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Link Turn: Only the aff can solve for the harms of tiered scrutiny. By overturning VM based on its violation of the Equal Protection clause, the aff reshapes the Supreme Court’s conceptualization to force them to face morally repugnant precedents head on. Independently, this radical reshaping shows that change is possible and the inherent contradictions throughout the K.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11248&context=mlr //MS

Note: Brackets represent outdates language.

The justices face many difficult choices in deciding how (or even whether) to phase out repugnant decisions. But one point ought not be controversial: when the Court abandons its prior work, it should come clean about doing so. Too often, doctrinal principles and specific holdings are fully superseded only by implication. This tendency sidelines the Court’s stare decisis framework, which cannot begin to operate if the fact of a departure goes unmentioned.357 Implicit repudiation is even less transparent than channeling the court of history, which at least signals that a precedent is being disavowed. Here, I am not critiquing the Court’s failure to resolve palpable tension between newly announced premises and earlier holdings, many of which may be obscure. My modest claim is that the Court should acknowledge when it breaks from any proposition whose correctness has become logically impossible. Shortcomings on this score often represent missed opportunities to articulate a rationale for dispensing with grossly outmoded precedents.

Two examples will help illustrate the point. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the Court repeatedly held that Congress could exclude from the postal system any material that it deemed “injurious . . . to the public mor- als”358 or otherwise “objectionable . . . upon the ground of public policy.”359 This principle endowed Congress with a startling censorial authority over much of the nation’s economic and political life. But when the Court later renounced this stance, subjecting mailability rules to the First Amendment, it made no mention of its prior institutional practice. Instead, the justices proceeded as if a dissent issued during the earlier regime accurately summarized existing law.360

Or consider Williams v. Mississippi361 (decided in 1898), one of the Court’s most ruinous decisions. Williams upheld a state constitutional provision that limited the franchise to persons able to “give a reasonable interpretation” of any portion of the state’s constitution.362 The Court recognized— but deemed irrelevant—that this clause was intended “to obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the [Black people].”363 The justices sharply reversed course in Louisiana v. United States (a 1965 decision), holding all such “interpretation” clauses facially unconstitutional.364 Yet Louisiana did not even flag the existence of directly contrary precedent. Nor is this the only time the Court has failed to reckon with its responsibility for condoning gross injustices.365 Court-of-history reform will be incomplete unless doctrinal reversals are reliably accompanied by conscious recognition of such clear-cut changes.

C. Regularizing the Court of History By adopting the pretense that external forces had not only foreordained Korematsu’s overruling but already effectuated the deed, Hawaii subtly destabilized two pillars of Supreme Court decisionmaking: the norms surrounding horizontal and vertical precedent. There is a better way to harmonize decisional law with modern realities. This Section first argues that ethical shifts should be accommodated within a paradigm of reason-giving, rather than bare invocation of the court of history. It then contends that openly normative utterances can play an important role within the established stare decisis framework. Lastly, this Section explains why the Court’s standard overruling procedures—which presume the existence of adversarial stakeholders—may be poorly calibrated to eliminating certain repugnant precedents.

