1---Mehling says theyre not related. The rest of the highlighting on what could be done not causal relationship.

While the EU's proposed CBAM would mark the first time any jurisdiction adopts a BCA targeting foreign goods, it is unlikely to be the last. In Canada, the federal government launched a consultation process to consider how a BCA could help the country meet its climate targets. Similarly, the UK Parliament's Environmental Audit Committee opened an inquiry into BCAs. Meanwhile, in the United States, Senator Christopher A. Coons and Representative Scott H. Peters introduced a bill that would impose a fee on imports of certain carbon-intensive products based on the “domestic environmental cost” incurred by U.S. producers under a portfolio of climate policies. More recently, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has introduced a bill that would impose a BCA on a range of imported goods based on a levy domestic manufacturers would pay for emissions that exceed the industry average. Although designed as a unilateral measure, the EU's CBAM could offer a foundation for international cooperation among like-minded jurisdictions. Recent developments lend support to such a possibility. On the eve of the Glasgow Climate Conference in November 2021, the United States and the EU issued a joint statement on trade in steel and aluminum, an area where the two trading partners have clashed in the past. Under the deal, both sides agreed to expand market access and suspend ongoing trade disputes over steel and aluminum tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO), while also launching negotiations on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum scheduled to conclude by 2024. This agreement would, inter alia, commit participants to “restrict market access for non-participants that do not meet standards for low-carbon intensity.” Another suggestion for international cooperation entailing a possible BCA has come from German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who expressed an interest in forming an international “climate club” during Germany's Group of Seven (G7) Presidency in 2022. While the G7 Statement on Climate Club adopted in June 2022 does not specifically mention BCAs, it commits the G7 to the establishment of “an open and cooperative international Climate Club” by the end of 2022, and expressly mentions “countering carbon leakage at the international level” as one of its goals. While international cooperation on BCAs is thus emerging as a policy option on both sides of the Atlantic, it is less evident what shape such cooperation might take. Some calls for cooperation involving BCAs have invoked the concept of a “climate club” without offering a clear definition of the concept. As evidenced by the vision set out by G7, the notion of a “club” is typically used in a much broader sense than that proposed in economic theory, where it entails an excludable “club good”—that is, a benefit to which only members have access—as well as penalties for non-compliant members and non-members. Several ideal types of clubs can be distinguished: normative clubs, under which like-minded members commit to achieving certain climate policy goals; bargaining clubs to enable more efficient negotiations of objectives, targets, and policies among major powers; and transformational clubs, which set legally binding rules for members and offer incentives for participation and compliance in the form of club goods and sanctioning. While the latter best describes the prominent call for a “climate club” articulated by economist William Nordhaus, the “club” designation is still often used to refer to any form of international climate cooperation with less than universal participation. Irrespective of whether it merits the label of a “club,” cooperation on BCAs between two or more trading partners will have to address three main questions. First, what legal form should international cooperation on BCAs take? International law in “her infinite variety” comprises a range of possible instruments, each of which can generate varying legal effects. Closely related to form is a second question, namely: through what forum—existing or new—can and should such cooperation be pursued? And third, what would constitute the substance of such cooperation, both in procedural and material terms? While not offering definitive answers to these questions, we consider the landscape of options policymakers will need to navigate. In pursuing cooperation on BCAs, jurisdictions have the option of enshrining such cooperation in a legally binding treaty or in more informal arrangements without binding status.Footnote17 A formal treaty would signal a strong commitment, as most states require domestic ratification, usually involving approval by a legislature. Even in the absence of a formal enforcement mechanism, legally binding treaty obligations may exert a “compliance pull,” for instance by making non-compliance less attractive due to the reputational damage caused. Treaties also tend to be more amenable to enforcement in domestic legal orders.Footnote18 While offering greater legal certainty, however, treaties are more cumbersome to negotiate and ratify as compared to informal agreements. Pursuing a treaty containing legally binding provisions may also make it more challenging to attract participation by states, and may altogether rule out participation of subnational jurisdictions, such as provinces or municipalities. By contrast, more informal arrangements—such as a memorandum of understanding—would not only avoid the foregoing drawbacks but could also allow for greater flexibility in the face of evolving circumstances.Footnote19 While details remain sparse, the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum, for instance, is likely to be non-binding in nature. Given that BCAs are only beginning to see concrete elaboration, such flexibility appears particularly desirable at this early stage, enabling international cooperation to better adjust to unfolding political dynamics at the domestic and international level. Even if states agree on a legally binding treaty, not all provisions need to be binding: international cooperation on BCAs could include a combination of non-binding objectives and principles as well as binding procedural obligations. Such binding obligations would offer greater legal certainty, but they would likewise be more challenging to negotiate and, depending on their substance, may require ratification at the domestic level. Although international cooperation on BCAs could emerge within its own political and institutional context, as the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum illustrates, embedding it within an existing forum could offer benefits. Not only would it provide a setting for the political negotiations preceding cooperation, but it could also afford an institutional “home” with existing administrative and financial resources. Different options exist to institutionalize cooperation on BCAs, each with different implications for the relevant procedures, actors, and political dynamics. One such option is cooperation under the international climate regime. Cooperation on BCAs could be framed as promoting the implementation of parties’ nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Parties could negotiate the terms of cooperation through existing processes, such as the annual climate summits, and build on operational support from the standing bodies of the international climate regime. Another international regime that could provide a forum for cooperation is the WTO, under whose auspices members could initiate dialogue through relevant bodies such as the Committee on Trade and Environment. Indeed, BCAs are expected to feature in the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, an initiative recently launched by a subset of WTO members. Given political realities, however, options for more substantive engagement under the WTO regime—such as plurilateral trade agreements or a customs union—are unlikely to offer a basis for cooperation on divisive trade-restrictive measures such as BCAs. “Minilateral” approaches outside a multilateral regime may therefore hold greater promise, although these could again evolve within the confines of an existing institution whose structures and processes would facilitate the necessary dialogue. Germany, for instance, has endorsed discussing its proposed “climate club” within the G7 and, subsequently, the Group of Twenty. Both groups of countries are informal gatherings without a mandate to adopt binding agreements, but they can serve as a vehicle for signaling political commitment. By contrast, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which has recently expressed interest in fostering cooperative engagement around BCAs, represents a type of formal organization that possesses a sizeable career staff and abundant technical and epistemic resources, all of which it could leverage to foster cooperation on BCAs. Finally, cooperation on BCAs could occur through bilateral arrangements. The proposed CBAM, for instance, envisions the ability of the EU to “conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries.” Although the geographic scope of such bilateral cooperation would be limited, it could provide the nucleus for expanded BCA cooperation over time—for instance through inclusion in regional agreements, such as the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability launched in 2019 by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.

2---Carbon border tax violates international principles and growth – Liu Youbin reiterated it would undermine mutual trust – prefer an actual Chinese minister.

3---China and India are firmly opposed to climate strategies – it makes up most of their emissions and would not adopt domestic trade measures – that’s 1AC Meyer.

4---NO CLIMATE CLUBS.

A---IMPLICIT PRICING---climate club premised on carbon pricing fails – the US says no to the club – that makes member unrealistic or excludes China – the AFF doesn’t solve. That’s TCB.