Express overrule is key. Keeping cases of this kind results in continuing harms--socially, legally, and ethically--even when they are allegedly "overruled in the court of history."
Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)
Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 //MS
In many respects, the moral makeup of long-dead generations is virtually unrecognizable today. Yet through the medium of precedent, lapsed cultural values continue to enjoy legal authority in the present. This Part explores the complex relationship between doctrinal stasis and ethical change. In doing so, it first highlights the continuing harms that repugnant precedents can cause. It then proposes specific methods of implementing well-grounded conceptions of aversive ethos.310 These recommendations may not satisfy proponents of strict judicial modesty. But they respect the Court’s conventions of repudiation—unlike the court-of-history approach—and would facilitate far more satisfying “ethical” overrulings than would rigid adherence to the canonical stare decisis factors.
A. The Stakes of Stasis
In the foregoing inventory of anachronistic precedents, some readers will perceive a call to action. But others will see a menagerie of slumbering monsters best left unprodded. It is not self-evident that the Court should take aim at its most culturally obsolete decisions. If Congress is not actually enacting racist immigration laws, and states are not actually imprisoning vendors of American flags, why bother dredging up ancient curiosities? Any proponent of eliminating archaic precedents must confront this seeming tension: if a decision is truly inimical to modern values, it is unlikely to be causing significant harm. Likewise, the more harm a decision is causing, the less likely it is to be ethically outmoded.
These generalizations will often hold true; and when they do, passivity may well be the better approach, all things considered. But a blanket attitude of noninterference risks devolving into complacency. Precedents can be worth phasing out even if they are not actively generating unsavory policies. This Section identifies a range of factors to consider in deciding whether formal repudiation would be the wisest course for any particular decision. For these purposes, I distinguish between ongoing harms and ongoing risks of harm. The latter grouping builds upon Justice Jackson’s evocative warning that Supreme Court precedents can “lie[] about like a loaded weapon,”311 supplying ready-made judicial sanction for tragic or misguided governmental actions.
a.
1. Ongoing Harms
Property and Power
Supreme Court precedents premised on Native Americans’ racial inferiority are directly responsible for the current distribution of property entitlements and regulatory authority. These decisions enabled the federal government to inflict incalculable harm on the continent’s original inhabitants by wantonly expropriating their lands and sharply limiting their preexisting sovereignty.312 The justices no longer refer to tribal members as uncivilized savages, to be sure. But several Indian-law doctrines predicated on such vile assumptions enjoy continued effect through the routine application of precedent.313 The Court has never confronted whether these doctrines could be wholly justified apart from aged stereotypes that “look[] far more like propaganda than fact.”314
Likewise, five U.S. territories are currently governed in a colonial fashion due to white-supremacist apprehensions at work in the century-old Insular Cases. Those decisions authorize Congress to hold indefinitely as “unincorporated- rated” territories315 any possessions deemed unready to be governed “accord- ing to Anglo-Saxon principles.”316 The resulting political subordination has blocked territorial residents from addressing grave economic woes through consent-based tools of self-governance.317 And current law’s dual-tiered system of constitutional protection has enabled Congress to disqualify these residents—most of whom are American citizens—from receiving much-needed forms of federal financial assistance.318
b. Expressive Degradation
The persistence of unjust precedents can inflict ongoing dignitary harms. Much like archaic state constitutional provisions319 or racially restrictive covenants that remain formally unexpunged,320 such cases—whether through their reasoning or their results—send exclusionary signals to historically marginalized members of society. These decisions espouse a civic vision of whiteness as “our race,”321 of nonheterosexuals as “sexual deviate[s],”322 and of indigenous peoples as “semi-barbarous.”323 As Professor Jasmine Harris has remarked, Buck v. Bell in particular “broadcast a lasting message to those with disfavored bodies . . . that their societal value lies not in their lives, but in their deaths.”324 It was to guard against further expressive degradation that President Ford formally rescinded the executive order implicated in Korematsu decades after its final victims were released from confinement.325
Importantly, these harms are experienced personally and elude easy measurement. The Court cannot safely assume that century-old holdings reinforcing antiquated gender roles will not inflict fresh wounds on account of their formal survival. Nor are the justices in any position to discount the pain felt by territorial residents who learn that the Supreme Court ostensibly regards them as members of “alien races.”326 Cases that seem obscure to most practicing lawyers likely linger as hurtful reminders within communities still struggling for justice, power, and recognition. Very real dignitary benefits could result from clarifying that these odious relics no longer express official truths about our political life.
c. Doctrinal Incoherence
Among current justices, it is uncontroversial that precedents whose underpinnings have “eroded over time” may qualify for overruling.327 This tenet reveals a shared aversion to doctrinal contradiction. The persistence of warring premises dilutes the law’s integrity, risks practical and pedagogical con- fusion, and undercuts the perceived capacity of principle to shape legal outcomes. It should come as no surprise when culturally archaic precedents also turn out to be “mere survivor[s] of obsolete constitutional thinking.”328 A desire to straighten out existing doctrine—independent of any ethical umbrage—may thus counsel repudiation of some of the precedents featured in Part III. Courts have already identified several acute tensions attributable to the formal persistence of these decisions.329