1. Preserving Stare Decisis¶ As illustrated in Part I, the court-of-history conceit undercuts the justices’ control over their past decisions’ present bindingness. The Court has repeatedly chided lower courts for failing to follow precedents that have not been squarely displaced.366 But in Hawaii, Korematsu’s invalidity—its present doctrinal nothingness—was said to be “obvious.”367 In this way, the Court has effectively invited myriad legal actors to channel the precedent-gutting verdicts of a figurative tribunal, and to proceed with only the murkiest conception of the court of history’s triggering conditions. And the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis seeks to ensure that precedents will not undergo drastic revision without sufficient justification.368 Yet Hawaii offered no reasoned explanation for the change it announced. However clear history’s verdict on Korematsu, the justices abdicated the task of translating that sonorous judgment into the stuff of judicial decisionmaking.¶ The court-of-history approach also places undue weight on perceptions of our deepest national values. By rendering those beliefs peremptory—trumps of all other interests and all procedural values—the justices may overlook considerations that counsel against summary repudiation. Consider the examples of military conscription and compulsory military instruction in public universities. Although efforts to revive such measures would likely be met with widespread fury among the affected populations, that is not an adequate reason to short-circuit the Court’s established processes for testing the vitality of precedent. Surely the Court should sometimes inquire about the government’s interest in retaining once-common tools. Moreover, some injustices may be too deeply embedded in modern life for the Court to disregard the immense reliance interests they have generated.369 And the court-of-history model would preclude the prospect of retheorizing repugnant precedents. On reflection, it might prove possible to justify some of those decisions’ outcomes for reasons that were not apparent generations ago.370 The stare decisis framework ensures that such countervailing concerns will not be ignored entirely— and that the justices’ assessments are laid bare, rather than concealed with heroic metaphors.¶ In addition, the standard framework is a superior tool for clarifying the scope of doctrinal repudiation. Precedents can contain multitudes371—especially if they have become objects of bipartisan reproach. Korematsu’s renunciation has been greeted so ambivalently because it is unclear what, precisely, the case’s “overruling” entailed.372 The court-of-history approach arguably encourages such dissembling by enabling the costless projection of virtue through untheorized disavowals. As Hawaii showed, it may be tempting simply to deem a precedent “overruled” when one is accused of replicating its logic. Whatever its defects, the justificatory structure of stare decisis facilitates agreement on the extent of proposed change, yielding a clearer understanding of what any departure from the status quo entails.¶ The court-of-history technique could also play havoc with constitutional law’s tiers of scrutiny. As discussed above,373 we should not expect the content of aversive ethical claims to align perfectly with the types of legal classifications most closely correlated with invalidity. For instance, it would seem absurd for today’s lawmakers to outlaw pool halls and bowling alleys on moral grounds (an authority recognized in Murphy v. California). Yet this form of economic regulation would be analyzed under the lenient standard of rational-basis review.374 Overruling Murphy would thus be a momentous development, whether brought about by the court of history or the justices themselves. Only the latter of those approaches would enable the Court to grapple with the systemic consequences of foreclosing a form of low-scrutiny regulation.¶ Lastly, a regularized court of history could require unmanageable and unrealistic historical inquiries. If precedents automatically expire whenever a contrary ethical consensus emerges, decisions can be drained of their author- ity if they are shown to have become ethically outmoded at any former time.375 This could—and should—become familiar terrain on which lawyers and judges argue. But it is far from obvious that courts should be charged with pronouncing on earlier generations’ freestanding ethical aversions. Many cul- tural norms remain largely unwritten and undiscussed precisely because their violation would be unthinkable. For this reason, today’s “matters of common notoriety”376 may be far more accessible than those of ages past. Carried to its logical end, then, the court-of-history technique could require up-or-down determinations about phenomena that elude lawyerly historical retrieval.¶ 2. “Ethical” Overruling¶ Decommissioning the court of history need not deprive us of its core in- sight: that some precedents have become inimical to our national character. The question, then, is how to implement this lesson within a framework that seemingly resists such lofty considerations.377 This is not the place to critique the Court’s recent renderings of when overruling may be justified; I take those accounts as a starting point, evaluating only their interaction with perceptions of aversive ethos. In my view, ethical judgments should not be routed exclusively through the familiar stare decisis factors. Doing so would overlook why some precedents are so grating—much like impeaching Andrew Johnson for illegally firing his Secretary of War, rather than for thwarting the development of a multiracial democracy.378¶ Consider first whether a decision’s factual underpinnings have collapsed.379 It would be possible to critique almost any repugnant precedent in such clinical terms. We now know that eugenic sterilization was based on shoddy scientific foundations; that our national honor can outlast the American flag’s commodification; that same-sex attraction is not a symptom of mental illness; that women are capable of working long hours; and that debt- ors’ prisons are ineffective at making creditors whole. But such factual insights fail to capture why these decisions seem intolerable today: they embody values that are alien to our way of life. This is why the Court’s official account of Plessy’s repudiation is so unsatisfying.380 I do not mean to say that bogus factual predicates are irrelevant to modern normative judgments. Karen Korematsu, after all, rightly chalked up her father’s conviction to “a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.”381 But something important will be lost if ethical transformations must be recast as empirical discoveries.¶ Other stare decisis factors perform little better in this respect. Virtually any anachronistic decision could be described as a doctrinal outlier or retro- spectively critiqued as “badly reasoned.”382 But these failings are not what make repugnant precedents repugnant. Patterson v. Colorado’s383 chief sin is not that it is “a remnant of abandoned doctrine,”384 but that stifling public commentary on judicial proceedings would flout a basic assumption of modern American life. Likewise, L’Hote v. New Orleans385 may well have been shoddily reasoned. But its most salient flaw is a moral one: it would be ludicrous to enclose sexually active women within specified territorial limits. As this example shows, characterizing a decision as “wrong the day it was de- cided”386 may erase the significance of hard-won societal advances.387¶ All decisionmaking occurs within a particular normative universe. Precedents have ethical foundations, as well as doctrinal and factual ones. If a judicial decision has become ethically intolerable, then it should be presumptively reversible for that reason (as well as others that warrant mention under standard practice). Ethical obsolescence should not serve as an unspoken motivation for activating a distinct set of value-free justifications.388¶ Lower courts’ anticipatory rejection of Cronin v. Adams389 illustrates how the Court might engage in “ethical” overruling.390 Cronin, decided in 1904, had allowed state and local governments to forbid women from entering establishments that sold alcohol.391 In refusing to apply Cronin in 1974, a federal district court cited “the vast changes in social mores and attitudes” since the turn of the century.392 Cronin had become a “discordant anachronism[]” whose continued application would perpetuate “the Victorian ideas of the past.”393 On appeal, the First Circuit agreed that Cronin had been neutralized by “cultural evolution.”394 The Supreme Court could offer similarly frank assessments in overruling precedents that trudge along as ethical outcasts.

