K is backwards – the nation-state frame prevents domination because of its commitment to self-determination and political independence

A common reading of civic republicanism is as an alternative to liberal po- litical morality.** Against the liberal focus on liberty as non-interference, civic republicans have placed their emphasis on liberty as freedom from domination by an arbitrary power, both public and private. This conception of liberty as non-domination as a primary good has led republicans to prefer constitutional institutions and a more engaged mode of citizenship as an antidote to the abuse of political power by corrupt elites. While the liberal conception of the citizen is thought of as a nexus of rights, which are construed in a negative manner, republican citizenship is a status that carries with it more stringent positive duties. It is thus more demanding of the individual citizen—it requires that people not only avoid harm to others and obey the law, but willingly share in practices of social cooperation and make considerable compromises and sacri- fices for the sake of the common good of being not dominated.

Accordingly, civic republicanism demands strong ties of obligation and solidarity among citizens who maintain each other’s freedom from domina- tion. Yet unlike the liberal nationalist version, these strong ties are not the result of pre-political identification with other members of the community. Rather, this is an allegiance to a certain political way of life, or a “love of coun- try,” a sense of “belonging to a polity,” in which citizens see the flourishing of institutions and practices as linked to their own political freedom.* Citizens in a republican polity are linked by sense of collegiality, and are perceived as sharing a common political good of non-domination.’

The motivational precondition here is not a particular motivation, but rather a cluster of motivations grouped under “civic virtue.” Citizens are to be motivated to (a) resist being dominated by an arbitrary power, (b) avoid domi- nating others, and (c) protect others from non-domination by third parties. In other words, for the normative ideal of social justice, understood here as non- domination, to be stable, citizens must see acting by civic virtues as regulative of the other desires and interests they may have, and, crucially, trust that other citizens are doing the same. While virtuous citizens must be vigilant against the abuse of trust by political institutions and fellow-citizens, the role of trust in institutions and fellow-citizens is crucial for maintaining the practices of republican citizenship.*

One may object, at this point, that this account of civic motivation is overly abstract and unrealistic. Unlike appeals to constitutional essentials or national identity, which are a familiar features of actual political discourse, can we really expect citizens to be motivated by such high-minded ideals as non-domination?® As a matter of fact, however, opposing domination and re- sisting arbitrary power are very common and effective tropes in the rhetoric of political parties and movements, both historically and presently. Consider the following examples. National liberation movements appeal not only to a shared cultural identity, but to the value of self-determination and resistance to foreign rule. Ideals of non-domination were also prevalent in abolitionist and anti-apartheid rhetoric, powerfully captured in Nelson Mandela’s famous 1964 speech during the Rivonia trial, where he describes the struggle against white and black domination as an ideal worth dying for.** And finally, the success of the recent campaign for the United Kingdom leave of the European Union (“Brexit”) was attributed, to a large degree, to the rhetorical power of “tak- ing control” back from political elites and Brussels bureaucrats. The validity and desirability of each of these particular arguments may be questioned, of course, but not so much their motivational efficacy.

But how can civic virtue and citizens’ trust in the motives of fellow-citi- zens be sustained beyond such specific and unusual circumstances? Different republican accounts provide competing answers to this question. In so-called “Athenian” or “civic humanist” versions of republicanism, man is perceived as essentially a social and political animal. Civic virtue is thus seen as the highest rational good for the individual, and the congruence between the per- sonal good and the regulative role of civic virtue is secured. The common good is understood as pre-political, embedded either in the basic human good of sociability, or in a particular way of life and a shared identity as an ethical community.”!

Historically, republicans such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, as well as some of their critics, have argued that this view of civic virtue cannot be ad- vanced in modern nation-states, and is restricted to smaller polities, such as the Greek polis or the city-states of the Renaissance.”? In response, some liberal nationalists, sympathetic to republican citizenship, argue that under the condi- tions of modernity civic virtue can only be maintained through a cultural na- tional identity.>* According to this argument, nation-states are the only political units large enough to sustain a modern political system, while at the same time maintaining a shared identity as a resource of civic virtue. As we saw above, however, this account faces the problem of the incompatibility between cul- tural national identities and political boundaries.

To avoid this problem, civic republicans maintain that the link between nationalism and civic patriotism is historically contingent. The common good is seen not as an objective pre-political good, but as the result of democratic in- terpretation.> Insofar as civic republicanism has an account of a shared collec- tive identity, it interprets this identity as a public culture of particular political traditions, practices and histories. Thus unlike the ethical community account, the shared view of the good is not a pre-political given, nor is it meant to be seen as fully encompassing of any individual ethical identity. The political cul- ture of the well-ordered republican polity maintains the civic virtue of citizens through the socialization into the political norms of non-domination, albeit in their particular form within the local political tradition, social norms, cultural traditions, and historical examples.*