Conflict not confined an escalation—US and every country in east asia gets involved
Newsham 20- retired US Marine Officer and a Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellow
Grant Newsham, "War in the Taiwan Strait is not unthinkable," Asia Times, 1-15-2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/war-in-the-taiwan-strait-is-not-unthinkable/-- 嘉玮
Conflict not confined
A fight over Taiwan will most likely not be confined geographically to the Taiwan Strait area – nor restrained in the level and scope of violence. And the US will likely get involved. Once that happens, the possibility of eventual nuclear escalation cannot be ruled out.
Indeed, the prospect of US involvement is near 100% once Americans in Taiwan are killed. Nothing unifies Americans more. Even worse for Xi, despite a 45-year track record of appeasement of China’s ambitions, the United States is finally waking up to the threat faced by the island democracy, as evidenced by recent National Defense Strategy documents, passage of the Taiwan Travel Act and other Congressional declarations calling for increased support for Taiwan.
Notably, support for Taiwan appears to have overwhelming bipartisan support, including from politicians who loathe President Donald Trump and resist him on every other matter.
Whether this stern approach to China will survive a change in US administration and the potential return of a PRC “engagement” faction in business, academia, and officialdom is an open question. Indeed, former US State Department East Asian Affairs acting director Susan Thornton advised Chinese Communist officials several months ago to just wait for another more accommodating administration.
Moreover, after too many years of US leaders – military and civilian – dismissing the Chinese military threat, a fight won’t be easy for the US. Even getting in close to support Taiwan militarily will be difficult and costly. The PLA has had two decades to upgrade its military and is, unfortunately, a match for the US in certain areas – or even superior.
That said, the American military is still powerful. Although it requires urgent improvements, the US military can still take on the People’s Liberation Army.
Chinese submarines, ships and aircraft will go down, together with the “only-child” sons manning them. The sorrow of the thousands of mainland Chinese families who were allowed only one child may not bother senior CCP officials, though, as there is a large, “spare” unmarried male population. In pursuit of Xi’s “China Dream,” Beijing may be less concerned about casualties than one imagines.
Rather, the bigger worry for Beijing might be the simple embarrassment of losing troops, ships and aircraft in such numbers that the CCP leadership appears clueless about what it has gotten into. As important, economic difficulties caused by the conflict might add to such perceptions on the part of the Chinese public.
Nations often rally around leaders once the shooting starts, even as casualties, hardships, and expenses mount. With Beijing’s firm control over its propaganda and internal security apparatus, it is possible that the PRC will become a fiercer, even more implacable enemy after losing tens of thousands of military personnel, and (foreseeably) some number of civilians. Still, it is entirely foreseeable that the Chinese public and Xi’s rivals might blame “Xi Jinping Thought” for their problems.
But for Beijing it still might be worth the costs given Taiwan’s value from a strategic geography perspective alone. Seize Formosa and the PRC has breached the so-called First Island Chain that effectively hems in Chinese forces and prevents unfettered access to the Pacific Ocean. PLA forces operating from Taiwan would undercut the entire US and allied defense posture in the Western Pacific. It would be a huge psychological blow to American prestige, and to Japan’s confidence in its ability to survive a similar assault.
American nervous system
Despite 18 years of the “Long War,” in reality, the US has gotten used to relatively painless wars in recent times. The immediate human costs alone of a war arising over Taiwan will be a shock. A few years ago four US Special Forces soldiers were killed in an ambush in Niger, and it was considered a national catastrophe. One wonders how the American public, and political class, will respond to losing 5,000 sailors and Marines in an afternoon.
Even the US military will be jolted. Recall the surprise of British forces (and the public) when Argentine bombs and missiles started sinking Royal Navy ships during the Falklands War in 1982. A fight with China will be much worse. US leadership spent too many years ignoring or denying the possibility.
As a result of the bloodshed, the US and PRC relationship will be hostile for decades to come. You don’t kill thousands of each other’s citizens and just forget about it. Not even long-time “Friend of China” Henry Kissinger and former Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson, who played key roles in paralyzing the US strategic response to China’s increasingly antagonistic rise, will be welcome in Beijing – and one hopes they would not be inclined to visit in any event.
For most “average” Americans, the allure of cheap Chinese goods at Wal-Mart will fade as the first casualties are announced, and even Wall Street bankers (some of them, at least) will realize they are, after all, flag-waving Americans. In the case of those with less patriotic and pro-democracy instincts, financial sanctions will likely prevent them from doing business with the enemy.
There is an added risk for Beijing. What if Tokyo publicly admits what it has long thought: that Japan’s first line of defense is Taiwan?
The Japan Self-Defense Forces are professional, well equipped and (in some cases) formidable – particularly the Japanese navy with its submarine and anti-submarine warfare units. It is hard to imagine a Taiwan Strait conflict not expanding to include Japan: it will either be compelled to support the US for fear of breaking the Japan-US alliance or it will be forced to respond to a Chinese attack on its territory, and seizure of certain of Japan’s southern Nansei Shoto islands as part of the PLA’s campaign against Taiwan.
So while Japan has spent decades pretending it is exempt from war and the serious requirement of preparing for it, conflict just might come its way, unbidden.
Tokyo either assents to PRC domination and ends its alliance with the United States – or rapidly improves its military capabilities – to perhaps include nuclear weapons. Most importantly, Japan and its military must be prepared to shoot – and that will be a huge psychological shift for the JSDF and Japanese society writ large.
Japan’s defense capability is less than it appears on paper, owing to decades of pathological dependence on the United States. But a crisis is often necessary to spur Japan’s ruling class into action. A shoot-up over Taiwan just might be crisis enough for Tokyo.
And while all this is happening around Taiwan, what does North Korea do? One plausible scenario is an attack on South Korea – both as a distraction to benefit Beijing’s efforts against Taiwan and the US, and as an outright effort to topple the ROK government and unify the peninsula on Pyongyang’s terms. Even launching a handful of missiles against the South or towards Japan would stir things up considerably, and stretch available US forces for the Taiwan front.
A fight over Taiwan would also force other countries to decide whose side they are on. This choice may come quickly for Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia if the Straits of Malacca are closed. This would signify the end of the convenient (but impossible to continue) global fantasy in which nations have avoided choosing sides while pretending the PRC is a benign country, like a really big Canada.
Nuclear weapons might start to look like a necessary option for more than a few countries besides Japan – Australia and South Korea, for instance.
As a logical outcome, one expects the world will split into rival camps, and with a considerable degree of economic disengagement. The US perhaps has the advantage for now, but suppose the PRC prevails (even modestly) in the conflict, and ASEAN nations decide to align with China more than is presently the case. And beyond into Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the PRC might be viewed as the safer long-term bet.
As noted, there is a possibility of the conflict spreading well beyond Asia as the US and partners shut down PRC bases and other facilities overseas that are useful for military and commercial purposes, or seize or sink China-bound merchant vessels – and any PLA Navy ships that present themselves.
The PRC will not sit idly, however. For starters, it is already capable of targeting US bases and forces in Japan and the Central Pacific and presumably will do so, further expanding the conflict and fueling tit-for-tat escalation.