The Alt is faux-radicalism. The relevant question is no longer interpreting but changing the world, which requires actual diagnosis of how to most effectively intervene in it.
Thompson’23[Michael J. Thompson is Professor of Political Theory at William Paterson University. He is the author of The Politics of Inequality (2007), The Domestication of Critical Theory (2016), and, most recently, The Specter of Babel: A Reconstruction of Political Judgment (2020).]Michael J. Thompson, THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL THEORY, https://vdoc.pub/documents/the-palgrave-handbook-of-critical-theory-7bg8cf7vs3r0/HZ
Such an approach obviously questioned “scientific socialism” with predictions of inevitable proletarian revolution and its “objective” emphasis upon the economic “base” as against the state, ideology, and the more “subjective” elements of the “superstructure” (Korsch 1970: 72). From this standpoint, indeed, political economy appears once again as the “critique of political economy”—as Marx subtitled Das Kapital—while the totality, or “ensemble of social relations,” turns into the crucial category and target for a transformative enterprise. Elements of the “superstructure” such as the state or ideology thus no longer appear as epiphenomena of the base but rather evince their unique dynamics and importance for practice. Insofar as new social relations are introduced, which can never occur in a single action, freedom is also no longer identified with any “system.” Marxism subsequently turns into a “method” grounded in history and needing constant revision rather than being an inflexible dogma. Truth also loses its purely scholastic status: it is no longer a matter of interpreting the world but of changing it—as Marx noted in his famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach—and critical theory, if it is really unique and radical, must contribute to that enterprise. Answers to philosophical questions no longer remain confined within epistemology, logic, or philosophy proper; instead the point of reference is “human practice and the comprehension of that practice” (Marx 1969: 13). The aim 1This chapter complements an earlier study of mine, Bronner (2002). 18 S.E. BRONNER is to link the principles and interests of different and often conflicting agents of change and, in the process, demonstrate how they are shaped through the given historical context in which they emerged. Marxism is thus no longer simply about the practices of the bourgeoisie or other enemy classes but rather the changing politics of the proletariat. Or, to put the matter more boldly, Marxism rests on “the application of the materialist conception of history to the materialist conception of history itself” (Marx 1969b: 92). Critique of working class politics (or that of any oppressed group) thus becomes an integral moment of radical theory. The result is what might be termed an antiphilosophy. Intellectuals and activists within the socialist labor movement had often called this or that claim of Marx and Engels into question. So, for example, Rosa Luxemburg attacked their support for the national self-determination of Poland; Eduard Bernstein questioned prevailing beliefs in the inevitable collapse of capitalism; and Rudolf Hilferding noted the need for an ethic to buttress “scientific socialism.” But Western Marxists engaged in an immanent critique of the problematic identified with what was popularly understood as Marxism. Its “orthodox” stage theory was called into question along with its reliance on the economic base, and the “inevitability” of the proletarian revolution. But there is a danger in caricaturing the supposed dismissal of class “consciousness” and human agency by the original socialist labor movement. Social democracy’s proletarian public sphere kept workers busy with cultural, social, and political tasks. Max Weber termed it a “workers’ world” and proletarian “consciousness” spoke to the “inevitability” of revolution, achieving reforms, and building working class solidarity through the Second International. For orthodox Marxists between 1890 and 1914 in Europe, these three criteria were unified.2 Social democratic parties were growing rapidly throughout the continent and battles for economic reforms were underway in the short-run even while the working class awaited “the day” on which it would conquer political power and substitute liberal republics as for the reigning monarchical regimes. Optimism about the coming revolution complemented assumptions about international proletarian solidarity. This was all destroyed by the “great betrayal” in which social democratic parties supported their respective nationstates in mobilizing their military forces for World War I. Something had clearly gone wrong: Orthodox Marxists had anticipated war among imperialist powers and some even suggested that revolution would prove a logical consequence. But their social democratic parties never acted on these insights. The revolutionary moment was rendered irrelevant or, more generously, simply taken for granted. Ideology was never treated as what Karl Korsch termed a “lived experience” that shaped political practice. Not only did this undermine proletarian resistance to nationalism and the war effort but, just as importantly, it made the entire social democratic enterprise seem unalterably staid and bureaucratic (both to the minority of workers on the far 2Note the discussion in Bronner (2011, 1ff). CRITICAL THEORY AND RESISTANCE 19 left and the majority of radical intellectuals) once the Russian Revolution took place in 1917. Lenin seemed to have been right all along. Already in 1902, he had insisted that the proletariat would only demand economic reforms if left to its own devices and that the existing mass party was not suited to revolutionary action. A vanguard party of professional revolutionary intellectuals was required to inject the requisite political consciousness into the proletariat from “outside” its ranks. Lenin and the Bolsheviks now appeared as the genuine heirs of Marx and the Paris Commune. Republicanism made way for their reliance on slogans like “All Power to the Soviets!” as a utopian “wind from the East” was felt by grunts in the trenches of the war-torn West. Occurring in an economically underdeveloped state with a glaring minority of workers, moreover, the Russian Revolution was viewed as a product of indomitable revolutionary will or what was then called “voluntarism.” It also seemed that the “totality” was being transformed during the “heroic” phase of the revolution or what was known as “war