economic decline triggers diversionary wars, guaranteeing conflict

This approach views a bad economy as a driving force incentivizing political leaders to initiate diversionary conflict as a way of proving their ability to lead the country (e.g. Bennett & Nordstrom, 2000; Brule´, Marshall & Prins, 2010; Fordham, 1998; Heldt, 1999; Solt, 2011). Of course, the leaders could also gain support by rebooting the economy, but they often feel unable to do so. International conflict can yield two distinct benefits to domestically threatened leaders (Haynes, 2017). First, an external threat increases internal cohesion. Many studies of intergroup psychology have found that favorable attitudes toward in-group members become stronger when individuals perceive a more severe threat from (or competition with) out-group members. Thus, a conflict with a foreign state can help an incumbent leader maintain political control (Theiler, 2018). Second, when facing domestic concerns about political leadership, leaders can engage in military conflict to demonstrate their competence (Richards et al., 1993). If they meet public expectations or even achieve a glorious outcome, their popularity can be restored. The effects of economic conditions on international conflict have long been debated, at least since Ostrom & Job’s (1986) study of US presidents’ use of force. Based on statistical analyses in large-N studies, some scholars have argued that the diversionary theory of war is supported only by anecdotal evidence, and that there is no significant relationship between domestic unrest and international conflict (Leeds & Davis, 1997; Meernik & Waterman, 1996). Even if some historical cases are classified as diversionary conflicts, these scholars contend, we cannot generalize a causal theory from them. Indeed, few insist that domestic unrest is a sufficient condition for international conflict, though it may cause political leaders to contemplate conflict initiation. Some studies even argue that domestically troubled states tend to be targets, not initiators, of international conflicts due to their weakened capability and unwillingness to fight (Blainey, 1988; Clark, Fordham & Nordstrom, 2011; Foster, 2006). Thus, during the last four decades, studies of diversionary conflict have aimed to identify (1) the conditions under which such conflicts occur, (2) the types of domestic unrest that produce international conflict, and (3) alternative options to the diversionary use of force against foreign states, as discussed below. First, many studies have shed light on dyadic or domestic conditions that facilitate diversionary conflict. Domestically challenged leaders are prudent in choosing their diversionary targets so as to remain in office. Targeting a territorial or strategic rival can revive domestic support because there is little need to justify the military action to the domestic public (Heldt, 1999; Mitchell & Prins, 2004; Tir, 2010). Also, political leaders may target states with rising power and/or a different identity to exploit their domestic audience’s fear of these rivals (Jung, 2014a), whereas they avoid attacking states that are either too powerful or too weak, because either winning is impossible or it will not strengthen their domestic standing (Tarar, 2006). Human rights violators may become democratic regimes’ diversionary targets because a liberal audience readily supports humanitarian intervention (Tokdemir & Mark, 2018).