The 1AC failed the moment it viewed reparations as a responsibility and obligation the state must do rather than a liability – Monetary UBI reparations is a responsibility from the state to its citizens that pushes black fungibility to the edges of white futurity that refuses to make racialized connections – Only framing reparations as a liability creates the necessary discrimination and linkage to disrupt the global racial empire.
Táíwò’22 [“Reconsidering Reparations.”, February 2022, Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of California Los Angeles, https://academic.oup.com/book/38812/chapter/337658637] CC and RP
So far, we’ve set one target for a good view of reparations: it should be rooted in, or at least expressible in terms of liability and not just in terms of responsibility. We’ve also discussed major challenges for each view on its own. But none of the views came out unblemished and each has benefits and drawbacks. To judge between the different ways of thinking about reparations, it will help to be direct and explicit about what a view about reparations ought to accomplish. Putting the standards in order of priority will also matter here, since it will help us decide between views that do well on some standards but not as well on others. I propose these three standards, in this order: 1. Reparations for global racial empire should make tangible differences in the material conditions of people’s lives. 2. Reparations for global racial empire should address the core moral wrongs of trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism, to the extent possible. 3. Reparations for global racial empire should discriminate: should distribute benefits and burdens based on the different relationships of persons and institutions to the core moral wrongs. The remainder of this chapter will focus on unpacking these standards and exploring how well different approaches to reparations address them. Standard 1 The first standard is the most important, and also the most complicated. By putting this criterion first, I want to resist treating arguments for reparations on purely intellectual grounds, untethered from the history of activism and political struggle that put the issue on the table in the first place. It’s not simply the fact that the moral atrocities happened; it is also the connection of those atrocities to presentday misery, incarceration, poverty, and desperation that explains reparation’s importance. This standard is about what we want reparations to do. It says that reparations for global racial empire should make tangible differences in the material conditions of people’s lives—the conditions of their living, working, and relating to each other. It’s hard to do better in explaining this priority than Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. did in his book Why We Can’t Wait: The Negro today is not struggling for some abstract, vague rights, but for concrete and prompt improvement in his way of life. What will it profit him to be able to send his children to an integrated school if the family income is insufficient to buy them school clothes? What will he gain by being permitted to move to an integrated neighborhood if he cannot afford to do so because he is unemployed or has a low-paying job with no future? During the lunch-counter sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, a nightclub comic observed that, had the demonstrators been served, some of them could not have paid for the meal . . . The struggle for rights is, at bottom, a struggle for opportunities.95 In placing material welfare first, I don’t presume that cultural or spiritual needs are unimportant. We need recognition, we need acknowledgement, we need good relationships with the people around us. But I do presume that we need to eat and protect ourselves from premature death and suffering, more than we need vindication—whether in cultural narratives, textbooks, or fancy academic journals. I presume that protection against mass displacement is a more fundamental need than the need for reconciliation with our neighbors. While such reconciliation might complement or strengthen such protection, the reverse is not true: without housing security, neighborly reconciliation becomes trivial to meaningless. So if we prioritize improving the material conditions of people’s lives, what approach to reparations best fits the bill? Relationship repair arguments, particularly the communicative versions, don’t seem up to the job. For these views, changing the living conditions of the potential recipients of reparations is more of a potential outcome of the main action than a target—to the extent that it is considered at all. The focus is on inter-group relations: the possibility of genuine moral community between those who inherit the claim right to reparations and those who inherit a moral liability to pay reparations. Proponents of this view agree that some sort of material and not merely symbolic reparations are called for, but this is because of the communicative consequences of making serious material concessions – making the attendant apologetic gestures credible as sincere and genuine.96 The living conditions of the people with the moral claim to reparations thus fades into the background, playing at best an instrumental role in explaining both how we would justify reparations projects and what they would be designed to accomplish. The harm repair view and the debt repayment version of the relationship repair view seem initially like they are better positioned to meet this first, most important standard. Both share a legalistic reference point that focuses on a concept of welfare. A clear virtue of the harm repair strategy is its preoccupation with the material and political lives of oppressed people. For the harm repair theorists, reparations ought to make a difference in the lives of the descendants of the enslaved and colonized, in concrete terms that make up for the harms they face as a result of their membership in those identity categories. But harm repair arguments may risk understanding even material welfare too narrowly. The danger is something like a resourcist view of racism: that what racial disadvantage comes down to is having less stuff, broadly speaking, than racially advantaged people. After all, those