An equitable basic income system must be universal and allow worker voice to influence policy

[Kourtney, DIONNE POHLER , RAFAEL GOMEZ , AND AKSHAY MOHAN, “Public Policy in a Time of Crisis: A Framework for Evaluating Canada’s COVID-19 Income Support Programs,” Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, JSTOR, Accessed 6/25/23, JCP – PL]

In the context of income support programs, equity is a standard of fairness in both distributive outcomes and process, and it also encompasses public economic notions of vertical and horizontal equity. Horizontal and vertical equity considerations imply, respectively, that those in similar circumstances (i.e., job loss) should receive similar supports and that those in dissimilar circumstances (i.e., with greater needs) should receive differing treatment (i.e., more supports). Notions of horizontal equity might require that income support provide relief when a job is lost, whereas notions of vertical equity might require that income support be provided when someone is unable to work.

Payments in an equitable income support system are also made without favouritism toward one person or one group over another, and equitable systems treat individual recipients with respect and sensitivity and protect their privacy. Equity also includes the existence of safeguards—such as the ability to appeal a denial of benefits to a neutral party—and transparency to prevent arbitrary or capricious decision making and enhance accountability. A more equitable income support system would also deliver benefits to targeted recipients independent of resources or expertise (e.g., asking participants to apply to programs with complex eligibility criteria or using an Internet-based application may lead to unequal access) and is equally accessible to targeted beneficiaries irrespective of gender or race.

Voice is the third objective, and it is the one that is most often ignored in the design and evaluation of public policies. Although equity and voice are closely related, they are treated as distinct concepts in contemporary IR. Because equity in distribution can be achieved without providing beneficiaries any real power or input into decisions that affect them, Budd (2004, 23) adds voice to the equity–efficiency framework’s evaluation criteria as a separate “standard of participation or involvement [and] the ability [for individuals] to have meaningful input into decisions” that affect their lives. Viewed through a lens of the voice objective, public policies can have a dampening effect on the ability of individuals to have meaningful input, such as when programs create inequalities in bargaining power among different labour market actors. For instance, providing wage subsidies or top-ups for firms’ essential workers may place more power in the hands of employers, whereas direct income support paid to individuals may place more power in the hands of workers.

There is a massive empirical literature in both management and IR documenting how workplace voice can lead to higher productivity via greater employee engagement and suggestions for efficiency-enhancing improvements (see Freeman and Medoff 1984; Morrison 2011; Pohler and Luchak 2014). Notwithstanding its impact on efficiency, opportunities for workers to use their voice meaningfully are intrinsically important, regardless of whether they are efficient (Budd and Colvin 2008). Voice as an objective is tied to an understanding that labour should not be treated as a commodity because it is embodied in a human being (Budd 2004) and that meaningful input requires relatively equal bargaining power between employers and workers (Webb and Webb 1897).

Whether the voice objective is balanced alongside efficiency and equity objectives in an income support program is determined by the extent to which it provides workers with a realistic fall-back option to losing a job, because this enables them to express concerns, for instance, about personal protective equipment in their workplace during the pandemic. Research has shown that legislated employment rights (e.g., to refuse unsafe work) are unfortunately not always enough to ensure protection for workers, particularly in non-unionized workplaces (Lewchuk 2013; Pohler and Riddell 2019; Reilly, Paci, and Holl 1995; Walters 1996; Weil 1999). Knowing that you may not be eligible for income replacement or support benefits if you are terminated from your job might also prevent you from airing such grievances to your employer or to a Ministry of Labour official. Even though workers across Canada have access to joint health and safety committees and an internal responsibility system that empowers them to refuse unsafe work, workers who lack union or professional licensing protection, and who are otherwise fearful or insecure about their employment, are less likely to voice their concerns to managers or third parties (Harcourt and Harcourt 2000; Kissinger 2017; Walters and Denton 1990; Walters and Haines 1988).

What options do workers have if their employer does not address their concerns, if they are at higher risk of COVID-19 mortality, or if they are unable to perform their job from home? In non-union settings, the answer is “not many” (see, e.g., Pohler and Riddell 2019; Weil 1999). Thus, crisis income support programs should also be evaluated on how they affect the ability of workers (particularly low-income workers) to express (voice) concerns about workplace safety and their own risk preferences.

In summary, to achieve optimal social and economic outcomes and, in particular, stated public health objectives during a crisis such as COVID-19, it is important to carefully design labour and social policies in such a way that they balance efficiency with equity and voice. Table 1 provides a description of the three EEV objectives with some of the suggested measures adapted to the crisis income support programs outlined in this section. In the next section, we apply these ideas to qualitatively evaluate the crisis programs introduced by the federal government and then compare these programs with alternative crisis proposals.