b---subjectivity – it’s unethical to defend immoral positions.

6. Why should not lawyers have the right and the moral permission to accept immoral causes? Why is it wrong to accept? In order to answer these questions we must first answer the same question posed before with respect to the client: what are the moral reasons that vie in favour of and against accepting. These reasons are certainly prima facie, i.e. defeasible in particular cases. As we shall see, we can always find situations in which these reasons are superseded by others. However, in most cases, there seems to be no moral reason to accept such cases. Instead, there are strong reasons against accepting. The fundamental reason not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is obvious: it is morally wrong to help someone do something wrong. As we have seen, the client has a right to pursue such a purpose in spite of not having moral permission to do so. If the client’s actions are wrong, contributing specifically, and in full awareness, to the performance of such actions must also be (prima facie) wrong. It must be remembered here that considerations related to the adversarial system or the right of defence are no longer relevant. These considerations are sufficient to support a right to accept, but they do not give a reason. 18 Neither do these considerations override moral reasons against accepting. Suppose I have the right to enter into any (legally permitted) association or club, but I have a moral reason not to enter association P (for instance, P is a racist club). Having a right to become a member of P does not override or diminish my reason against doing so.19 Similarly, having a right to accept a client with a wrong purpose does not affect the moral reason I have for not accepting this client. There are additional reasons against accepting representation for immoral causes. First, the resources devoted to representing an unjust cause might be assigned to other, valuable (or at least not unjust) ones. This is particularly important in countries where legal resources are far from being justly distributed. Second, in many cases, the representation of an unjust cause typically contributes to the success of other unjust or immoral causes, especially when the case is institutionally relevant (appeals to the Supreme Court, cases of public interest, etc.).