One instance spills over---the plan creates a slippery slope that destroys legitimacy.

Perhaps Congress simply does not care about, or actually approves of, the continued evolution of United States antitrust law and policy in all its complexity. However, this silence or indifference has important consequences. It shifts power from the most democratic elected institutions to the more distant, less democratic institutions of agencies and courts to craft fundamental economic policy free from all but the most macro-level interventions or corrections. No legislature can spend all of its time on competition policy. But when it does, one should ask:

Is the legislature addressing fundamental issues or minor matters at the fringe?

Is the legislature addressing matters of national importance or local concern of a small group of members?

Has the legislature proposed or explored actual improvements or is it primarily airing issues for which no action is likely to ensue?

How is the legislature ensuring that power is delegated subject to democratic controls and that the other institutional actors are acting in accordance with democratic norms?

If major changes have occurred elsewhere in the system, had Congress actually approved or merely not paid attention?

What non-mandatory hearings occur, how were they selected, and why do they matter?

Without such inquiries, power naturally migrates from the more democratic institutions to the less democratic portions of the system. If legislatures approve of the course of current competition law and policy, they should say so. If they do not approve, then their silence should not be used to justify self-interested actors shifting power in their favor, while the legislature chooses to turn its attention to other pressing issues and only nibble at the edges of competition policy.