4. History. Courts assume OLRC’s reading is correct unless they’re blatantly incompatible

EPA argues that the Office's determination of the text of Section 111(d) presented in the United States Code is entitled to no deference, see EPA Br. 46-49, refusing to acknowledge that Congress provided that the contents of the Code “establish prima facie the laws of the United States.” 1 U.S.C. § 204(a). Instead of offering any interpretation of this statutory provision, EPA relies on a footnote in United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964), for the remarkable proposition that the Code “is entitled to ‘no weight.’ ” Id. at 99 n.4. EPA neglects to mention that the Welden footnote dealt only with the “change of arrangement” of statutes and merely applied the rule that even when Congress changes the arrangement of statutes, “it will not be inferred that Congress ... intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.” Id. (quotation omitted).

EPA also states that “the text in the Statutes at Large controls” over the Code when “there [is] a substantive difference between the two.” EPA Br. 47. Instead of identifying any “substantive difference,” EPA relies upon a failed conforming amendment that the Office correctly determined could not be executed because it did not have priority over an earlier substantive amendment in the same bill. EPA refers to the Section 302(a) conforming amendment as “unexecuted text” and demands that it be “considered and given effect.” EPA Br. 48 n.23. But it has been “considered” by the Office and found to have no effect because it did not have execution priority. Given that a *15 separate provision in the same bill deletes the text it would amend, there is no effect for it to have. Even if it had priority over the earlier substantive Section 108(g) amendment, the result would be the same: After Section 302(a) conformed the cross-reference, the cross-reference would then be deleted by Section 108(g) and replaced with the language that is in the Code. Thus, the text of Section 111(d) in the Code is exactly the same as it would be if the two amendments were executed in reverse order.

EPA demands authority to second-guess the determination made by an expert, nonpartisan legislative agency so that EPA can reach a different result by ignoring the rule that is routinely applied by the Office, and is consistent with Congress's drafting manuals, that amendments are to be executed in order. EPA would instead execute amendments in reverse order, see EPA Br. 48 n.22,9 or alternatively refuse to execute an earlier amendment whenever EPA finds a later amendment would fail as a result, so both amendments fail. EPA Br. 53. What EPA would do is irrelevant. The task of executing amendments is the job of the Office, not EPA.

In justifying its request to supersede the Office's determination, EPA says its rival “is not a ‘legislative agency’ ” because it does not “make law.”10 *16 EPA Br. 47. Yet the Office is directed by the Law Revision Counsel who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Speaker.11 Accordingly, the Law Revision Counsel and by extension the Office he directs are “subservient” to Congress. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) ( “In constitutional terms, the removal powers over the Comptroller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress.”). Moreover, Congress has rules that permit Members to raise “questions of privilege” to countermand determinations of its agents that are inconsistent with the views of Congress. See Rule Ix, Rules of the House of Representatives, 113th Cong. (2013); see, e.g., H.R. Res. 362, 101st Cong. (1990); 136 Cong. Rec. 4997, 5005-06 (199) (question of privilege used to countermand determination of House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group). Here, Members of Congress received the second supplement to the 1988 edition of the United States Code early in 1991 containing the Office's determination. Murray Energy has found no evidence that any Member challenged the determination using a question of privilege or by other means.

Additionally, the Office assists in the one-time process of repeal and reenactment of the provisions of each title of the Code, referred to as “positive law codification.” 2 U.S.C. § 285b. In the positive law codification of the Clean Air Act recently completed by the Office and submitted to Congress, the *17 text prohibits Section 111(d) mandates for “any air pollutant ... emitted from a source category that is regulated under section 211112 of this title.” Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States House of Representatives, Draft 55 U.S.C. § 211111(d).12 In preparing positive law codification, the Office “actively seeks input from Federal agencies, congressional committees, and others with expertise in the area of law.” Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States House of Representatives, Positive Law Codification in the United States Code at 3. The Office prepared a document detailing changes and corrections that it recommended, and none were made for Section 111(d). Law Revision Counsel, Discussion Draft, Explanation of H.R. _____, to Enact Certain Laws Relating to the Environment as Title 55, United States Code, “Environment” (2014), available at http://uscode.house.gov/ codification/t55/exp.pdf.

The only circumstances justifying a departure from the text of the Code are those where the Office's determination is plainly inconsistent with the Statutes at Large or is unreasonable. Neither circumstance is present here. The Office duly executed an important substantive amendment rather than refusing to do so because later in the same bill Congress included a superfluous conforming amendment. For EPA to step in 25 years later in order to second-guess the Office unduly interferes with the functioning of the legislative process.