Diversionary Conflicts don’t escalate – Economic decline causes invasion of weak nations

First, many studies have shed light on dyadic or domestic conditions that facilitate diversionary conflict. Domestically challenged leaders are prudent in choosing their diversionary targets so as to remain in office. Targeting a territorial or strategic rival can revive domestic support because there is little need to justify the military action to the domestic public (Heldt, 1999; Mitchell & Prins, 2004; Tir, 2010). Also, political leaders may target states with rising power and/or a different identity to exploit their domestic audience’s fear of these rivals (Jung, 2014a), whereas they avoid attacking states that are either too powerful or too weak, because either winning is impossible or it will not strengthen their domestic standing (Tarar, 2006). Human rights violators may become democratic regimes’ diversionary targets because a liberal audience readily supports humanitarian intervention (Tokdemir & Mark, 2018).

Another condition for the onset of diversionary conflict is regime type. Some scholars claim that democratic leaders facing hard times domestically are more likely than authoritarian ones to initiate diversionary conflict (Gelpi, 1997; Smith, 1996). These researchers have concluded that a bad economy, an upcoming election, and low approval ratings may encourage democracies to pursue international conflicts. But others oppose this argument, countering that democratic leaders are more constrained by other political actors such as opposition parties and legislatures (Miller, 1995) and less capable of hiding their diversionary incentives (Bell, 2013). Following this logic, some would expect authoritarian regimes to be more likely diverters than democratic ones. Indeed, non-personalist leaders of juntas and one-party regimes are concerned about their states’ political and military elites, so they sometimes exploit international events to maintain domestic control (Weeks, 2014).

Second, some studies have examined how distinct types of domestic unrest may push leaders to engage in international conflict. Because diversionary incentives cannot be measured directly, many studies focus on a particular type of domestic unrest: political, economic, social, or military. Little consensus has been reached, however. Some use economic variables such as unemployment and inflation rates or the Gini index as proxies for diversionary incentives (Fordham, 1998; Solt, 2011). But this measurement is invalid if the domestic public blames previous leaders or foreign actors for a bad Jung 3 economy. In fact, when a leader has recently assumed office or when a global economic crisis occurs, the domestic public typically shows support for its leadership even while demanding economic reforms.

Other analyses have measured political unrest in terms of congressional opposition (Brule´, 2006), partisan support (Morgan & Bickers, 1992), upcoming elections (Gaubatz, 1991), presidential scandals (Hendrickson, 2002), low presidential approval ratings (Li, James & Drury, 2009), and coup risk (Miller & Elgu¨n, 2011). However, political events vary in terms of the number of participants, intensity of opposition to leadership, and effects on the central government in charge of foreign affairs. Therefore, a few studies have focused on the political leader’s party and his or her support base to measure the extent to which the leadership was shaken (Brule´ & Williams, 2009; Fordham, 1998). In addition, collecting data on political events across nations and times is difficult, so only relatively recent information on developed states is reliably attainable and usable for testing the diversionary hypothesis.

Third, some studies have pointed out alternatives to targeting foreign states in response to domestic challenges. Political leaders can resolve domestic problems directly, rather than divert public attention from them, by carrying out domestic reforms. Oakes (2012) described the failure of economic reform by the junta as a precondition for its occupation of the Falklands. Moreover, political leaders sometimes choose to repress opposition voices and strengthen internal control (Davies, 2016; Enterline & Gleditsch, 2000). If reform and repression are unavailable, domestically challenged leaders may target ethnic or religious minority groups or refugees and exploit the majority’s in-group cohesion without risking high costs (Oakes, 2012: ch. 5; Savun & Gineste, 2019; Tir & Jasinski, 2008). These studies highlight a menu for political leaders facing domestic problems, which includes foreign diversion as well as domestic reform, repression, and internal diversion.

To summarize, domestic unrest has been widely seen as causing international conflict. When the economy worsens, for example, political leaders often struggle to maintain domestic control and may view conflict with a foreign state as a way to divert public attention and gain domestic support. However, there is mixed evidence to support this theory of diversionary conflict. Therefore, various types of domestic unrest and their interactions with other variables should be considered to provide a more satisfactory explanation of international conflict based on sound empirical evidence.