The plan does not itself resolve the political status of the territories or eliminate the imperial yoke. But it DOES directly repudiate the Court's Constitutional sanctioning of colonial domination and gives rise to the vitally important political project of a reckoning with U.S. imperialism.
Ponsa-Kraus 22, George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History at Columbia Law School
[Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, June 2022, the George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History at Columbia Law School, o-editor of Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution, and the author of several articles and essays on the constitutional implications of American territorial expansion, served as a law clerk to Judge José A. Cabranes on the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and to Justice Stephen G. Breyer on the Supreme Court, “The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories,” Yale Law Journal, ] /RS
Suppose the Supreme Court overrules the Insular Cases. Then what?
The territories would still be territories. They would still be subject to U.S. sovereignty and Congress’s plenary power under the Territory Clause. They would still be denied voting representation in the federal government. But the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories would finally be erased from American constitutional law. Permanent colonies would no longer have the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
On the question of which constitutional provisions apply in the unincorporated territories, little, if anything, would change. The “entire” Constitution would not apply to them then, either. To cite just the most obvious evidence in support of this proposition, the provisions governing representation in the federal government would still exclude the territories, as they always have.
The phrase “United States” in the Uniformity Clause would now include them. But as noted earlier, that provision does not foreclose the differential treatment of territories under Congress’s plenary power even with respect to uniformity, as the Court’s decision in Binns demonstrated just a few years after Downes.398 Recall that Binns relied on Congress’s plenary power over all territories to uphold the imposition of excise taxes that would otherwise have violated the Uniformity Clause, on the ground that the resulting revenue benefitted Alaska. The Court could employ analogous reasoning to uphold programs that benefit the territories today.
The Citizenship Clause would surely include the territories, though in my view it does already, and only a distorted version of the already erroneous standard account could lead to a different conclusion, as it did in Tuaua and Fitisemanu.399 As for other constitutional provisions, we have seen that the Insular Cases themselves recognized the applicability of fundamental limitations on Congress’s power in the unincorporated territories. Whether these include jury-related provisions would depend on how the courts chose to analyze the question of whether these rights are fundamental in the territories—a question courts could answer with regard to the relevant legal context, as they already do in the states.400
Finally, the disappearance of the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories need not affect the United States’ power abroad. Recall, a majority of the Justices in Reid itself recognized this, though Justice Harlan was not among them. Rejecting the relevance of the Insular Cases to the application of the Constitution in foreign territory, they found a way to answer the question before them without reliance on those decisions.401
So what would change? No longer would a constitutional challenge involving a territory trigger a suspension of the laws of constitutional physics. No longer would the doctrine of territorial incorporation haunt constitutional challenges involving the territories, muddling matters and engendering a confused and confusing jurisprudence. No longer would cases involving these territories bestow a patina of legitimacy upon their patently illegitimate status. No longer would perpetual colonialism have the endorsement of the federal courts.
Advocates of repurposing, “focused on the functional goal of maintaining indigenous practices, may argue that the benefit of ending legal subordination is too abstract compared to the tangible protection that repurposing the Insular Cases may bring.”402 And it is true that overruling the Insular Cases would not concretely require Congress to do anything specific at any particular time. However, as I have shown, repurposing the Insular Cases has not actually brought the territories any tangible protection that could not be achieved without them.403 Meanwhile, a decision overruling them would be an event of momentous symbolic significance, which would shine a light on the territories’ subordinate status and draw attention to Congress’s responsibility for it. For the people of the unincorporated territories, who have no voice in the federal government, and who are largely invisible to the rest of the United States, a strong statement by the Supreme Court rejecting the constitutionality of their indefinite subordination would be no small thing.
And what would become of the territories? My hope is that the Court’s definitive rejection of the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories would give rise to an American reckoning with the reality of U.S. imperialism that would, in turn, lead to the demise of perpetual colonialism in the United States. Or to put it in more concrete terms, my hope is that in the course of definitively rejecting the doctrine of territorial incorporation, the Court would bring attention to the plight of the territories while reviving and endorsing the understanding that, under the U.S. Constitution, territorial status must be temporary because it subjects people to U.S. sovereignty and federal laws while denying them representation. I suspect it is too much to hope that the American public would finally become aware of the territories. But perhaps it is not too much to hope that such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court would go a long way toward eroding the insidious message of constitutionally sanctioned subordination that the Court’s failure to overrule the Insular Cases sends instead. And perhaps, in the wake of such a decision, U.S. officials charged with governing and administering the United States’s colonies would feel that much more pressure to bring democratic legitimacy to the United States’s relationships with the territories.
For better or worse, territorial self-determination cannot become a reality without action from the political branches of the federal government. On the better side of the ledger, a widespread consensus exists even in the federal government that it is up to the people of the territories to decide where their decolonization should lead. Their options include statehood or independence, with or without free association404—or the United States could amend the Constitution to provide for a noncolonial form of asymmetrical federalism that genuinely protects alternative forms of sovereignty without sacrificing equality and representation.