communism.” These were the years of rationing and civil war when money was abolished (though the ruble was worth nothing anyway); soldiers elected their officers amid civil war (though the Red Army was being built from the ground up); communal housing was being erected (though there was a shortage of private dwellings); and avant-garde cultural experiments of all kinds were underway (Bronner 2012: 107ff). The old world was dying and the new was not yet born and, within the historical context, Lukacs insisted that one could remain an “orthodox” Marxist even if all Marx’s predictions were proven wrong so long as the “totality” served as the point of theoretical reference and the target of revolutionary transformation (Lukács 1971: 1–2). It was no longer a matter of finding the right citation justifying this or that action or belief but rather applying Marxism to transforming capitalism in its given context. Revolution no longer meant simply nationalizing property, introducing a republic, and privileging enlightenment values—as was the case with social democracy. The entire “inverted world” (Hegel) of the commodity form now seemed ripe for transformation. Class consciousness not “objective conditions” would prove “the decisive step” for the proletariat no longer to exist as the mere “object” of capitalist exploitation and instead recognize itself as the “subject” of revolutionary action capable of controlling the now alienated and reified world that it had created. To this extent, abolishing its existence as a mere cost of production and overcoming its alienation would enable the working class to become (with a nod to Hegel) the subject–object of history. Praxis became the foundational concept. Its origins were in France where, following the legacy of Louis-Auguste Blanqui, anarcho-syndicalists like Georges Sorel employed it to justify “direct action” against the state and their attack on the “abstract theory” popularly associated with official Marxism since the time of Bakunin.3 This antitheoretical (or, better, antireflective) 3Note the excellent discussion in Krausz (2015, 306ff). 20 S.E. BRONNER theme, along with the belief in action as its own justification, would drop out of Western Marxism and critical theory. But the voluntarism remained if only because radicals no longer believed that capitalism would create its own “gravediggers” (Marx). The old stage theory became irrelevant.4 World War I and the great betrayal seemed to invalidate claims that the “truth” about class conflict derived from an “objective” investigation into the level of economic development, and Gramsci was clear-sighted when in 1917 he interpreted the Russian Revolution as a “revolution against Das Kapital.”5 With the suspension of teleology in practice, if not necessarily in theory, ethics took on new importance for Marxism. Tension had existed between Kantian and Hegelian interpreters of Marx since 1898 and the formulation of Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism. His insistence that the working class was not growing, and that its revolution was not inscribed in history, logically required substituting ethics for teleology—and, in his view reform for revolution. Bernstein’s revisionism rested on the slogan “enough of cant, and back to Kant.” Bolsheviks and radicals would respond by highlighting Hegel’s influence on Marx, emphasizing the role of class consciousness in the revolutionary enterprise and, so to speak, linking ethics to the revolutionary commitments that would fulfill the imperatives of teleology. Such is the philosophical foundation for what Lenin understood as “true consciousness” being embedded in the vanguard party that alone incarnated the prospects for revolutionary action or, more bluntly, the revolutionary will. Kant’s universalist “practical” ethics of everyday life predicated on intention now made way for a consequentialist ethic based on the categorical imperative of revolution (Lukács 2014: 64ff). But Lenin had little use for this philosophical formulation and he criticized Lukacs (and Korsch) for indulging in utopian idealism. An apologia to the Communist International was in order and, following its condemnation of History and Class Consciousness in 1924, Lukacs wrote was a little monograph on Lenin lauding his unwavering political commitment to the “actuality of revolution” (Lukács 2009). Exigency dictated exaggeration. Lenin knew that the “actuality” of revolution had vanished in 1921 as the Bolsheviks crushed the Kronstadt Soviet, introduced the New Economic Policy calling for capitalism in the countryside, and raised the prospect of “socialism in one country.” He also drew the appropriate political consequences from the suppression of workers’ councils in Europe and the ill-fated March action of that year in Germany with his pamphlet Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (1921). 4 In 1917, when Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks, the tradeoff was clear: Trotsky embraced Lenin’s notion of the vanguard party while Lenin endorsed Trotsky’s idea of the permanent revolution that essentially fused the bourgeois with the proletarian stage in reference to the Revolution of 1905. See Trotsky (2014). 5Affirming the claims of Karl Kautsky and his orthodox followers, Gramsci notes: “Events have exploded the critical schema determining how the history of Russia would unfold according to the canons of historical materialism. The Bolsheviks reject Karl Marx, and their explicit actions and conquests bear witness that the canons of historical materialism are not so rigid as might have been and has been thought.” Gramsci (1977, 34ff). CRITICAL THEORY AND RESISTANCE 21 Nevertheless, the messianic belief that revolution could be made at any time gripped Western Marxism from the start and became ever more abstract in the thinking of Ernst Bloch and, especially, Walter Benjamin.6 What Lukacs would later call “romantic anti-capitalism” ran rampant among radical intellectuals who envisioned abolishing the system without drawing inferences from the way it actually functioned. This combined with neglect for republican institutions, the need for accountability within the communist movement, disgust with the postwar republics in Germany and Italy, their suppression of workers’ councils, and the timidity of their social democratic leadership. With the utopian visions inspired by the Russian Revolution, moreover, an aura was also cast over the Communist Party: Brecht put it well when he had one of his characters exclaim in The Measures Taken: “the party has a thousand eyes we have only two.”