who make harm repair arguments often appeal to the amount of wealth that the racially advantaged. And a close inspection of the debt repayment family of arguments finds that they do not assign direct primary importance to the living conditions of the people who are currently owed reparations. The primary harms and injuries considered in this argument are those that befell the ancestors of the people who today are owed reparations. To the extent that harms to people living and breathing today shows up in the argument, it is as whatever particular harm can be contrived into a shape that will attach to non-payment of reparations, rather than in terms of the current living conditions and life chances of these people. These arguments for reparations, if successful, could at best tell us that reparations are owed to today’s Black people. These arguments couldn’t tell us what current rates of poverty, physical and mental health, or low levels of community institutional power and self-determination have to do with reparations as a project. The social and political conditions that make reparations important fade into the background, playing at best a rhetorical role in the justification and design of reparations projects designed on this basis. Proponents of the harm repair view could respond by expanding what they mean by harm, expanding it until the targets for correction include not only income disparities but also the psychological, social institutional, interpersonal and informal consequences of racism or colonialism. But I’ve argued that, if they study this carefully, they will find that fewer of the determinants of these aspects of social structure lie in any particular country, church, university, or state government’s jurisdiction than they bargained for. If they arrive at a set of reforms that will comprehensively change the social structures that in fact undergird the forms of domination that live on in the current political conditions of their people, they will have arrived at the constructive view: they will be describing a worldmaking project. Standard 2 Applying the second and third standards is more straightforward and makes use of the observations we’ve already made in applying the first standard. The second standard holds that reparations for global racial empire should respond to the core moral wrongs that these involved. A structural understanding of slavery, colonialism, and their legacy invites us to view the core wrongs of both the events (atrocities of slavery and the slave trade, colonial conquest, genocides) and also the social structure built out of these. The communicative repair view targets our attitudes and normative expectations of ourselves and each other. Some version of this might be required to make meaningful progress in achieving social justice, since our institutions are partly constructed by our attitudes and expectations. But this is an overly narrow view, for the historical processes that we seek to replace set up vastly different schedules of accumulation of social advantages and disadvantages – not just mistrust and lack of camaraderie. The debt repayment view targets our relationship of obligation, and our ability to inherit moral debts and liabilities. It is certainly true that past generations’ nonpayment of individual or collective reparations is a wrong. But it hardly seems a compelling construal of the core moral wrong: enslaving and colonizing people are wrong in and of themselves, not just because the slavers and colonizers avoided compensating those they wronged afterward. The constructive view responds directly to both aspects of the core moral wrongs of global moral empire. It addresses the events with its distributive principle: requiring those who inherited the moral liabilities of the atrocities of the past to take on more of the burdens of building the just world than those who inherit the moral claim rights. It addresses the structural aspect of the core moral wrong by setting a just world order as its practical target. Standard 3 That brings us to the third standard: that a good reparations view should discriminate, selecting beneficiaries and burdened parties based on their historical relationships to the core moral wrongs under consideration. The constructive view does this, building it in as a distributive principle in a larger social project. The debt repayment and harm repair views also lend themselves to discrimination, but they are only built to handle a simple binary. This starkness may seem more morally stringent, but it is no advantage. As noted in this chapter’s discussion of liability and also of the major challenge for the harm repair view, the relationship of all of us to past oppression is more complicated than such binary accounting allows. The world order determines all of our political circumstances, and all of us are advantaged and disadvantaged by it in various respects. What separates us, largely, is the extent to which we are benefitted and the extent to which we are harmed. In “If the Shoe Fits” Vincene Verdun discusses her past: she discloses that she is descended both from enslaved people of African descent and slave-owning planters of French descent. Similarly, in the present, as an African-American she is someone who is owed reparations, but as a US citizen she is someone who pays taxes and thus would contribute to any scheme of reparations financed by the United States federal government. Rather than explaining this away, she uses it constructively to argue that it fits squarely into reparation as she envisions it: something that addresses her simultaneously as someone to whom something is owed and someone from whom something is owed. Accepting this complication allows us to decisively reject the specious right-wing objections to reparations projects that suggest that rich Black folk like Oprah and Jay-Z are insurmountable complications. Just as the differences in our relationship to history lie in the extent to which we are advantaged and disadvantaged by the world order of global racial empire, our relationship to reparations projects should be determined by the extent to which we have inherited moral liabilities versus the extent to which we have inherited claim rights. We don’t need a rigid binary between one sort of inheritance and the other.