GMI requires a means test based off of needs --- it isn’t universal

Deeming 17 (Deeming, Christopher. Senior Lecturer in Social Policy @ Strathclyde University, PhD from the University of Bristol. “Defining Minimum Income (and Living) Standards in Europe: Methodological Issues and Policy Debates” School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol. Social Policy & Society (2017) 16:1, 33–48, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474641500041X. Accessed 7/13/23)

Most European countries have a comprehensive set of income support programs to protect households from income shocks and poverty. These include both social insurance and social assistance transfers. Social insurance programs, such as unemployment benefits, protect workers from loss of income due to unemployment, and eligibility is typically time-limited and requires individuals to have made sufficient contributions while employed. Social assistance (or income support) transfers are typically not linked to contributions but tend to be categorical, such as universal child benefits, or means tested, and aim to protect households from poverty or compensate for higher expenditures (e.g., child benefits). At the center of means-tested benefits are Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) schemes, which play the role of last-resort income support programs aimed at protecting working-age households from poverty. Such schemes become increasingly important in the context of economic shocks and have played an important role in in protecting households from the economic consequences of lockdowns in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic.1

The primary objective of GMI schemes is to provide households with enough income to prevent them falling into poverty.2 Benefit levels are typically determined by comparing household “needs” with household “means”. Needs reflect both household size and composition, as well as other characteristics such as disability status and local housing costs. Means reflect income both from work and assets. The means-tested nature of GMI schemes, with benefits withdrawn as other household income increases, can result in strong work disincentives. While eligibility is typically not time limited at the outset, it may be conditioned on working adults being available and searching for work to help mitigate the work disincentives inherent in means-tested schemes. Indeed, many schemes embed periodic reassessment of eligibility which, in practice, could result in recipients becoming ineligible for GMI payments.