Diversionary War Theory false –

A widely accepted belief is that international conflict unifies states and that leaders use external threats to rally support (Richards et al., 1993). This view is affirmed by A Study of War that states that "foreign war as a remedy for internal tension, revolution, or insurrection has been an accepted principle of government" (Wright, 1942, p. 140). Academics understand the diversionary theory of war as poor domestic conditions that motivate the leader to engage in aggressive foreign behavior (Levy, 1989; Richards et al., 1993). These internal conflicts can be social or economic problems (Gent, 2009). The assertive policy brings a fractured nation together as the public ignores the domestic problems, while a "rally around the flag" effect is also seen (Richards et al., 1993; Tarar, 2006).

Related to the diversionary war theory is the "rally around the flag" phenomenon. This effect is credited to Mueller (1970), who describes it as the short-lived popularity of leaders during times of international crisis. Concretely, conflicts on the international level generate a rally around the flag effect, where members of society become more patriotic and supportive of the leader that subsequently stays in power (Haynes, 2015; MacKuen, 1983). As a result of the rally effect, leaders could engage in international conflicts to distract the population from domestic struggles (Mitchell & Prins, 2004; Ward & Widmaier, 1982). Furthermore, copious amounts of evidence exist that support this phenomenon (Mitchell & Prins, 2004). Due to the fact that the "rally around the flag" effect is such a crucial element for the research question, it will have a separate part dedicated to the subject.

Within the diversionary theory, the assumption exists that crises are a constant of the international environment, but not every crisis will capture the public's attention (Meernik & Waterman, 1996). Hence, international disputes are not interchangeable when trying to improve domestic popularity; public opinion will not always agree with the vital national interest that needs protection that is presented by the leader (Jentleson, 1992; Meernik & Waterman, 1996; Tir, 2010).

Nonetheless, leaders will want to gather a large amount of support for their public policies. As a result, they will act in a way that pleases the general public, if not, a negative opinion by said public is capable of stifling the course of the leader's policy (Foster & Palmer, 2006). In other words, the constituency wields the actual political power. So, Foster and Palmer (2006) claim that when the public favor declines, leaders can choose to use force abroad since it creates group cohesion and generates a rally. Leaders, however, are admittedly more concerned about maintaining popularity among people whose support they need, which makes them more inclined to use diversionary force when the approval rating declines among their party members (Foster & Palmer, 2006).

Based on further evidence, the tiny boost in approval ratings is not enough incentive to use military force during an international crisis (Meernik & Waterman, 1996). Therefore, the political conditions on the domestic level are rarely connected to the use of force (Meernik & Waterman, 1996; Lian & Oneal, 1993; Richards et al., 1993). Furthermore, there exists little factual evidence of a relationship between the declining approval ratings of leaders and their subsequent engagement in international disputes (Foster & Palmer, 2006; James, 1987; Richards et al., 1993), especially in cross-national studies (Mitchell & Prins, 2004). Thus, this possibly indicates that there's no consistency between diverting the constituency with war during times of electoral disapproval (Foster & Palmer, 2006).