Alt is a prereq. Takes out solvency. Solving formalization is a prerequisite to basic income. The k comes first

A third strand of IPE involves a broadening of focus to include systems of human activities and social relations (Haagh 1999, 2019a, b; Pagano 1991, 2017). In human IPE, the notion of hybrid property is extended to encompass mechanisms that protect human development processes, thus generating property rights in stability through a combination of developmental protective institutions and policies (Haagh 2012). This permits a wider measure of freedom as a state of well-being that is informed by stability in place and activities (Haagh 2019a). It also points to wider measures of how such a state is protected. To illustrate: human IPE suggests that we should distinguish between four senses of property. Firstly, we need to distinguish between material and nonmaterial property, or owning a particular thing or resource, and enjoying a state. Secondly, we need to distinguish between legal and institutional meanings of owning. For Basic Income, the important point concerns the way in which the substance and impacts on freedom of legal titles are shaped by the development of hybrid property in human development.

Hybridity represents higher levels of formalisation of economic life, and higher levels of resource sharing, and transparency in the form that this sharing takes. Hybridity is therefore a condition for the flourishing of social and economic rights, and Basic Income is no exception. As a relevant example, Ugo Colombino (2009) have shown that tax neutral financing of Basic Income is most plausible in societies with high levels of formal female inclusion. Human IPE also ofers a frame for understanding why public support for occupational life—the development of a dimension of occupational citizenship (Haagh 1999, 2002a)—relies on a composite number of social rights. In all, human IPE enables a deeper, multi-level, analytical filter that enables us to consider and compare Basic Income claims and debate across time and space. We can assume that the form and extent of the formalisation of the human economy shape the form of feasibility—and the views prevailing concerning—potential effects and trade-offs connected with reform in the direction of Basic Income. This formalisation is central to enabling substantive social equality.

An upshot is to question the directness of the impact of Basic Income on freedom, and thus to nuance a common claim within Basic Income debate. In stylised terms, the way that this connection (Basic Income—freedom) is mediated by developmental systems is set out in Fig. 14.1. Te two triangles represent the logic of two different systems that are instantiated in the development of more hierarchical capitalism, and more egalitarian capitalism, respectively. Te frst is shaped by weaker and the second by stronger hybrid property in human development (Haagh 2012, 2015, 2019a). Te key assumption here is that the level of overall formalisation of human economy shapes impacts of individual rights and distributions, the level of control that individuals enjoy in the economy, and the way that control is accessed, for instance, through individual bargaining or democratic institutions, respectively (Haagh 2019b). Concomitantly, public finance and regulatory conditions matter, in relation to income and in relation to more substantive forms of social equality. Besides national diferentiation in models of capitalism, the frst triangle in Fig. 14.1 also represents the global shift towards neo-liberalisation and financialisation of the global economy, led by—if not confned to—Anglo-liberal and middle-income countries with already high levels of informality and/or social inequality. An assumption can be made that a Basic Income’s direct impact will be greater, but its comparable impact will be lower, in countries with high informality.