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Inability to think beyond the nation-state makes global poverty inevitable

Hayden 7 [Patrick, Emeritus Professor of Political Theory and International Relations at the University of St Andrews, focusing on the intersection of international politics and social and political theory, “Superfluous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the Political Evil of Global Poverty, 290-292,” https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070350021001//MDC]

Pogge maintains that abject global poverty offers evidence of what he refers to as ‘radical inequality’. For Pogge, it is not only the extreme (both absolutely and relatively), pervasive, and persistent characteristics of global poverty that make it unjust, but most importantly that it is avoidable.57 As Pogge notes, if global poverty were simply a matter of ‘bad luck’, of the uncontrollable consequences of natural events and simple chance, then while it might be unfortunate it would not be unjust. Contrary to this, he counters that while it ‘is bad luck to be born into a family that is too poor to feed one . . . the fact that a quarter of all children are born into such families is not bad luck but bad organization’.58 Advancing what he calls an ‘institutional’ understanding of human rights, Pogge argues that the injustice of global poverty arises from the fact that it is produced by shared global institutions with which, under conditions of economic globalisation, we all are engaged in some form. In other words, within the global political and economic order we are all connected to extremely powerful institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, which determine and mediate our relationships to one another to a significant degree insofar as they govern markets, trade, and foreign affairs. Because these institutions and the governments through which they operate constitute a highly integrated whole that designs and coordinates policies, decisions, and actors for the purpose of producing specific consequences, the outcomes of this scheme must be ascribed to identifiable social structures and agents.59 Hence, Pogge contends that radical inequality is an extreme injustice in that it foreseeably and avoidably results in the severe impoverishment of billions of human beings. Global poverty is not due simply to unavoidable extrasocial factors (although such factors, like natural disasters, may exacerbate the conditions of poverty) but most fundamentally to institutional design, decisions, and actions. What is crucial to note here is that feasible alternative decisions and actions can be taken; alternative institutional schemes can be implemented which do not produce pervasive, persistent, and radical inequality.60 That such alternatives are not adopted means that the worse-off are knowingly being starved and impoverished, as the foreseeable and avoidable conditions of extreme poverty are imposed upon them and they are coercively excluded from the benefits of economic globalisation. To put this all another way, the foreseeable and avoidable infliction of the ongoing harm of global poverty is a political evil, in the sense that it arises from a coordinated institutional scheme the effects of which make human beings superfluous. While it may not be the explicit intention of political leaders, and heads of multinational corporations and transnational financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF to make a large portion of humanity superfluous, the fact that such a systemic outcome is knowingly perpetuated allows us to judge as radically unjust the institutional design and policies of the current global politico-economic order. For this reason, global poverty cannot be regarded as a ‘non-moral’ form of evil, that is, as a terrible event ‘that is not caused by human agency’ or that results from ‘unchosen’ human action.61 Given the case put forward by Pogge and others, this is a conclusion that has become difficult if not impossible to sustain. Rather, as George Kateb has argued, ‘deliberate impoverishment or neglect or correctable misery’ may be properly regarded as a moral and political evil.62 It is the structural nature of global poverty today that makes it possible to trace back to specific institutional contexts the agents and policies responsible for continuing radical inequality. And insofar as these structural conditions can be identified as the products of human agency, they may also be avoided through systemic change. Change may be difficult, of course, since structural violence becomes normalised in institutional conditions that produce or reinforce social, economic, and political disparities. In most cases the institutions that contain elements of structural violence are long-standing, giving these forms of violence an appearance of normality and even acceptability. As such they are ‘symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from harm’.63 Those on the disadvantaged side of structural inequalities often are rendered voiceless as their suffering and concerns go unheard, and they remain invisible within a stratified social order.64 In effect, gross social inequalities inhibit the establishment of, in Arendt’s terms, a common world where each person is able to see this world ‘from the other person’s standpoint’.65

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