The reason to overrule the Insular Cases is not, however, to resolve the political status of the territories, which the Court cannot do. It is to end the proposition that the unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional zone. Again, doing so would have the salutary twofold effect of reining in the purely teleological and poorly reasoned jurisprudence engendered by that proposition, while withdrawing once and for all the Court’s implicit imprimatur from the outrageous notion that a U.S. territory can remain a territory forever—notwithstanding the flagrant political illegitimacy and shameless hypocrisy of a representative constitutional democracy that allows itself, in perpetuity, to govern a people without representation.
The fact is that not even Justice White, who originally insinuated the doctrine of territorial incorporation into the Court’s jurisprudence, went so far as to endorse indefinite territorial status explicitly. On the contrary, in the closing passages of his concurring opinion in Downes, he did the opposite, albeit in characteristically racist-imperialist terms:
[I]t is lawful for the United States to take possession of and hold in the exercise of its sovereign power a particular territory, without incorporating it into the United States, if there be obligations of honor and good faith which, although not expressed in the treaty, nevertheless sacredly bind the United States to terminate the dominion and control, when, in its political discretion, the situation is ripe to enable it to do so. Conceding, then, for the purpose of the argument, it to be true that it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution for the legislative department, in the exercise of its discretion, to accept a cession of and permanently hold territory which is not intended to be incorporated, the presumption necessarily must be that that department, which within its lawful sphere is but the expression of the political conscience of the people of the United States, will be faithful to its duty under the Constitution, and therefore, when the unfitness of particular territory for incorporation is demonstrated the occupation will terminate.405
Even Justice White understood that it would be wrong for the United States to subject a place and its people to territorial status indefinitely. Even the doctrine of territorial incorporation, as qualified in this closing passage of White’s troublesome concurrence, rests on the assumption that the political branches have a constitutional duty to ensure that territorial status will not go on forever. If there is any proposition in the Insular Cases worth preserving, it is this one.
Exposing the linkages between the Insular Cases and ongoing jurisprudence shows the continuities between the settler past and civic present. Puerto Rico's judicially sanctioned dependence reveals how ideals of America as a “liberal” nation are simply a guise for its latest implementation of imperialism. The 1AC rejects Cold War-era constitutional theory and engages a new analytic attentive to the strengths AND limitations of judicially managed reform.
Rana '20 [First;11-02-2020; Aziz Rana is an American legal scholar and author who currently serves as Richard and Lois Cole Professor of Law at Cornell University specializing in American constitutional law ; "How We Study the Constitution: Rethinking the <i>Insular Cases</i> and Modern American Empire," ]
Returning to the Insular Cases thus provides two critical insights about the nature of the American constitutional project and about how constitutional law has largely been studied in recent decades. On the constitutional project more generally, to the extent that commentators engage with the settler-colonial past, the overwhelming tendency is to treat this past as a previous historical period. Slavery and land expropriation may have been evils from an earlier era, but, especially over the course of the twentieth century, American legal practice and political identity fundamentally shifted to that of a more liberal and inclusive nation. There may be sins that have to be addressed, but, under this view, it is a basic mistake to think of the country still in settler terms.
Such a profound shift no doubt has occurred, and the United States of today is not the United States of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Insular Cases highlight the deep continuities between the presumptive settler past and civic present. The legal decisions and political events around the Spanish-American War and the war in the Philippines offer critical connective tissue between the two defining logics of American empire—settler conquest and global primacy. They highlight how, as the basic ideological and institutional terms of American life changed, these changes still projected into the future key elements of the settler foundations. There are populations that continue to this day to experience direct colonial subjugation, from Native peoples throughout the country to local communities specifically in the territories. The post-1898 debates around annexation and the meaning of American international authority also illustrate continuities—even under profoundly revised ideological terms—with respect to who actually wields economic, political, and cultural power. For all the changes, the Insular Cases and the emerging terms of global assertiveness spoke to how classically privileged American insiders were able to preserve their basic institutional status within the society—one that increasingly embodied a completed settler project—while at the same time asserting greater dominance abroad. This means that those two driving logics of empire cannot be thought of as distinct historical periods: colonial settlement followed by the American Century. They are deeply interlinked and fold into one another rather than marking clear breaks or ruptures in time.
