The 1AC spotlights the vital importance of competing modes of Constitutional interpretation. The question of Puerto Rico's status should be for the Puerto Ricans, but struggles over what the American Constitutional order ought to look like and be like are essential. The plan rejects conservatism and cramped originalism and in favor of a living constitutionalism.
Bayonet 22[Gabriel Prats; 2021-2022; The author is a third year law school student from the Inter American School of Law. ; "Vaello-Madero: Putting on Hold Equal Rights for Territorial Citizens," Revista Juridica de la Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico 56, no. 1 (2021-2022): 39-71//JJB]
The prima facie legal interpretation of these cases, particularly in Puerto Rico, invariably leads to the discussion of the island's territorial status and the intense debate over the most plausible political path that can be taken to improve the Commonwealth's current state of self-governance. This is a mistake, not because the island's status is not important, but rather it dismisses the importance of these cases from a constitutional point of view. Whether it be statehood, an improved Commonwealth, or independence, the question of Puerto Rico's future status in relation to the U.S. must be decided amongst Puerto Ricans. It is not within the Court's province to decide Puerto Rico's ultimate political status. Yet, these cases highlight fundamental questions of how Congress should treat U.S. citizens residing in the territories, and the interplay of constitutional law with modern standards of equity and fairness, which are vastly different from those present during the time of the Insular Cases. Even considering the conflicting internal political views of the current members of the Supreme Court, one would expect that the American legal system would recognize that a change for the better is warranted. These cases represent legal milestones in the pursuit of equitable treatment for U.S. citizens living in the territories through an expansion of the frontiers of federalism. However, the cases also represent a curtailment of territorial power, such as the power to establish territorial bankruptcy procedures or to prosecute criminal acts. After the Vaello-Madero hearing, it was apparent from the variety of issues argued that the outcome would most likely come down to how the Supreme Court justices interpret the Territorial Clause and the power it delegates to Congress. In other words, there was a growing idea that the case would be decided on the merits by either an originalist analysis of the Territorial Clause or by using a Living Constitution approach to conform with the reality of territorial policy. Ultimately, the latter was discarded. A. Originalism Originalism is the legal doctrine that holds that the Constitution should be interpreted as originally understood at the time it was adopted by the Founding Fathers adopted it.134 Originalism has historically taken many routes in the constitutional analysis of legal texts. However, modern originalism can best be 134 Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 909, 910 (1998). 2021-20221 63 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. attributed to conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1 35 In the words of Justice Scalia himself. Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself. And the principal defect of that approach that historical research is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive will, unlike nonoriginalism, lead to a more moderate rather than a more extreme result. The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values so that as applied, even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end up as something of a compromise. Perhaps not a bad characteristic for a constitutional theory. Thus, nonoriginalists can say, concerning the principal defect of originalism, "Oh happy fault." Originalism is, it seems to me, the librarian who talks too softly.1 36 In matters relating to Equal Protection under the Constitution, Justice Scalia understood that: [T]he function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively higher degrees. For that reason it is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. 137 B. Living Constitutionalism On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Living Constitution perspective distances itself from originalism by arguing that the provisions of the Constitu135 Id. at 910-11. 136 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989). 137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 64 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tion should be interpreted to conform to present societal needs.1 38 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., renowned for his progressive constitutional interpretations, stated that: [T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.1 39 The Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause have been a particular target for living constitutionalists, but this has been the very subject of external and self-criticism of the doctrine altogether. As Professor Ernest A. Young put it: [I]t is essential that living constitutionalists understand the downside risks that come with any evolutionary model of constitutionalism. Living constitutionalism needs a cultural shift, based on a sense of tragedy, to temper its progressive optimism. Progress can and does happen, but it is by no means inevitable, and sometimes constitutional law goes to hell in a handbasket. That is what happened in the Fourteenth Amendment's first seventy-five years.14 0 In regards to Due Process, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a known swing voter during his time on the Supreme Court,14 embraced the notion that: Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 4 2 138 Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1456, 1457 (2001). 139 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 140 Ernest A. Young, Boden Lecture: Dying Constitutionalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 952 (2019). 141 Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25 (2007). 142 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). See also Id. at 60-61. 2021-20221 65 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. This doctrine is usually linked with judicial activism or "judicial legislation," 143 a phenomenon many argue is justified ever since the days ofMarbury v. Madison,144 when the Court said: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." 145 C. The clashing doctrines in the Vaello-Madero decision The Vaello-Madero case presented a clear instance where both of these doctrines of constitutional interpretation were adopted, as Justice Sotomayor's dissent drastically changed the approach on how equal protection is viewed in the territories. The present Supreme Court is undoubtedly a conservative one, thus it was foreseeable that the approach that was most likely going to prevail is the originalist doctrine. As the doctrine stipulates, the majority approached the text of the Territorial Clause and how it interplays with the Due Process provision of the Fifth Amendment with respect to an unincorporated territory of the Union. Though, this question leads to much deeper queries, as Justice Gorsuch observes in his concurrence, 146 the Supreme Court rested on Congress' rationale to exclude Puerto Rico from SSI benefits for mostly economic reasons, barely elaborating on the fundamental right of due process when it applies to U.S. citizens living in the territories. In other words, the majority adopted an originalist approach more focused on the political backlash of extending these federal benefits to Puerto Rico vis-a-vis the criticism that other States of the Union might raise towards Congress in response. While the living constitution doctrine seemed like a viable alternative to resolve this case, considering the historical underpinnings of the Insular Cases, it cannot be denied that those particular cases were a prime example of judicial activism in the early 20th century. These were times when the prevailing societal views of national and ethnic minorities were significantly different, as the priorities of the U.S. government were purely set on expansionist policies. It can be argued that the Insular Cases were essentially seals of approval for both the Executive and Legislative branches to validate the disparate treatment of the minority groups that lived on the recently acquired territories. The doctrines of territorial incorporation from Downes and express incorporation from Balzac had nothing to do with the textual interpretation of the Constitution. Nowhere in the Consti143 Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and the Living Constitution, 42 DAYTON L. REV. 257, 262 (2017). 144 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 145 Id. at 177. 146 Vaello-Madero, --- S.Ct. at 14 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 66 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tution is there an instruction guide to determine when a territory is destined for incorporation and how that affects the interpretation of how fundamental rights ought to apply differently to American citizens living in these territories. 14 7 Thus, just as the Court incorporated these doctrines via judicial activism under the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, the present Vaello-Madero case should have been decided utilizing the same route, only this time applying the modern standards of fairness and justice. Yet, this was not the case. Justice Sotomayor's dissent was a textbook example of what the opinion would have looked like if this approach was followed. The legislative intent on excluding Puerto Rico from the SSI program cannot be rationally based on the Territorial Clause, a clause that the very Insular Cases interpreted bestow only temporary powers upon Congress to take the necessary measures to organize them:1 48 in particular, as Justice Sotomayor conveys, in a territory with no voting power in Congress.149