Deconstruction forces contradiction.

A serious philosophical argument often brought against deconstruction, for example by Habermas (1987: 185–210), is that it is subject to the performative contradiction. Simply put, this mistake is made when there is a contradiction between what you say, and the way in which you say it. Thus Habermas claims that when Derrida argues against reason, he has to make use of rational means. ‘Anyone who argues against reason is necessarily caught up in a contradiction: she asserts at the locutionary level that reason does not exist, while demonstrating by way of her performance in argumentative processes that such reason does in fact exist’ (Fleming, 1996: 169). The claim made above – that we can never have complete knowledge of complex systems – falls into the same trap. It looks like an absolute statement about complex things but denies that such a statement can be made. Whether Habermas is correct in his assessment that Derrida argues against reason13 is of less importance now than it is to look at the ‘logic’ of the performative contradiction. The first thing one should notice is that most careful or modest claims will come under pressure from this test. The claim ‘no sentence has an exact meaning’ obviously fails the test, but the claim ‘perhaps some sentences are not perfectly clear’ is also in trouble. If it is correct, then the sentence itself is perfectly clear. If it is not correct, then perhaps all sentences are clear. This point can be made more explicit by examining what kind of statements would pass the test. The claim, ‘When I am rational I will always be right’ passes the test with flying colours! It may not be true, but there is no contradiction between what I say and how I am saying it. I am always right, and I am also right that I am always right, and I can make this claim in an assertive tone of voice. Surely a test that will pass most self-assertive, macho claims and that will fail most modest claims, cannot be all that useful when dealing with complex things. Some reasons for this can be supplied. The performative contradiction is predicated on the assumption that one can adequately distinguish between the performative and the locutionary levels, and, in the terms Habermas uses to criticize Derrida, between logic and rhetoric. However, in order to make this distinction clearly, one would need to take in a position that can characterize what is being said from an external vantage point. In the language of complexity, that would mean that one has access to a framework that is not the result of a strategic choice, i.e. some objective meta-framework. This is exactly what the view from complexity is sceptical about. The argument is that our frameworks are all compromised to some extent; dealing with complexity is a little messy. As Derrida (1988: 119) says: if things were simple, word would have gotten around.14 In a way, the view from complexity acknowledges that some form of performative tension is inevitable. We are playing in what Wood (1990: 150) calls the ‘theatre of difficulty’, and this requires a certain ‘performative reflexivity’ (1990: 132). We need to demonstrate the difficulties we are in; also in the way we talk about them. Our discourse should reflect the complexities. To talk about the complex world as if it can be understood clearly is a contradiction of another kind15 and this is a contradiction with ethical implications. Those who claim to have access to the truth are denying us our critical perspective and, therefore, keep us in a kind of false consciousness by not restoring the world to its original difficulty. It is only by acknowledging that we are in trouble that we can start grappling with the complexities around us. To be subject to the performative contradiction would seem, at least from the perspective of a certain kind of logical argumentation, to be a weak position. Such a position is seen as not being sufficiently rational and thus unscientific and irresponsible. The view from complexity argues to the contrary, that the conditions imposed by the test for performative contradiction feeds off a kind of intellectual arrogance that is in itself irresponsible. We only have limited access to a complex world and when we are dealing with the limits of our understanding, we are dealing with ethics. In Derrida’s (2000: 467) words: ‘There is ethics precisely where I am in performative powerlessness.’ The modest position is not weak; it is responsible.