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The 1AC reveals the limits of law and the Fourteenth Amendment, rupturing redemptive narratives and inflecting constitutionalism with a critical understanding of the contingency of "progress." We must be realists, NOT nihilists.

Young 19, Alston & Bird Professor of Law at Duke University

[Ernest A. Young, former Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law, one of the nation's leading authorities on the constitutional law of federalism, active commentator on foreign relations law, focusing on the interaction between domestic and supranational courts and the application of international law by domestic courts, writer on constitutional interpretation and constitutional theory, “Dying Constitutionalism and the Fourteenth Amendment,” Marquette Law Review, 3-1-19, ] /RS

III. THE LESSONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

I promised at the outset that if you walked with me through the dark valley of the Fourteenth Amendment’s early decades, we would come out the other side with some insights about constitutional theory. I did not promise, however, that they would be sunny or uplifting. For me, the lessons of the amendment’s years of failure are as follows.

To begin, this is at least in part a story about the limits of constitutionalism itself. Importantly, I do not simply mean the limits of judicial review. Judicial review doesn’t come off that well in my story, but neither do political-branch actions or popular constitutionalism. After what is still the most devastating war in American history, Americans tried to resolve the central issue of that war—the oppression of black Americans—through a flurry of constitutional creativity that had not been seen since the Founding and has not been equaled since. The resulting amendments, in and of themselves, failed to do what their framers set out to do. They could not prevent the condition of the freedpeople from deteriorating radically after the withdrawal of Union troops from the South.144 And they did not achieve real progress until the country itself had changed, nearly a century later. You cannot change basic social conditions simply by changing the Constitution.

One might think this to be simply a problem with the subset of constitutional principles that purport to be “redemptive” or “aspirational” in nature. And surely it is easier to constitutionally entrench a state of affairs that has already been achieved than it is to move the social mountain by ratifying words on paper. But the story of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the subsequent reassertion of racial oppression involves a failure not just of the aspirational amendments but of any number of other constitutional principles. For example, the original constitutional structures of federalism and separation of powers, designed to mediate conflict and preserve liberty, failed of that mission both before and after the war. Conflict over race is the central drama of our national story, and when push came to shove, constitutionalism was unequal to it.

To that cheery observation let me add another: This is also a story about the limits of constitutional methodology. Much debate in constitutional law proceeds as if by getting the methodology right, we could perfect American constitutionalism and guarantee good results. But it’s hard to see how any methodology would have helped all that much in confronting the hostile environment into which the Fourteenth Amendment was born. As I’ve suggested, originalism offers no solace here. The basic point is that any methodology can be conducted well or poorly, and as far as I can tell, interpretive methodologies generally do not themselves do much to ensure excellent rather than miserable application. My aim here is to say something about how the history I’ve canvassed might encourage living constitutionalists to do their job well rather than poorly.

The first thing that living constitutionalists need to get straight is that there is nothing inevitable about moral progress. The use of organic metaphors such as “evolving meaning” can cause us to confuse constitutional development with natural processes that may have some sort of direction hardwired into them. Sometimes living constitutionalists seem to acknowledge that progress is not inevitable. Jack Balkin, for instance, states that “[a] story of constitutional redemption is . . . a story of contingency” that “does not claim that the eventual redemption is assured. It claims only that we should strive to achieve it.”145 Yet most living constitutionalist accounts of our history have an optimistic, onward-and-upward feel to them. Professor Balkin does not seem to recognize that the very title of his book—Constitutional Redemption—dovetails precisely with the name that the nineteenth-century Redeemers who reestablished white supremacy, had for their constitutional project.

To overcome this myth of inevitability, living constitutionalism needs a sense of tragedy. This may be the great contribution that the Fourteenth Amendment’s lost years can offer to constitutional law. C. Vann Woodward made a similar point about what the South had to offer America more generally. Writing before Vietnam, Professor Woodward proposed Southern history as an antidote to the “American . . . legend of success and invincibility.”146 He noted that “Southern history, unlike American, includes large components of frustration, failure, and defeat”:

An age-long experience with human bondage and its evils and later with emancipation and its shortcomings did not dispose the South very favorably toward such popular American ideas as the doctrine of human perfectibility . . . . For these reasons the utopian schemes and the gospel of progress that flourished above the Mason and Dixon Line never found very wide acceptance below the Potomac during the nineteenth century.147

In this sense, ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment is the Constitution’s South. It’s the part of the Constitution that failed (before rising again to something better). It brings to constitutional law “[t]he experience of evil and the experience of tragedy”148 needed to remind us that moral progress is not inevitable, that social forces can push constitutional meaning in bad as well as good directions, that living can turn into dying constitutionalism if we are not very, very careful.

I don’t have much to offer beyond this. I doubt that there is some identifiable methodological tweak that can guard constitutional interpretation effectively against the possibility that history may move in the wrong direction. If we let the movement of history into interpretation—as opposed to history’s state at an originalist snapshot in time—then we let in the contingency that comes with it. What I am suggesting is that constitutional culture may be more important than constitutional method when it comes to hanging on to constitutional values. I think we need to change the culture of living constitutionalism if we are going to prevent future tragedies, like the dying constitutionalism of the Fourteenth Amendment’s lost years.

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