the doctrine, any attempts by European states to colonize land in the Americas or to develop spheres of influence would be seen by the United States as acts of aggressions justifying intervention. This foreign-policy approach sought to undermine two checks on American power in the region. The first was the continuing commitment of European empires to sustain an economic and political monopoly over Latin America. The second consisted of efforts by local governments to close their doors to U.S. business or to limit external supervision of their economies. In effect, the Monroe Doctrine imagined American imperium as an economic and military sphere of influence, in which international stability was profoundly wedded to the promotion of American commerce with non-European societies.
During much of the nineteenth century, this account of economic expansionism stood side-by-side with the more dominant picture of empire as settler conquest. Yet, with the end of the frontier and in the context of destructive efforts to create formal dependencies (especially as illustrated in the Philippines), the Monroe Doctrine increasingly articulated the rise of American global assertiveness. It came to be associated with an “open door” foreign policy, and especially with Secretary of State John Hay’s 1899 and 1900 notes on U.S. relations with China.57 It also underscored a critical new logic for American interventionism. Since capitalist markets required specific institutional arrangements in non-European countries, continual interference to transform local societies into mirror images of the United States were justified.58 The United States therefore enjoyed an international police power to replace existing modes of authority with institutional structures marked by centralized political and economic power, private property, and wage labor.
In a sense, the American imperial experiment in Puerto Rico and the Philippines (not to mention Guam and other territories) became both a model for the future as well as the historical artifact more commonly presented. On the one hand, U.S. officials chose not to pursue further colonial possessions. But on the other hand, the 1898 experience spoke to the importance of imagining American power in terms of creating a stable world of self-governing republics. And the Insular Cases were a significant moment in constitutionalizing an aggressive foreign policy organized through a centralized state. They bestowed on the federal government far greater discretionary power. While Downes largely located such power in congressional hands,59 the practice of continuous and increased interventionism steadily shifted this authority to the presidency. In effect, the new imperial politics of American primacy laid the groundwork for an expansive executive, which could act flexibly abroad to quell disorder and impose capitalist democracy. Eventually, against the backdrop of World War II and the Cold War, the perceived need for permanent action led to the entrenchment of a massive new national security framework, complete with a peacetime structure for gathering intelligence, the elevation of the policymaking responsibility of military officers, and the dramatic growth of executive agencies tasked with issues of defense.60 As a result, by the mid-twentieth century, an increasingly unified administrative apparatus had replaced the relatively decentralized institutions of nineteenth century settler expansion. If the United States did not possess a European-style colonial empire, it nonetheless developed an analogous bureaucratic infrastructure in pursuing its own global ambitions.