Liberalism is declining but continues to be dominant – Chinese hegemony ensures a collapse of the LIO.

Liberals espouse a wide array of views depending on their understanding of the intended purpose of liberal principles. As such, the meaning of ‘liberalism’ diverges in different parts of the world. In the United States, liberalism is associated with the welfare-state policies of the New Deal programmes initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,2 while the ideas of laissez-faire economics exist simultaneously within current American conservatism.3 In Europe, liberalism is most commonly associated with a commitment to government responsibility and social welfare, whereas in Latin America and many post-Communist countries it often relates to socialism, and is hence, generally referred to as social liberalism.4 In China, liberalism refers politically to Western democracy and economically to a market economy.

Despite the above differences, the liberalism in any country generally affirms the principles of equality, freedom, democracy, civil rights, secular government, international cooperation, and the resultant programmes in support thereof. Liberalism first became a distinct political movement after achieving a degree of popularity among Western philosophers and economists during the Age of Enlightenment. In the first half of the 20th century, Western liberalism spread from European democracies to other parts of the world, mainly due the dominance afforded by their victories in both world wars. In the aftermath of WWII, the United States became the de facto leading exponent of liberalism, and its hegemonic power signified the influence on international norms of the American liberalist values of equality and freedom. This is exemplified in Chapter I, Article 1, Clause 2, of the United Nations (UN) Charter reflecting the UN directive: ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’5

Liberal democratic governments achieved great social progress across Western Europe during the Cold War, a development that would reinforce their values in almost all fields as liberalism came to be viewed as a Western ideology in direct opposition to the oppression in the Communist East. With the subsequent success of the US-directed Western camp in its strategic competition with the Soviet-directed Eastern camp, liberalism became the dominant international ideology in the post-Cold War period. This triumph of the Western world led many to believe in the pre-eminence of liberal values. Francis Fukuyama went as far as to say, ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’6

The history of liberalism has been filled with competition from other ideologies—conservatism, secularism, constitutionalism, nationalism, fascism, communism, Islamic fundamentalism, and so on. And yet, despite the aforementioned predictions to the contrary, today it faces challenges once more. In 2016, anti-establishmentarianism gained momentum; in the United States it took the form of Trumpism, while in Europe and other democratic countries it became known as populism.7 Although liberal parties in many countries continue to wield power and influence both domestically and abroad, the combination of Brexit and the 2016 election of Donald Trump dealt a serious blow to the global standing of liberalism. People in both the UK and the United States are now ideologically divided, and liberalism is far less dominant than in the past.

However, the root causes of the decline of liberalism in Western countries differ from those in non-Western countries. In the West, this trend has been mainly the byproduct of the inadequate response of democratic governments, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, to the need to resume their domestic economies. Faced with the inefficiencies of democratic governance, many liberalists, including former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Fukuyama, have made critical comments on this very issue.8 Yoni Appelbaum warns that ‘[w]ith democracy in retreat abroad, its contradictions and shortcomings exposed at home, and its appeal declining with each successive generation… . The greatest danger facing American democracy is complacence. The democratic experiment is fragile, and its continued survival improbable.’9 Younger Americans, for instance, have lost faith in the ability of American democracy to deliver on its promises.10 Among people born before WWII, more than 70% highly value living in a democracy, while for those born after 1980 the number shrinks to less than a third.11 The situation in the United States is not unique, as there is a similar decline of liberalism across most democracies. In Australia and New Zealand, for example, the generation gap in regard to democratic values is comparable with that in the United States.12 Results of a survey of European millennials show that only 32% selected democracy as one of their top five most important social values.13 Increasingly, liberalists in the West seek to reform liberalism, to the extent that some now refer to their political ideals as liberal progressivism, while others style themselves as progressive liberals.14

Meanwhile, the argument for liberalism in non-Western countries has been undermined by both the slowing economic growth of Western countries in comparison to rising states, and the foreign policy double standards that the former have demonstrated. When it comes to economics, global millennials are much more likely than older generations to express positive opinions about the Chinese communist government and its ability to improve living standards as compared with Western governments. At the same time, people in developing countries admire China’s policy of setting clear national priorities that invest greatly in the future, and as a consequence are more open to non-democratic forms of government. In 2011, almost half of global millennials were agreed that the idea of a strong leader was preferable to that of a democratic parliament and elections.15

