“We give our language … a body blow when we hold that it is reasonable to read ‘or’ for ‘and.’"

I cannot agree that the plan's clear and simple language is reasonably susceptible of the interpretation offered by the defendants. Plain as day, the plan provides that the valuation date shall be on "the last day of each calendar quarter and, as the Administrative Committee elects, any other day of the Plan Year." Pan American World Airways, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (Pan Am ESOP), at I-4, Excerpts of Record (ER) at 3 (emphasis added). This language is not in the least ambiguous: It can only be interpreted to mean that the Administrative Committee has the authority to select valuation dates in addition to the four already provided by the plan. The Administrative Committee has nevertheless taken the position that it may do away with the quarterly valuation dates altogether, and substitute a single valuation date in their stead. I can think of only one way to derive that interpretation from the quoted provision: by substituting the disjunctive "or" for the conjunctive "and." Unlike the majority, I am unable to approve as reasonable an interpretation that requires us to perform such radical surgery on a document's plain language.

I see two obstacles [**10] barring the majority's conclusion, one linguistic, the other structural. As a linguistic matter, "and" and "or" are not synonyms; indeed, they are more nearly antonyms. One need only start the day with a breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly impressed by the difference. While "and" and "or" are both small words, and are occasionally seen joined with a slash, when they stand alone, they have substantially different meanings with dramatically different effects. We give our language, and our language-dependent legal system, a body blow when we hold that it is reasonable to read "or" for "and." While I don't foreclose the possibility of substituting the two words for each other where it is necessary to avoid a patent absurdity or correct a drafting error, see, e.g. Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1855, 2021 (1985); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 775-77, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752 (1985), I can't agree that the substitution is permissible in ordinary circumstances.