Fortunately, no drastic revision of stare decisis is required in order to accommodate shifts in our national character. This consideration is absent from routine formulations of the doctrine, to be sure.395 But the Court once con- firmed that precedents are vulnerable to reversal if they are “inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this country” or incompatible with “our society’s deep commitment[s].”396 It would be remarkable if such a malleable framework could not account for a factor so central to whether past practice deserves continued respect. The acknowledged distinction between legitimate and illegitimate reliance interests397 can also be applied to the ethical arena, blunting any impulse to retain deeply anachronistic decisions. And the first principles of stare decisis may provide powerful justification for values-based overruling. It is difficult to see how “the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”398 would be advanced by preserving precedents now re- garded only with contempt.

Plainly, viewing ethical obsolescence as a justification for overruling would enable the justices to discard certain precedents that they disfavor on the merits. Professor Randy Kozel has urged the Court to move in precisely the opposite direction. To prevent doctrinal fluctuation in response to the justices’ shifting methodological commitments, Kozel would recognize just two primary reasons for overruling: procedural unworkability and faulty factual premises.399 Kozel’s framework does contain a carve-out for decisions that have “caus[ed] extraordinary harm.”400 But he makes clear that this exception should be invoked only in the rarest of situations.401

The persistence of culturally repugnant precedents—and not just a few— casts doubt on such strong resistance to merits-sensitive stare decisis. A closer alignment of America’s aversive ethos with its decisional law could eventually produce dozens of case-related casualties. But that would not be because any- one’s preferred interpretive philosophy had gained ascendancy at the Court. It would instead result from an overlapping consensus that certain uses of state power would be unthinkable in modern times. If anything, the image of the Court making a clean break from past benightedness seems more likely to enhance the justices’ stature than to threaten it. Nor is it obvious why the gradual disappearance of obsolete precedents would prove destabilizing.402 Rather, adherence to archaic propositions would more predictably cause disruption, insofar as expectations have formed around their absence from public life.403 And ethically distasteful decisions hardly warrant continued respect due to their “accumulated practical wisdom.”404 In short, an optimal stare decisis framework would permit the overruling of precedents that are inimical to modern values—whether or not they have produced devastating conse- quences.

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