BI Support Takes From Other Political Projects - Counterproductive

One might object to this overly pessimistic analysis on the grounds that expressed support from currently marginalized individuals or groups should not be so lightly dismissed. After all, those groups may one day be in a position to genuinely effectuate policy influence, at which point BI support pays off in real terms. However, this argument hinges on the view that political support is sticky, and that political factions who have once expressly supported BI would continue doing so when their power position improves. Unfortunately, there is little reason to think that groups that move up on the political ladder will necessarily sustain their support for BI. For, in the absence of policy responsibility, one’s support for BI is cheap in a second relevant sense: there are few political costs associated with supporting BI in an environment in which one is never put in the position of having to defend one’s support against a skeptical—at times even hostile—political base, let alone the electorate. This is even more the case when we consider that furthering the case for BI means precious political capital must be spent at the expense of other political objectives. The political opportunity cost of supporting BI once one has achieved a position of policy responsibility may simply prove too high to be politically sustainable. Thus, we likely find the very same parties or politicians who support BI while in opposition suddenly ditching their support when achieving office, typically as part of a governing coalition. In addition, we may plausibly expect a similar scenario in relation to trade unions who become more powerful, in particular given their internal division about BI because of the strong laborist philosophy inherent to most unions. The fact that cheap political support for BI may not be sufficiently robust to survive a move of its supporters into a position of policy responsibility is not the only problem, however. Worse still, some instances of political support for BI may even be counterproductive as support from one particular faction or group may prevent others from endorsing the same policy. Because political factions generally use identification with policy positions as an instrument to differentiate themselves from their (internal or external) political competitors, support for BI from faction X may prevent faction Y from endorsing a policy that would otherwise naturally fit their political profile. There exists a “first mover disadvantage” to BI being associated with a political faction that is unable to move it up on the policy agenda, when precisely this association prevents more powerful individuals or groups from offering valuable support. In this case, expressed support is not just cheap but represents a real cost in terms of advancing the case for BI. In many countries (e.g., Ireland, Namibia) BI is promoted by groups with a strong religious affiliation, which may well prevent nonconfessional social movements or associations from expressing support. Similarly, BI advocates who adopt a liberal entrepreneurial perspective (e.g., Vivant in Belgium or Götz Werner in Germany) may find it difficult to curry favor with factions endorsing strong socialist values. Initial effects of the identification of BI with one specific faction, combined with the “reactive reluctance” of other factions to support the policy because of such political identification, may produce a form of path dependency that causes BI to be marginalized by association.