In addition, the perception that Western countries apply double standards in their foreign policy further undermines the popularity of liberalism. For example, the policies of Western governments towards Arab states have been inconsistent with the professed goal of promoting liberal values in the region. Despite having a far less democratic system of government than the United States, the monarchy of Saudi Arabia has received steady support from the United States due to its status as an important strategic ally, while the secular regime of Syria has been opposed since the so-called Syrian uprising of 2011. This assistance has extended to Saudi Arabia’s military intervention into other Arab states, as demonstrated by the provision of military aid to anti-government forces in Syria and the use of military assets to suppress anti-government forces in Yemen and Bahrain. Furthermore, the Arab Spring Movement that pledged to rid the Arab world of dictators has resulted in new dictatorships rather than liberal governments.16 In fact, quantitative research shows that both military and economic forms of American intervention are more likely to hinder than to promote human rights abroad,17 suggesting the likelihood of a decline rather than a rise of liberalism in the Middle East.

Competing Ideologies in China

The decline of liberalism as a mainstream global political value creates an opportunity for other ideologies to compete for influence. Its successor is likely to originate in a country that achieves greater political and economic success than the United States. Looking ahead over the next decade, China appears to be the sole country with the potential to shrink the comprehensive strength disparity between itself and the United States sufficiently to become a new superpower. Today, people in democratic countries regard China in way a similar to what Europeans once did the United States—as an uncouth land of opportunity and rising economic might.18 Consequently people in many countries fear that the current liberalist order may be replaced with one shaped by Chinese values.19 Christian Reus-Smit has noted, ‘a fear that as power shifts to the East, [the] non-Western great power will seek to reshape international order according to their own values and practices’.20 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently remarked, ‘Very soon we will find ourselves at a point in history when, for the first time since George III, a non-Western, non-democratic state will be the largest economy in the world. If this is the case, how will China exercise its power in the future international order? Will it accept the culture, norms and structure of the post-war order? Or will China seek to change it? I believe this is the single core question for the first half of the twenty-first century, not just for Asia, but for the world.’21

In 2017, the Chinese government announced its plan to increase soft power significantly by 2035, publicly stating that China’s modernisation, ‘offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind’.22 This statement implies a desire on the part of the Chinese government to advance its official ideology and exert global influence. In fact, after the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, the Chinese Communist Party sent international propaganda delegations abroad to introduce its programmes and opinions.23 However, the ideological situation in China is complicated. For one thing, the official ideology advocated by the Chinese government is inconsistent with the popular traditional values espoused by ordinary people. In addition, even Marxism, the official ideology that ostensibly guides domestic administration, differs from the exceptional Chinese traditional culture applicable to foreign policy. In general, there are three powerful ideologies competing for influence in China’s foreign policymaking.

(1) Marxism is the official ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, but it has limited influence on actual foreign policy. The Chinese government has stated that Marxism should guide all areas of its work, such that ‘[i]n developing this culture, we must follow the guidance of Marxism, base our efforts on Chinese culture … We must continue to adapt Marxism to China’s conditions, keep it up-to-date, and enhance its popular appeal.’24 Nevertheless, the Chinese government seems reluctant to mention Marxism when explaining its foreign policy. In fact, the government has not claimed to use Marxism as a guiding principle in its foreign policy since the adoption of the opening up and reform policy in 1978, clearly due to the contradiction between the core idea of class struggle in Marxism and the emphasis on international cooperation imbued in the opening up principle. The later adoption of peaceful development as a fundamental principle made guiding foreign policy through Marxism impossible. Implemented in 2004 with Hu Jintao as Party Secretary, the principle of peaceful development has since become the orthodoxy that guides China’s foreign policy, to the extent that it has now become immutable.25 Since class struggle is the core of Marxism, it cannot possibly harmonise with peaceful development. A return to class struggle in foreign policymaking would, on the contrary, endow on China a much more aggressive international image.

