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Maintaining the cases risks abuse of Constitutional precedent to fit political motivations.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 //MS

As a nation, we are not on a constant upward trajectory. “Memory is short, political leaders change, and history may repeat itself.”330 Perhaps the most acute danger posed by repugnant precedents is that governmental actors will convert artifacts of legal history into tools of ongoing oppression. This concern should not be overstated—ethical shifts do real deterrent work, conditioning most elected officials not to stray from America’s deepest unwritten commitments. But politicians also play an active role in shaping and reshaping those commitments. As our political marketplace continues to coarsen, policies that had become unthinkable may regain traction in public discourse.331 Even cherished norms can erode—especially if persons seeking to undermine them can claim a grounding in positive law. In this way, surviving Supreme Court precedents may enable malefactors to redraw ethical boundaries by downplaying those boundaries’ very existence.332 And it takes only a single nonconformist actor to make these risks a reality.

The legacy of Korematsu is instructive. Few precedents have been so roundly vilified in modern times. Even so, then-candidate Trump supported his proposed ban on Muslim immigration by citing the example of Japanese internment, claiming that “[w]hat I’m doing is no different than FDR.”333 Although the more apt analogy would have been to the law upheld in Chae Chan Ping,334 this remark reveals the potential of repugnant precedents to ease ethical backsliding. Such decisions may also stir dormant demons during times of crisis. Shortly after 9/11, a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights warned that another terrorist attack by nonwhites would produce “a return to Korematsu”—“you can forget civil rights in this country.”335 And an attorney in the White House Counsel’s office privately suggested that race-based profiling at airports might be valid under Korematsu.336 Even today, Hirabayashi could be invoked to facilitate the “mass targeting . . . of undesirables.”337

In short, it is never safe to assume that governmental actors will refrain from wielding authorities that existing law confers on them. This risk may be especially pronounced in the American legal system, whose apex court has admonished lower tribunals to follow its precedents until explicitly instructed otherwise.338 In situations governed by the decisions examined in Part III, courts have often applied them faithfully—if under protest.339 And lower courts’ detached descriptions of existing doctrine suggest that some judges might choose to apply, rather than distinguish, even the Court’s most ignominious holdings.340

Remedial realities may further heighten this sense of permission. Under qualified-immunity doctrine, actors contemplating the implementation of a repugnant precedent have little to fear from suits for money damages. It is difficult to see how a practice’s unconstitutionality could be “clearly established”341 if the Supreme Court has explicitly declared that it passes constitutional muster.342 And it would likely take multiple years for a legal challenge to wend its way through the judicial process before any adverse ruling by the Court. These dynamics should not be ignored in predicting whether politicians will ever exercise powers that ostensibly attach to their offices.

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