The perm doesn’t solve – the act of the aff re-entrenches the securitizationalist structure by establishing separate identities as a collective (China) to the point where nonsecuritization is unachievable.
Roe ’04 [Paul Roe has been in the IRES department since since 1999; first as a Visiting- and now as an Associate Professor. Paul holds a PhD from the Department of International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth. He has been a Visiting Researcher at the then Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) and also at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). More recently, Paul has also been a Visiting Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Malta. Paul teaches and researches largely in the field of security theory. His teaching is concerned with the evolution of Security Studies as a discipline; both with Strategic Studies and with more non-traditional and critical approaches. He has previously written on the concepts of the security dilemma, societal security, and securitization, and has more recently published in the field of gender and security. Paul's book "Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma" was published by Routledge in 2005. Roe, Paul. “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization.” JSTOR, Sept. 2004, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26965518.pdf?ab_segments=. ]
The Copenhagen School’s position on desecuritization – or, perhaps, more accurately, Waever’s position on it – outlines three possible options with regard to how to desecuritize. The first is simply not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place. The second is that, once an issue has been securitized, ‘to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals’ (Waever, 2000: 253). And, finally, the third is to move security issues back into ‘normal politics.’ Dealing with the second and, by extension, third strategies, Waever points out some difficulties. He begins by noting in the societal sector of secu-rity (that which concerns threats to ethnic/national identities), ‘securitiza-tions have a particularly strong self-reinforcing character.’ This is because security action on the behalf of identities typically decreases the seense of security even for those defended because problematizing the security of an identity and triggering attempts to define and compete it tend to expose its contingency, incompleteness, and impossibility and thus lead to further action (Waever, 2000: 253). In other words, the very nature of collective identities creates propitous con-ditions for so-called societal security dilemmas (see, for example, Roe, 2002). I will return later to the question of societal security and desecuritization. For the moment, though, it is sufficient to mention Waever’s claim that the goal is not to construct ‘societal security policy’ but rather policy that ‘attempts to avoid the triggering of societal security concerns in the first place’, leading him to conclude that 'securitization studies are thus likely to lead to a special interest in strategies that pre-empt or forestall securitization rather than those that solve already pre-existing security problems (Waever, 2000: 254). For Waever, then, the best - indeed, perhaps the only- way forward is to prevent issues from being framed in terms of security in the first place. But this all seems rather unsatisfactory: to desecuritize surely implies exactly that - to take the security out of security, to move it back to normal politics. Set against this, Waever's suggestion can better be described as non-securitization, where there is simply no security to begin with. To be sure, although in some cases very much desirable, by its very nature non-securitization nonetheless avoids having to deal with the tricky question of “emergency politics.”