Status denial of China leads to alienation and creates a danger to the international order.

China’s approach shows that in times of power shifts in global politics, much depends on the extent to which the international order can allow rising powers to see themselves as equal to established powers. This phenomenon is neither uniquely Chinese nor uniquely contemporary. Historically, rising powers—including the United States itself in the nineteenth century—have been more cooperative in international systems that make room for them at the global high table. By contrast, exclusion and inequality have been powerful sources of conflict.

The United States should take these lessons to heart if it wants the fundamentals of the current order to endure. In institutions in which China’s status is secure, the United States should ask more of Beijing. China should be called upon to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN Security Council; to support the expansion of the council to include new permanent members that may be friendlier to the United States, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan; to work harder to maintain its WTO commitments and avoid unfair trade practices; and to collaborate with the West to pressure North Korea into acting as a responsible nuclear power. Washington is better positioned to make these demands because China values its status within these institutions and is more likely to shoulder the burdens necessary to preserve it. Washington may also find that its requests are more likely to be successful if they are made in return for Beijing’s desired improvements in its status in the international order.

Accordingly, in institutions in which China experiences status inequality, the United States should assent to reforms. At the IMF and the World Bank, the United States could cede some control of voting rights to give China a greater say in these institutions. Washington could also work to open up top leadership positions at international financial institutions and within the UN system to Chinese nationals. On climate change, instead of causing global economic imbalances through the Inflation Reduction Act’s vast domestic subsidy regime, the United States could unilaterally play a much greater role in the global financing and implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. All of these actions would enhance the openness and fairness of the international order, creating incentives for China to cooperate on a wider range of issues.

The divide between China and the United States over some issues, such as human rights and Taiwan’s future, is bound to remain intractable. Overall, however, the current international order can be adjusted to mitigate bilateral frictions between the two countries.

In international politics, order sits uncomfortably alongside the violence it takes to impose it. When the global distribution of power shifts substantially, the question is not only who gets to make the rules of the road but also who gets to break them with impunity. Rule-making and hypocrisy, after all, go hand in hand when it comes to managing international conflict and cooperation. China’s quest is ultimately for the right to be as hypocritical as the United States in the international order. By accommodating China’s desire for greater status and demanding more of it as a beneficiary of international cooperation, the United States can both avoid alienating a rising power and endangering the future of international order.