No Arctic War impact.

Competition and disagreements between Arctic states are likely to continue. This is “normal” within the international system. Although overly optimistic rhetoric related to “Arctic exceptionalism” may have set up false expectations that the post-Cold War Circumpolar North would be entirely cooperative, this is unrealistic. Seeing every point of friction as a portend that the Arctic regime is unravelling, or misreading every investment in defence and security as an indicator of revisionist designs for the region, tends to perpetuate a bifurcated debate between so-called “realists” and “liberal internationalists” predicated on empirically skewed foundations. Strategic rivalry between Russia and the West (including Canada) may have “spill over” effects on circumpolar security, but we maintain that there is little likelihood of conflict between Arctic states generated by Arctic resources, boundary disputes, or governance issues.84 Similarly, Russian and Canadian investments in defence and security capabilities in the Arctic, when appropriately contextualized, do not fit the criteria for an Arctic “arms race.”

Canada’s June 2017 defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” reiterates longstanding images of the Arctic as a region undergoing massive change. “The Arctic region represents an important international crossroads where issues of climate change, international trade, and global security meet,” the policy describes. Rather than promoting a narrative of inherent competition or impending conflict, however, the narrative points out that “Arctic states have long cooperated on economic, environmental, and safety issues, particularly through the Arctic Council, the premier body for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states have an enduring interest in continuing this productive collaboration.” This last sentence suggests that Russia (described elsewhere in the policy document as a state “willing to test the international security environment” that had reintroduced “a degree of major power competition”) does not inherently threaten Arctic stability given its vested interests in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of Arctic change cited in Canada’s policy emphasize the rise of security and safety challenges rather than conventional defence threats, thus confirming the line of reasoning that has become well entrenched in Canadian defence planning over the last decade.

This logic also mirrors some main tenets of Russian security and defence strategy, particularly on the salience of investments in dual-use capabilities that can address national defence and “soft security” objectives. These new roles do not preclude military power from fulfilling its traditional functions, such as protection of national territory, power projection, deterrence, and containment. In Russia’s case, military power is an expression of great power status. Geography and geopolitics make the Arctic essential to strategic deterrence. The Kremlin also asserts military power as a means to ascertain and assert sovereignty over its EEZ and continental shelf. Although the probability of an armed conflict over Arctic maritime disputes remains low, Russian strategists view military power as a tool to prevent such disputes from escalating to a dangerous phase. Furthermore, defence and security forces (including border and coast guards) are intended to protect Moscow’s economic interests in the North, fight smuggling and poaching, and prevent illegal migration. They are also deployed to prevent potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure, including oil and gas platforms, nuclear plants, and nuclear waste storage facilities.

Arctic policy statements in both Russia and Canada reflect both hard and soft considerations, with the latter featuring most prominently in external-facing messaging. For example, while Russia’s October 2020 Arctic development strategy includes provisions to boost regional military capabilities “in accordance with current and forecasted military threats,” the document does not put excessive emphasis on military-related issues. Instead, it commits to implement “multi-vector foreign policy activities aimed at preserving the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability, and mutually beneficial cooperation” through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This includes enhancing Arctic states’ efforts to create a unified regional search and rescue system, prevent and respond to humanitarian and environmental emergencies, coordinate the activities of rescue forces, and ensure interaction of the Arctic states within the framework of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Overall, Russia’s strategy emphasizes that local socio-economic conditions must improve dramatically to allow Russia to effectively exploit its natural resources and bolster human security. Thus, while Russia has invested heavily in building up its military and “dual use” infrastructure in its Arctic Zone, it concurrently demonstrates a greater attentiveness to threats and challenges that emanate from the non-military sphere. This latter set of challenges provides the foundation for its Arctic Council chairmanship priorities for 2021–2023, focused on economic, social and environmentally sustainable development in the Arctic region. It is telling that Canada articulated a similar emphasis during its last chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2013–2015—and despite international stresses over the Ukraine crisis managed to shelter the forum politically so that it could continue its important work on human and environmental security.

Rather than applying reductionist (and often outdated) definitions of militarization that simply equate a larger military presence to the probability of inter-state conflict, we encourage more deliberate parsing of defence and security doctrines to identify those that do not undermine regional stability or are conducive to regional cooperation. While strategic competition has heightened tensions between Russia and Canada in the global sphere, both maintain a strong commitment to work with their circumpolar neighbours to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace and stability. Strategic deterrence does not violate this logic. Furthermore, increasing traffic and foreign presence in the Arctic heightens regional safety and security concerns, blurring the lines between defence and security, trade, investment, development, economic, and foreign policy. Investments in Arctic defence and security that are designed to protect sovereign jurisdiction, improve domain awareness, better respond to search and rescue and emergencies, and enhance safe maritime navigation do not represent an Arctic “arms race” or threaten the regional order. Although resurgent strategic competition leaves the global geopolitical climate uncertain, there remains little likelihood of conflict generated by resource or boundary disputes, or governance issues in the Arctic. In that region, observations or drivers associated with geostrategic competition at the international systemic level should not be misapplied to objective and subjective geographical assessments of the regional Arctic security environment. Instead, regional governance remains sophisticated and resilient, rooted in international law and the acknowledged sovereignty and sovereign rights of Arctic coastal states.