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Their impact calculus sanitizes violence done in the name of empire – the modern era is the bloodiest in human history

Duffield 7 – Mark Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre @ University of Bristol, and an Honorary Professor at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute @ University of Manchester with a PhD in Anthropology; “Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples,” Polity Press; p. 34-36; 2007

So far, biopolitics has been examined in relation to supporting and promoting the life of population. Foucault has pointed out, however, that biopolitics contains a fateful paradox. At the same time as fostering life, biopolitics also has the ability to disallow life ‘to the point of death’ (Foucault [1976]: 138). Death in this sense can be both literal and, importantly, indirect and metaphorical. As well as forms of social death through marginalization and exclusion, this can include, for example, the regular exposure to risk associated with the way of life within mass consumer society (Foucault [1975–6]: 256; Beck 1992). While Western states support and promote life to the full, through mass transport systems, centralized food chains, agribusiness, manufactured vulnerabilities, carbon emissions or pollution, people are also directly or indirectly exposed to unprecedented risk and violence ‘in the most profane and banal ways. Our age is the one in which a holiday weekend produces more victims on Europe’s highways than a war campaign’ (Agamben 1998: 114). In decoding life itself, bio- genetics is creating the potential for new and far-reaching forms of social exclusion that can as yet only be glimpsed. As Harvey, Bauman and Agamben would no doubt agree, this is possible because we are now all potentially surplus to requirements.

The paradox of biopolitics is graphically expressed in the emergence of total war in Europe at the same time as the appearance of social insurance and the welfare state. During the nineteenth century, as the state began to consolidate its ability to promote and support life at the level of population, the simultaneous modernization of warfare was exposing that same population to death on a widening scale. The great world wars of the twentieth century not only established the paradigm of total war, they were formative events in the spread of social insurance and the emergence of a centralizing welfare state (Thane 1989). The biopolitical tension between the state’s increasing power to optimize collective life and its ability to wage war at the level of entire societies is expressed in Foucault’s often quoted argument that wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended, ‘they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital’ (Foucault [1976]: 137).

Since they have become managers of life, modern regimes have been able to wage wars of incredible destructiveness. Martin van Creveld has given an account of the emergence of total war in relation to the dissolution of the laws and customs of eighteenth-century European interstate warfare and the rise of industrialized forms of procurement, logistics and munitions (van Creveld 1991; see also Kaldor 1999; Smith 2006). Legal or contained ‘trinitarian war’ first emerged with the birth of the European nation-state in the mid-seventeenth century. It involved the slow development of codes of conduct and legal instruments that distinguished and separated the people, the army and the government for the purposes of war (van Creveld 1991: 39–42). During the course of the eighteenth century, trinitarian distinctions were progressively refined. As the state asserted its legal monopoly over the use of armed force, ordinary people were prohibited from taking part in wars. These became affairs of state, and governments used war as an instrument of politics. To distinguish it from crime, war was defined as something waged by sovereign states alone. People should show loyalty, pay their taxes and generally keep out of the way of armies. During the nineteenth century the legal separation of people, army and government would be converted into positive law, giving rise to modern ideas of the ‘civilian’ and the disparagement of ‘civil’ war. Conventions stipulated that hostilities could not commence without previous and explicit declarations of war and they were to be ended by formal peace treaties negotiated between the belligerent states. Soldiers were those licensed to bear arms and engage in conflict on behalf of the state. Civilians were not to be abused, but, in exchange, they must not become involved and must accept the political outcome of contained battles. To reinforce this point, private or partisan warfare together with its encouragement was made illegal.

This model of contained interstate warfare, however, was seldom applied outside Europe. Wars of colonial conquest and pacification, especially against non-European peoples, have traditionally been waged with little restraint against non-combatants (Schmitt [1963]). The hapless ‘lower races’ entered history, as it were, as a politically surplus population or what Agamben would call bare-life, with the trinitarian distinction between peoples, armies and governments already blurred and obscured. In this respect, the genocidal closure of the global commons effected by the late nineteenth century’s New Imperialism, in terms of its pioneering methods of cowing, dispossessing and destroying on a societal scale (Hochschild 2002), was a rehearsal for the great wars and totalitarianisms to come (Arendt [1951]). Within Europe total war has been described as the blurring of the boundaries between established trinitarian divisions and the weakening of the restraints on violence (van Creveld 1991: 42–9; Schmitt [1963]: 6–8). From the mid-nineteenth century innovations in communications, such as the railways, steamships and the telegraph, together with advances in the mass production and destructiveness of armaments, not only supported the New Imperialism, their implications began to question and push against the laws and conventions of war that separated state and society. During the world wars of the twentieth century, through declaring states of emergency, whole societies were mobilized for the purpose of war (ibid.: 14). At the same time, national populations were exposed to death in new ways, not only directly through mass conscription, but since society was now the human and industrial embodiment of the war effort itself, civilians also became targets. To paraphrase Agamben, like the surplus life of the colonies, the ‘civilian’ in Europe and Asia entered a zone of non- differentiation where it was possible to kill without committing murder. Although seemingly protected by laws and conventions, through the licence that emergency provides, civilians routinely became the targets of indiscriminate military intimidation, blockade and destruction. Total war made the twentieth century the most calamitous and bloody in human history (Hobsbawm 1994).

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