The aff wreaks havoc on the economy. None of their turns are assumptive of actual plan implementation

A sudden, drastic change in the tax base and tax rates would wreak havoc in all areas of the economy, and especially in the state and local government sector. 141 The tax code is currently a major consideration for all actors in the economy, be they investors deciding what to invest in, or local government finance officers deciding whether to borrow or tax to fund a particular project. Given that virtually all actors in the economy base their decisions at least partly on tax considerations, many people will be hurt economically if the tax treatment of their actions changes suddenly. 142

[*442] There has been a spirited debate in academic circles concerning whether there is a need for transition rules to soften the blow to taxpayers who made plans under one tax regime only to have those plans significantly altered by subsequent tax law changes. In the view of some scholars, such transition rules are economically wasteful since they amount to insurance policies protecting vested taxpayers against the repeal of tax preferences. 143 Because these insurance policies are funded by the public, the beneficiaries of the insurance have no incentive to respond to changing political and economic realities. Others have argued that forswearing transition rules will only make the situation worse by increasing political maneuvering and increasing the cost of tax preferences to the government to compensate beneficiaries for the lack of grandfathering protection. 144 It may be that the transition rules are irrelevant as a matter of economics or finance and that the real test for transitional relief is a political one. 145 One thing is certain: if the current tax scheme is repealed, the groups that benefited from that system will demand political relief. 146

Regardless of the outcome of the debate about what to do when the tax law changes, it nevertheless remains true that, all things being equal, stability ordinarily is a goal of tax policy. Although there have been many changes to the income tax code over the years, the changes have occurred within the context of a familiar system. [*443] Wholesale reform of the entire taxation system has no modern precedent in the United States. It would be very difficult to predict the disruption that the transition would engender, but even supporters of flat tax plans admit there would be significant instability during the transition. 147 Even after the transition, however, the new flat taxes would be subject to tinkering the same way income taxes currently are. It will be hard to realize any benefits from any plan if the taxation scheme is not left in place long enough for the changes brought about by the new regime to take root. 148

The current tax code already changes with fair regularity, and we should expect a new tax code to require some fine-tuning that will result in technical changes for a few years after enactment. Given the fundamental nature of the reforms being proposed, it is unlikely that policy makers will get all the details of the new tax regime right on the first try. Even without technical adjustments, it is merely the nature of our political process that Congress will be unable to resist the temptation to tinker with the tax code regardless of the tax base. 149

Besides the importance of stable tax policy to investment planning, the tax system should act as a stabilizing influence on the economy during times of economic fluctuation. In the economy at large, the income tax structure is responsible for countering swings in the business cycle. In an upturn of the economy, caused by either real economic growth or inflation, the income tax automatically produces higher revenue yields without lag time or a governmental discretionary act, such as a reassessment of property, and conversely, it collects less in a downturn cycle. In this way, the government extracts more money during times of prosperity and less in recessionary times to lessen the possibility of the economy swinging out of control. 150 A consumption tax is less likely to be as robust an automatic stabilizer because the revenue stream produced by the tax will be much "more stable over the business cycle." 151