Regardless of whether we solve – shunning them is still a moral imperative

Let us adopt Tiemstra's idea of calling this kind of sanction behavior "shunning." We find shunning most explicitly developed in the customs of certain Mennonite groups. The fundamental question of this paper will be whether there is indeed a moral duty to shun certain regimes because of their immorality. I begin with a formal definition of shunning: An individual or institution A shuns another individual br institution B when A, in part or totally, refuses to engage in social, economic or political interaction with B (avoids B) as a witness against flagrant, willful and persistent immoral behavior by B. Note that shunning is distinct from avoidance behavior motivated by considerations of self-interest. Thus a nation is not shunning when it bans the sale of strategic materials to an enemy, nor is an individual shunning if he refuses to associate with another out of fear that he will be "led astray" by the latter's vices.