Realism can’t explain China rise - their use of history is selective and plagued by threat inflation

Realist Perspectives on the Rise of China While there are different types of Realism,[6] proponents such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans J. Morgenthau agree on the pessimistic assumption that human nature is selfish and the international system is anarchic.[7] That is, it lacks a governing authority above and beyond the state. This lacuna leaves self-interested sovereign states—the central actors in world politics—competing for power and security.[8] This competition is a zero-sum game in that states seek to take advantage of any possible means to achieve relative gains. Since states often fail to cooperate in the Realist “self-help system”,[9] survival depends on the struggle for power and security, which can ultimately lead to conflict.[10] In a world where perceptions matter,[11] China’s actions are in some quarters perceived as Realist. Those who argue a realist perspective when interpreting China’s rise look to several distinctive examples. Two of these will be analysed in this paper: military expansionism and historical analogy. Realist interpretations have been bolstered by Xi Jinping’s declaration of a “China Dream” resulting in the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,[12] as well as retired People’s Liberation Army Colonel Liu Mingfu’s directives that China needs to “take over from the United States as the world’s greatest military power”.[13] However, through a comprehensive illustration of these two facets of Realist concern (military expansionism and historical analogy), we will see that Realism cannot fully account for them. China’s unprecedented economic growth has been coupled with the “world’s largest military build-up”[14] via a huge expansion of military spending and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to “change the international system” and “obtain global hegemony”.[15] Statistics compiled by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm China’s dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the period 2003–2012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed in SIPRI’s Yearbook[16]. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that China’s annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2008 (when it became the second largest military spender) to almost $170 billion in 2010. Furthermore, estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, China’s military spending could overtake America’s after 2035.[17] In addition, China’s military expansion has led it to be more confident in its military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law.[18] Furthermore, Jia Xiudong’s[19] comment in response to Taiwanese independence—“We will use whatever means we have to prevent it happening”[20]—shows China’s military capabilities go “well beyond Taiwan”, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of China’s rise. A Pentagon senior defence official’s opinion that “the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favour” supports this.[21] Nevertheless, solely Realist interpretations of China’s rise through a military perspective would constitute an oversimplification and exaggeration of reality. As SIPRI figures show in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, China’s (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3 per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, “As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.”[22] In addition, data listing military spending as a percentage of the world share shows China’s 5.5% representing spending of 89.8$bn remains significantly behind the United States’s 45.7% representing 739.3$bn [23]. While China’s increased military assertiveness has been highlighted, it is also important to note its diverse role in the international community. Figure 1 For example, China’s troop deployment for UN Peacekeeping Operations has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000,[24] and in 2012, China’s troop contributions to peacekeeping operations outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.[25] While there may be vested interests at stake for China, the level of cooperation and integration exhibited by its increasing role in UN peacekeeping missions—which seek global peace and security—suggests states are not only ‘self-interested’, as Realist theory would advocate. Hence, to use only Realist interpretations of China’s rise provides too narrow a view, as it does not explain the full extent of China’s rise through military aspirations. Another important empirical illustration of the Realist interpretation of China’s rise is the United States’ response to China’s military expansion. US Defence Department figures evidence the considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific—a region blighted by territorial rights and surrounding resource-rich waters[26]. As part of a response which the United States calls a “pivot” or “rebalance”[27] towards the Asia-Pacific region, there have been efforts to bolster America’s military presence in the region. This has resulted in increased naval assets in Singapore, a full marine task force in Australia planned by 2016, increased troop and hardware deployment in South Korea, a new military access agreement with the Philippines, and a commitment that 60 per cent of US Navy assets will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.[28] The pivot or rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region seems to align with the Realist ‘Thucydides Trap’ cited earlier. As Thucydides puts it, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.”[29] In other words: “The dynamic inherent when a rapidly rising power (China) becomes more confident, a ruling power (US) fears losing its edge, and entangling alliances on each side drive the parties towards war.”[30] History seems to support the tendency for war: “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivalled a ruling power, the outcome was war”.[31] If we consider John Mearsheimer’s argument valid, China will respond to the American build-up by pushing the United States out of Asia, in “much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere”.[32] One view is that China will “come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine as Japan did in the 1930s”.[33] However, it is problematic to use the Thucydides Trap and Mearsheimer’s predictions to assess China’s rise through Realist interpretations. Although former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ comments that the US ‘pivot’ “isn’t about China at all”, his clarification that “it is more about our relationships with the rest of Asia” suggests a much more balanced approach then Realists would claim.[34] In addition, President Obama compliments the positive role that China can play: “from reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula to preventing proliferation” [to] “seeking more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing” [which will include] “greater communication” [between militaries in order to] “promote understanding and avoid miscalculation”.[35] This weakens the case for the use of Realist interpretations in relation to the rise of China—not entirely, but enough to conclude that a fully Realist interpretation of China’s rise is inadequate. Elements highlighted by Mr Bates and President Obama, “cooperation”, “communication” and “reducing tension”, in addition to the actual visit of China’s top military commander General Chen Bingde to the United States in order to improve military ties,[36] decrease the likelihood of falling into the Thucydides Trap. It can be argued that Mearsheimer’s arguments, based on historical analogies, are too weak to hold merit in this discussion. How can historical analogies from an American experience predict what China, a country with a contrasting and unique history and culture, will do today? Analogical arguments are “not causes or explanations”; they