MMT relies on the maintenance of monetary sovereigns, which is incommensurate with an ethos that is attentive to cross-border politics
Konsta Kotilainen 2022 [“A cosmopolitan reading on Modern Monetary Theory”; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343?needAccess=true&role=button ; Konsta Kotilainen holds M.A. and B.A. degrees in World Politics and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki. He’s also studied at the University of Cambridge.] ARL
Much of the recent IPE literature on monetary issues has tended to ignore “big” socially burning questions that initially were in the field’s focus of attention (Cohen2017, 675). Among such questions, the democratic legitimacy of monetary and macro-economic governance is rarely explicitly tackled, even if the groups of decision-makers and “decision-takers” rarely coincide within these traditionally technocratic domains. More generally, there is little dialogue between empirical IPE research and normative democratic theory (Agné2011).1 The normative aspects of global economic governance, less surprisingly, have been largely brushed aside also in macroeconomics. Economists’ accounts of democracy have traditionally remained implicit (Kurki2013). The pre-2008“new consensus” on the primacy of monetary policy and the merits of central bank independence took the democratic deficit in macroeconomic governance as essentially a virtue without engaging with political theory (for a partial exception, see Blinder1996; on the new consensus, seee.g. Goodfriend2007; Woodford2009). The post-2008 worries about “secular stagna-tion”, economic inequalities, and the ongoing Covid-19 havoc, have drawn some of the average macroeconomist’s attention towards the fiscal capacities of the state, but no explicit normative discussion on the long-term objectives or institutional basis of fiscal policy involvement has yet emerged within the mainstream of the profession. Even if one focuses on critical approaches to macroeconomic governance that are broadly sympathetic to strong democratic claims–as I will in this paper–it is difficult to find accounts that would build on normative political theory and economic inquiry in a balanced and engaged way (for one exception, see Patomäki and Teivainen2004). One-sided perspectives to political economy easily result in unfortunate incompatibilities between views that seem promising in their own right. An important task, then, is to cross-examine such views in order to find ways to save and synthesize what is valuable in them and disregard what is not. There appears to be such an incompatibility between the increasingly influential neo-chartalist Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) emphasizing the macroeconomic role of the nation-state, on the one hand, and cosmopolitan calls for supranational democratic economic governance, on the other. While both accounts endorse the general idea that democratic macroeconomic governance in service of the “public purpose” should be the objective, their proponents reach conflicting conclusions about the desirability of national self-determination in economic affairs. MMT is primarily an economic theory and cosmopolitanism an ethico-political theory, but their concerns overlap to such an extent that clear mutual tensions can emerge. The neochartalists (Kelton2011; Mitchell, Wray, and Watts2019; Wray2012) argue that the contemporary “monetarily sovereign” states are far more able to pursue autonomous macroeconomic policies than what is commonly believed. According to the neo-chartalists, a national control over currency allows these states to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policies. In case a sovereign state also happens to be democratic, its substantial autonomy, in effect, opens up room for democratic governance. In contrast, cosmopolitans and global democrats4(see e.g. Hale, Held, and Young2013, 113–188; Hale and Held2017; Held2010, 107–110; Patomäki and Teivainen2004; Scholte, Fioramonti, and Nhema2016) are convinced that an economic governance framework organised largely around sovereign nation-states and their unilateral policy decisions cannot deliver truly democratic outcomes. Many IPE and legal scholars doubt whether there even exists genuinely monetarily sovereign states in the globalized political economy (Cohen2008, 205–310; Zimmermann2013, 5). Cosmopolitans raise further questions about whether any category of states enjoys much substantial auton-omy to resist global economic imperatives. And to the extent that such autonomy exists, cosmopolitans argue that it should be exercised only within certain ethical bounds that take the cross-border ramifications of national policies into account (Held2010, 107–110, 167)