Triggers threat spiral and self-fulfilling prophecy

With these assumptions as a background (and they are better viewed as assumptions than as facts), what points can be made about the North Korean military threat and US security policy? First, the fact that threats are constructions rather than photographs of reality is worth keeping in mind. What is seen as threatening at one time or to one person may not appear threatening at another time or to another person. Most threats are not self-evident. An excellent example of threat construction – and deconstruction – is the case of North Korea and Iraq, both included in the axis-of-evil triumvirate by President George W. Bush in his January 2002 State of the Union address. At the time, Iraq was continuing a decade-long evasion of required UN inspections. North Korea, on the other hand, appeared to be honoring its 1994 nuclear freeze agreement (although the President was aware of intelligenceinformation suggesting that the North Koreans were cheating on that agreementby pursuing a clandestineuranium-enrichment program). The threat theme for North Korea was containment. The threat theme for Iraq was terrorism and flagrant violation of UN sanctions. And so the Bush administration launched a highly publicized campaign to jus- tify preparations for military action against Iraq. When in early October 2002 the North Koreans admitted to nuclear cheating, the raw material with which to construct a perception of North Korean threat was significantly augmented. And after the North Koreans began to unfreeze their nuclear installations in December 2002, everything pointed to the conclusion that North Korea was a more imminent threat to the United States than was Iraq. North Korea's conventional military was much stronger than Iraq's; the North Koreans had nuclear materials, perhaps even nuclear weapons, along with the means to manufacture more in a short period of time; and the North Koreans had the demonstrated capability to manufacture long-range missiles that might deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. But the Bush administration's carefully constructed threat theme was that Iraq was the greater threat, and so the North Korean threat had to be downplayed. The administration's threat framing actors worked overtime to convince the public that the North Korean issue was not a crisis, and that it could be handled with diplomacy. But few bought the story, and framing actors in the domestic and foreign media questioned the administration's threat assessments. The artificiality of threat perceptions, and the role of trade-offs in addressing threats, were clearly revealed. The apparent reason that North Korea was not treated as a threat was that the United States did not have the military resources to fight two wars simultaneously. Beyond that consideration, it was widely suspected that even without an Iraqi challenge the United States lacked the military means to effectively address a North Korean threat, giving rise to the paradoxical proposition that a provocation from a weak country is more likely to be framed as a threat than provocation from a strong country. The arbitrariness of threat perception – and the actions that are taken to counter threats – is illustrated by an exchange that President Bush had with a reporter at the end of December 2002. Responding to the reporter's widely-shared observation that the United States was preparing for war with Iraq, the President remonstrated, "You said we're headed to war in Iraq – I don't know why you say that. I hope we're not headed to war in Iraq. I'm the person who gets to decide, not you.''~8 The President is, after all, the first threat framer. The counter-intuitive observation that threats are not self-evident is of more than academic interest, because those who feel threatened are inclined to devote their attention and resources to avoiding or eliminating what they fear most, and in doing so, they necessarily neglect other threats or endeavors. To make the best decision in a trade-off situation, it is necessary to make a careful calculation of costs and benefits. And because no single person or small group of persons can make such calculations with complete (or sometimes even acceptable) accuracy, a transparent decision making process is needed to allow diverse input to be fed into the final decision. Such transparency is often lacking in both Washington and Pyongyang. It is well not to overlook the potential for triggering or exacerbating a conflict spiral, or in this case, a threat spiral. Improvements in North Korean military capabilities, or a heightened threat rhetoric, may invite US-ROK military improvements and counter-threats ("axis of evil"), which in turn invite another round of responses from the North Korean military (Kim Jong-il vows to counter a US "hard line" with Pyongyang's own "ultra-hard line." Measured responses and repeated attempts at communication are the best means to defeat such spirals. For North Koreans as well as for Americans, threats appear to be coming from all directions. The Kim Jong-il regime is convinced that its greatest foreign threat comes from the United States. The George W. Bush administration is not as clear about either the absolute or relative danger posed by North Korea. For both countries, part of the threat perception, based as it is on subjective estimates of a potential adversary's intentions, is self-generated. Given the constructivist nature of threats, it is possible for both Americans and North Koreans to reconfigure their views of reality. The tools that can be used to do this shaping include dialogue, propaganda, promises, and incentives, as well as threats, counter-threats, and the military means to back them up. Policy makers in Pyongyang and Washington need to continuously monitor the environment for changes in threat contours, balancing the danger of over-reaction against the danger of complacency.