Indeed, one way to think about the persistence of Puerto Rico and other territories as colonial dependencies even in the twenty-first century is that they emphasize how the country’s driving legal and political identity may have shifted from a settler to a liberal or civic nation, but the roots still persist. As protests in the summer of 2020 underscore,61 the country has never properly confronted its colonial infrastructure or its imperial legacies, whether at home or abroad.62 Thus, any frank engagement with the nation’s constitutional project requires a colonial assessment. As a matter of constitutional reform, this means ending the colonial status of all the existing territorial dependencies, in line with the genuine political desires of local and self-determining communities. More generally, what is needed in the present is a constitutional conversation that includes the types of policies that have been the heart of independent movements abroad—from sharing sovereignty with Native peoples and land return to reparations, systematic wealth redistribution, structural reforms to state security and policing apparatuses, truth commissions, and providing judicial avenues for the remedy of colonial crimes. These concluding paragraphs are not the appropriate setting to assess the practicality or wisdom of each of the above policies, let alone the particular form that they could take. But, for our purposes, what is interesting is that such reforms—alongside the writing of new constitutions entirely—have been essential to the constitutional politics of anticolonial struggles elsewhere.63 Yet, only at rare moments64—whatever the potential problems of transplantation from the Global South to the U.S. context—have any of these reforms even been genuinely discussed in this country. Moreover, the main thrust of American constitutional study largely ignores all of them as relevant to the conceiving of the legal-political order.
Therefore, the effort to link American constitutionalism and the American empire necessarily also requires assessing the field of constitutional law itself. In many ways, the modern field is deeply bound up with the rise of the United States to superpower status. For much of American history, law schools did not treat the study of the U.S. Constitution as an important part of their curriculum, let alone their mission. Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell’s curricular and pedagogical model, which spread in the late nineteenth century and became the standard across elite law schools, focused especially on private common law—subjects like contracts, torts, and property—through a case-method analysis of appellate judicial decisions. If offered at all, constitutional law was almost always an upper-level elective.65 It was only in the late 1920s and 1930s that constitutional law became a required course at most law schools.66 This move was part of a general recognition of the centrality of the modern administrative state to legal practice, and so went along with a growth in public law offerings as a whole, particularly administrative law.67 But even so, given law school’s primary focus, “Legal luminaries during the first half of the twentieth century, Roscoe Pound . . . , Karl Llewellyn . . . and others,” as Mark Graber notes, were “best known for their writings” on private common law subjects, and “[t]he most celebrated work of legal scholarship during the decades before the Second World War, Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), [was] devoted almost entirely to how justices make decisions in nonconstitutional cases.”68
In fact, it was only during the Cold War that the constitutional scholar emerged as perhaps the law school’s preeminent public face. As Graber writes of the contrast before and after World War II, “Legal luminaries during the second half of the twentieth century [were] best known for their constitutional analysis” with “virtually all law professors with any name recognition outside of law . . . scholars of” the Constitution.69 As I explore in Rise of the Constitution,70 there were various reasons for this development. Among them, public constitutional discussion and analysis increasingly moved from a matter of institutional design—whether to drastically reform the judiciary or have a Senate at all—to a relatively narrow concern with court cases and textual interpretation, the natural expertise of the lawyer. But one of the features of this shift was that the field gained preeminence within the legal academy at just the time that the United States consolidated its own global standing as a world hegemon. And not surprisingly, the constitutional law professor that came of age during the early Cold War tended to take as given and even to embrace the existing terms and overall legitimacy of this hegemony.
Thus, it is not just that constitutional practice needs to assess the broader society’s colonial infrastructure. To the extent that scholarship remains bound to the analysis and disputes of Cold War constitutional theory, moving beyond those constricting parameters is equally key. This means that constitutional law must expand its “canon,”71 as Sanford Levinson called for two decades ago, to cases that highlight the continuing imperial logics of collective life. But in a sense, the present moment—marked by institutional dysfunction and popular discontent—speaks to the need for scholars to approach their work with far greater creativity than simply adding new cases at the margins. The field must engage with matters well beyond the debates driven by twentieth-century judges and the conditions that Cold War constitutional theory—and by extension the American Century—set for “judicially managed reform.”72 We currently have a mode of constitutional study that largely takes for granted the version of U.S. legal-political design and the rights discourse cemented during the American Century. It rarely reflects on, especially in the classroom, how either came to be and mostly treats established structures as almost natural and inevitable political objects. Of course, constitutional scholars have a responsibility to teach students how to operate as lawyers in a courtroom and thus on the terms presented by the existing law. But to a profound extent, constitutional law is not just the technical training of lawyers. It has also become a central repository for the country’s broader cultural memory and consciousness about its legal-political processes and institutions.
This latter reality underscores the need for a new mode of analysis, one no longer the product of that very American Century and so capable of critically assessing existing institutional and ideological terms. What is the actual relationship between the structure of the constitutional state and the exercise of colonial rule at home and abroad? What are the strengths and limitations of judicially-managed reform as a mechanism for actual colonial accounting? Despite the fact that the study of the Constitution is supposed to be about foundational matters of legal-political life, in truth fundamental questions about the basic organization of American state and economy have played only a minor role in the mainstream of the field. Any serious grappling as a constitutional matter with the realities of U.S. imperial power requires ending this evasion once and for all.