(2) Economic pragmatism has been the ideology most popularly accepted by both the government and ordinary people in China in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms of 1978. As the potential for another world war substantially subsided, economic prosperity became the reference point for judging the appropriateness of an ideology in China. The country’s economic achievements over the last four decades have laid a strong social base for the values of economic pragmatism. Although the Chinese government has not specified economic growth as its primary priority since 2013, most Chinese people still regard the economy as the basis for national comprehensive strength, and therefore, support the elevation of economic interests to the level of a main policy objective. Economic pragmatism has largely established its legitimacy in China through the Marxist argument whereby the economy is the basis of the political superstructure, a perspective that shares certain similarities with the American economic nationalism as represented by Steve Bannon.26 In regard to foreign policy making, both define strategic interest from an economic perspective and stress the importance of foreign trade. At the same time, both are reluctant to take on international responsibility and share the desire to shake off the burden of maintaining world order. It was for this reason that Deng Xiaoping adopted the principle of ‘keeping a low profile’, while Trump espouses ‘America first’.27

(3) Today, traditionalism is gaining momentum among everyday Chinese people, as well as intellectuals and politicians, even though it is not the official ideology. Traditionalism does not exclusively refer to Confucianism, but rather to a combination of all schools of ancient Chinese thought. Despite their differences, each of these schools emphasises the significance of political leadership, as well as the role of strategic credibility, in constituting a base for the solidarity and durability of that leadership. In this regard, they argue that a superpower’s foreign policies should prioritise strategic reputation. To achieve this end, the ancient idea of ‘humane authority’ (wang) promotes the values of benevolence (ren) and justice (yi) in guiding decision-making.28 Traditionalism also advocates the strategy of leading-by-example, and thereby emphasises the importance of a leadership that produces demonstrable achievements. This school of thought encourages China to improve its international strategic reputation by shouldering more international security responsibility, especially in providing neighbours with security protection.

Although traditionalism is not the Chinese government’s official ideology, scholars of traditionalism and the Chinese government are agreed that foreign policy should be guided by Chinese traditional political wisdom rather than any ideology rooted in Western culture, including Marxism. For instance, in 2011 the government issued the white paper China’s Peaceful Development, which stated unequivocally, ‘Taking the path of peaceful development is a strategic choice made by the Chinese government and people, in keeping with the fine tradition of Chinese culture, the development trend of the times, and the fundamental interests of China.’29 In this statement the phrases, ‘development trend of the times’ and ‘fundamental interests of China’ reflect objective factors, and that of the ‘fine tradition of Chinese culture’ the subjective factor. This official document reflects the Chinese government’s intent to take traditional political values into account when formulating foreign policy. Although the Chinese government adjusted its foreign policy guidelines from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achievements’ in 2013, it has nonetheless continued to be guided by Chinese traditional values in its decision-making. For instance, at the Conference on Diplomatic Work towards Surrounding Countries, explanations of new foreign policies included terminology applicable to Chinese traditional values such as qin (closeness), cheng (credibility), hui (beneficence), and rong (inclusiveness).30 These four Chinese characters also appeared in the foreign policy section of the 19th Party Congress report.31

Along with the previously mentioned change in foreign policy guidelines, China has also adjusted its diplomatic posture from that of an ordinary power to a major power, implying a shift in the government’s perception of its current capabilities. At the World Peace Forum in 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained this change through the lens of ancient Chinese philosophy:

The unique features of China’s diplomacy originate in the rich and profound Chinese civilisation. Throughout its five thousand-year history, the Chinese nation has developed the humanistic-oriented concept of loving all creatures as if they were of your species and all people as if they were your brothers, the political philosophy of valuing virtue and balance, the peaceful approach of love, non-aggression and good-neighbourliness, the idea of peace as of paramount importance and harmony without uniformity, as well as the personal conduct of treating others in a way that you would like to be treated, and helping others succeed in the same spirit as you would want to succeed yourself. These traditional values with a unique oriental touch provide an endless source of invaluable cultural asset for China’s diplomacy.32

Regardless of whether or not these benevolent Chinese traditional thoughts have seen application in real policies, the Chinese government has claimed, at least rhetorically, to be guided by them when formulating foreign policy. In fact, citations of ancient Chinese sayings are now a prerequisite for Chinese leaders’ policy speeches. However, the possibility that such Chinese traditional values embrace those of economic pragmatism, so generating a hybrid that guides China’s foreign policies, cannot be ruled out, since economic pragmatism is still very popular among everyday people and bureaucrats.