No uniqueness – Chevron gets struck down now
Dempsey et. Al. 5-24, Financial Services lawyer and advocate
[Leah Dempsey, Elisabeth Esposito, Eric Waeckerlin, William McGrath, Bella Wolitz, Rosa Baum, Leah Dempsey was vice president and senior counsel for federal advocacy at ACA International, "Chevron Deference on the Chopping Block? Supreme Court to Hear Case That Could Change Landmark Precedent," Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, 5-24-2023, ] /RS
Several sitting Supreme Court justices have indicated a willingness to narrow or even strike down the Chevron doctrine. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has written that Chevron rests on the “fiction that ambiguity in a statutory term is best construed as an implicit delegation of power to an administrative agency to determine the bounds of the law.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 286 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Brett Kavanaugh has criticized Chevron for encouraging administrative agencies to aggressively pursue policy goals unless “clearly forbidden” by statute. Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2016). And in dissent to the court’s denial of certiorari in Buffington v. McDonough, 143 S. Ct. 14, 18–19 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), Justice Neil Gorsuch opined that pursuant to the framework imposed by Chevron, “[r]ather than provide individuals with the best understanding of their rights and duties under law a neutral magistrate can muster, we outsource our interpretive responsibilities. Rather than say what the law is, we tell those who come before us to go ask a bureaucrat.” Other Supreme Court justices have also criticized the Chevron doctrine or taken the position that clear statements from Congress are required for major regulatory programs. Brownstein wrote about one example, regarding West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) here. Another example includes Dep’t of Transp. v. Assoc. of American R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 61 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
Chevron is getting overturned or limited means DA is inevitable
Gilley et al. 5-02[Craig A.;05-02-2023; Craig represents investment and private equity companies, providing transactional and compliance support to ensure that both their acquisitions and ongoing investments fully comply with regulatory requirements. ; "Supreme Court to Hear Case That Could Overrule Chevron and Curtail Administrative Agencies' Ability to Regulate Broadly," ]
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed to review Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a direct challenge to Chevron deference. A decision in the case could either overrule Chevron altogether, or alternatively narrow the doctrine to clarify that statutory silence is not the same as ambiguity and therefore an implied grant of virtually unfettered agency authority. Either way, a decision in the case is likely to constrain federal regulatory agency action going forward.
The case involves a challenge to a rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce) that requires the fishing industry to pay for the costs of government compliance observers on commercial fishing boats, even though the authorizing statute itself is silent on cost reimbursement. After the DC Circuit upheld the rule in the face of the statutory silence based on Chevron deference, the fishing companies challenging the rule asked for the Supreme Court to overrule and/or reevaluate the scope of Chevron.
One of the most important principles in administrative law, Chevron deference was coined after the landmark 1984 Supreme Court case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and involves the level of judicial deference given to administrative actions, particularly rulemakings.
At its most basic level, the doctrine stands for the proposition that where there is ambiguity in the underlying statute, courts should defer to reasonable interpretations by the agency implementing the statute and adopting supporting regulations. In those circumstances, courts should not substitute their own preferred interpretations.
The question for a court is not whether the agency's action was correct or best but only whether the agency's action was reasonable. The permissiveness of the current doctrine has given administrative agencies wide berth when crafting administrative regulations, thereby making it a target for those critical of certain regulations or of the growth of the administrative state.
On Monday, the Supreme Court justices agreed to take up Loper to address the Chevron deference issue. The specific question to be addressed is "whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency." Oral argument will likely occur next fall, with a decision by spring 2024.
The grant of certiorari here could be a harbinger of a major change in administrative law by this time next year, as there was little reason for the court to grant the case (there is no circuit split for example) other than to reevaluate Chevron. Indeed, most of the court's conservative justices have previously signaled a desire to curb the power of the administrative state by rolling back Chevron. While the writing was on the wall that something like that was coming, the timing right now in this case is a bit of a surprise.