China won’t invade Taiwan—ten warrants

Hemant Adlakha, "10 Reasons Xi Won’t Attack Taiwan Anytime Soon," The Diplomat, 1-20-2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/10-reasons-xi-wont-attack-taiwan-anytime-soon/-- 嘉玮

Here are 10 practical constraints making it highly unlikely that China will resort to using force.

First, a war between even a small country and a big power today is not only expensive but also not an easy walkover for the bigger side, as Russian President Vladimir Putin is finding out. With the war in Ukraine soon to complete one year of fighting, what is notable is that Ukraine has been able to sustain itself despite having a much smaller GDP and a weaker military than Russia.

Second, with China’s export markets drying up in Europe and the United States, the Chinese real estate crisis deepening further, the World Bank and the IMF predicting a gloomy economic growth outlook of 1.7 percent and 2.7 percent respectively, the immediate key priority for the Chinese leadership is not to use force in the Taiwan Strait but to strengthen the economy. China’s economy is struggling in the midst of a pressure campaign waged against it by the United States. At the same time, the Chinese economy is also slowing down sharply under the mounting pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially following the CCP regime’s reversal of the zero COVID policy. Under such circumstances, it would be foolhardy on the part of Xi, or the CCP, to burden the national economy by taking on the enormous expense of a war.

Third, regardless of the fact that Xi has locked down a third five-year term, his goal to consolidate a power base within the party is far from accomplished. It is often the case that more control only breeds more paranoia among authoritarian leaders. The fear of being unable to keep forced unification a short-term exercise might be acting as a potent deterrent for Xi – especially as Putin has already paid a heavy political price for the war in Ukraine.

Fourth, though Xi will be in favor of waging a quick war on the cheap, that may not be within his control. There is always a risk that conflict will escalate into “total war” – a phrase that became popular to describe the situation in World War II, as each side used every possible resource to destroy their opponent.

Fifth, Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be compared in military strength – Taiwan is armed to the teeth. Unlike Ukraine’s steppe-like fertile plains and plateaus, Taiwan consists of over 100 islands. Taiwan’s outer islands are dotted with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. In addition, Taiwan’s granite hills are home to tunnels and bunker systems.

Sixth is the possibility of U.S. involvement in. While officially Washington maintains “strategic ambiguity” on the question whether it would defend Taiwan militarily if needed, none other than President Joe Biden himself has repeatedly answered directly in the affirmative. Amid the China-U.S. competition it seems more and more likely that Washington cannot afford to allow Beijing a free hand in any military campaign against Taiwan.

Seventh is the Japan dimension. The current Japanese government under Kishida has followed up on signals from the late Prime Minister Abe that Tokyo would help to defend Taiwan. Abe once said, “A Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan.” The Kishida government’s push for a more muscular defense role in the region is believed to be in part motivated by the potential for a Taiwan contingency.

Eighth, according to a Hong Kong-based expert on Chinese politics, Xi will be well aware of the West’s solidarity during the Ukraine crisis The European Union is China’s major trading partner. Running afoul of it, as well as the United States and Japan, would be dangerous for a leader who knows he must raise living standards at home.

Ninth, Taiwan may not have been included in a series of recent U.S. multilateral security and trade initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region but the island is perceived as integral to defense mechanisms such as the Quad, AUKUS, etc. For example, the Quad insists on maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, not only Japan but India and Australia might come to the rescue of Taiwan. In such a scenario, China might not want to risk facing three big military powers together.

Last but not least is the ASEAN factor. ASEAN has emerged as China’s largest trading partner and their bilateral trade is set to achieve the target of $1 trillion in a couple of years. Yet Southeast Asian governments are growing wary of China too. In a recent speech, the former Singapore foreign minister George Yeo said: “No country in ASEAN is going to turn down opportunities that come their way in China, but every country worries that too great a dependence on China will constrain our autonomy of action.” It is highly unlikely Beijing would resort to an action that will force countries in Southeast Asia to see China as an enemy.