Social security is a method of rewriting social solidarity – it constructs the identities of recipients as uniquely deserving of moral obligation
William Walters 4, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics,” Citizenship Studies, Volume 8, Number 3, September 2004, pp. 237-260
Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land and security. It rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home. Of course there is a history to the understanding of homeland and a notable variance in its meaning across countries (Robin and Stra˚th, 2003). However, in a great many of these uses it has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: the home as hearth, a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not; international order as a space of homes—every people should have (at least) one; home as a place we must protect. We may invite guests into our home, but they come at our invitation; they don’t stay indefinitely. Others are, by definition, uninvited. Illegal migrants and bogus refugees should be returned to ‘their homes’. Home as a place to be secured because its contents (our property) are valuable and envied by others. Home as a safe, reassuring place, a place of intimacy, togetherness and even unity, trust and familiarity. Hence domopolitics embodies a tactic which juxtaposes the ‘warm words’ (Connolly, 1995, p. 142) of community, trust, and citizenship, with the danger words of a chaotic outside—illegals, traffickers, terrorists; a game which configures things as ‘Us vs. Them’ (Stasiulis, 1997, p. 203). Bigo is right to suggest that the politics of internal and transnational security both mobilizes and plays upon fear and unease to legitimate itself (Bigo, 2002). But 241 Downloaded by [Acadia University] at 01:10 08 October 2013 William Walters besides these negative forces, it also plays upon the positive image of home. These are some of the contours of the domological.
But there is a second aspect to domopolitics—domo as conquest, taming, subduing; a will to domesticate the forces which threaten the sanctity of home. Domopolitics is not reducible to the Fortress impulse of building walls, strengthening the locks, updating the alarm system. It contains within itself this second tendency which takes it outwards, beyond the home, beyond even its own ‘backyard’ and quite often into its neighbours’ homes, ghettos, jungles, bases, slums. Once domopolitics extends its reach, once it begins to take the region or even the globe as its strategic field of intervention, then the homeland becomes the home front, one amongst many sites in a multifaceted struggle.4
Towards a Genealogy of Security
A second objective of the paper is to make a contribution to the genealogy of security. More specifically, I want to place the emergence of domopolitics within a trajectory that has hitherto been overlooked. Perhaps because of their background in academic international relations, many authors locate the rise of Schengenland, Homeland and other securitizations within something we might call a post-Cold War (or, more recently, a ‘post-9/11’) narrative. Refugees, organized crime, drugs-smuggling, terrorism and people trafficking are seen as occupying a security field that opened up with the demise of the Cold War. Increasingly these figures constitute the new enemy, the new threat that underwrites the politics and policies of security.5
Practices and experiences of internal and transnational security, then, are typically compared with the logics of international security. But this move tends to overlook the fact that the twentieth century saw other methods of actualizing security. Perhaps the most notable of these is social security. The state is ‘polymorphous’ (Mann, 1993). Most western states were welfare states at the same time that they were national security states (but also bureaucratic states, capitalist states, patriarchal states, and so on; Brown, 1995). But there is an academic convention which tends to keep the analysis of social security largely separate from national, and today transnational security. The former is the domain of the social policy specialist, the latter the preserve of international relations. It is this division that I want to challenge here. Placing questions of social security and internal security, welfare and domopolitics within the same frame of analysis will enable us to see the latter in a new light. (While it is not a path I follow here, it could also facilitate a new perspective on the meaning of social security as well.) Comparing social and internal security is uncommon but, it seems to me, there are at least two good reasons why this is a valid and timely move.
First, both social security and domopolitics are governmentalities. That is, both are concerned with the government of population (Foucault, 1991a). But as long as the analysis of domopolitics remains confined to the field of international security studies, this is not adequately addressed. By comparing domopolitics to social security, I want to focus attention on the particular ways in which domopolitics governs population. How does it understand risk? Our time is not 242 Downloaded by [Acadia University] at 01:10 08 October 2013 Domopolitics the first to be transfixed with the prospect of dangerous mobilities. In today’s response to asylum-seekers do we hear echoes of the treatment of the vagrant and the pauper? How does it divide and classify its subjects? What kind of security does it promise and for whom? How does it appear when interrogated as a response to poverty, both national and global?
Second, I want to make this comparison because both social security and domopolitics are not simply public policies pursued by the state. They are much more: they need to be understood in terms of diagrams. Rajchman has clarified the concept of the diagram which comes to us from Foucault via Deleuze (1988). The diagram expresses ‘something at work in many different institutions and situations, spread out in several countries, working in a manner not given in the map of social policies and prescriptions, planned as such by no one’ (Rajchman, 1999, p. 47). Foucault gives us the panopticon as a diagram of the disciplinary society, revealing how a certain set of techniques and logics—ways of organizing space and time, accumulating bodies, regulating activities, and so forth—can be found at work across the social space during the nineteenth century—in prisons, schools, factories, barracks and hospitals.
Welfare states did not dispense with discipline, but combined it with other diagrams. According to Ewald (1991), the welfare societies of the twentieth century had insurance as their pre-eminent diagram. He recognizes this in noting that insurance was for these societies simultaneously an abstract technology, a technology of risk and a political imaginary. In other words, social insurance, and social security more generally, provided a mechanism through which an important set of identities and practices were established. This included a definition of the state as a welfare state caring for all its members who are, in turn, constituted as ‘social’ citizens bearing certain social rights and responsibilities; a definition of society as a solidaristic collective whose members bear certain risks together; a definition of the family as a household unit comprising a gendered division of paid and caring work; and so on. Through insurance, the state was crystallized in this particular form.